

TOWARD EUROPEAN STALEMATE

THE POST-KHRUSHCHEV "COLLECTIVE
LEADERSHIP" AND SOVIET YOUTH

RICHARD N. JOHANNES

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Toward European Stalemate

by Richard N. Johannes

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Observe your enemies, for they first
find out your faults.

Antisthenes.

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PREFACE

At the time of Stalin's death there were those who thought (or at least hoped) that the U.S.S.R. would change and become more reasonable in its foreign policy, thus reducing international tension. The period of interest to this paper then is from Stalin's death to the Twentieth Party Congress when Communist Party First Secretary Khrushchev proclaimed that war between communists and capitalists was no longer inevitable. The period of interest is broken into five parts: a background section to set the world stage before Stalin's death; the period from Stalin's death to the Berlin Foreign Ministers Conference (January, 1954); the period beginning with the Berlin Conference and ending with the defeat of the EDC treaty (August 30, 1954); the period from the EDC treaty defeat to the Federal Republic of Germany's accession to NATO (May 6, 1955); and finally the period after the Germans' NATO accession to the Twentieth Party Congress.

This paper proposes to examine the above period in an effort to better understand its events and the changes that evolved in the Soviet approach to the European and world situation.

The English translation of all Soviet materials used was obtained from The Current Digest of the Soviet Press. Where that was unavailable, the Department of State Bulletin, the New York Times or Keesing's Contemporary Archives were used.

World Communism is the ultimate goal of the Soviet leaders, in the sense of their aspiration. This aim is based on expectations derived from the Marxist-Leninist view of history; it also nourishes a striving for power. Nonetheless, while seeking to expand their influence and power into the non-Communist world, the Soviet leaders give primary attention to maintaining the security of the Soviet state.

Raymond Garthoff
Soviet Military Policy

I. BACKGROUND

At the end of World War II with Germany defeated, the Soviet Union had never been so strong--the European (capitalist) economy was in shambles and yet, as Henry Kissinger writes in Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy:

At the precise moment when Soviet armies stood in the center of a war-wrecked Europe and Lenin's prophecies of the doom of capitalism seemed on the verge of being fulfilled, a new weapon appeared far transcending in power anything previously known. Was the dialectic of history so fragile that it could be upset by a new technological discovery? Was this to be the result of twenty years of brutal repression and deprivation and of four years of cataclysmic war that at its end the capitalist enemy should emerge with a weapon which could imperil the Soviet state as never before?¹

To offset this nuclear weakness, the U.S.S.R. had the Red Army which could sweep over Europe quite rapidly, thus Europe represented Stalin's "hostage" against precipitous action by the United States.² Though Stalin could do nothing immediately about the U.S.'s exclusive possession of the Atomic bomb, he felt he could "undermine the will to use it by a world-wide campaign against the horrors of nuclear warfare."³ That was precisely what he

¹Henry A. Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1957), p. 362.

²Raymond L. Garthoff, Soviet Military Policy (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1966), p. 107.

³Kissinger, p. 363.

endeavored to do (i.e., ban-the-bomb sloganeering, the Stockholm Peace Appeal, and the World Peace Council).⁴

Soviet ideology demands continual calculation of the balance of power (relation of forces--sootnoshenie sil) in order to determine whether to advance or retreat and this must be done continuously since "any equilibrium or relation is of indefinite, but temporary duration."⁵

With these ideas in mind one can understand why it was necessary for Stalin to consolidate Eastern Europe (thus moving any future war front as far East as possible) and yet not threaten the U.S. to the extent that it might launch a nuclear strike.

Certainly the promulgation of the Truman doctrine and Marshall plan greatly disturbed Stalin, as these actions would serve to strengthen the West. The potential of the Brussels Pact plus an awareness that the U.S. was growing more reluctant than ever to consider the use of nuclear weapons may have stimulated Stalin to attempt to get complete control of Berlin (the Berlin Blockade) before the West became stronger.⁶ Stalin was partially right in that the U.S. did not use nuclear, or even conventional, weapons. Though the U.S.S.R. was not attacked, the blockade did not drive the West out; it had the opposite effect. Just as the Western concern over Czechoslovakia (1948) had led to the Brussels Pact; the Berlin blockade served as a catalyst for the creation of NATO. The formation of NATO meant a favorable shift of the "relation of

⁴ Marshal D. Shulman, Stalin's Foreign Policy Reappraised (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963), p. 22, 131-134.

⁵ Garthoff, p. 79, 94.

⁶ Jan Librach, The Rise of the Soviet Empire (Revised edition; New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1965), p. 178-179.

forces" for the West in Europe just as the U.S.S.R. was obtaining the Atomic bomb.⁷

In the Far East where the West was not so strong (after all it let the Chinese Communists take over China) and the U.S. had indicated it would not defend Korea, the U.S.S.R. through the vehicle of the North Korean Army invaded South Korea only to discover the U.S.A. was as interested in "containment" in the Far East as it was in Europe.⁸ Once again this had the effect in Europe of pulling the NATO alliance even closer together; so close that the rearmament of Western Germany came to be a feasible concern of NATO planning despite the natural French hostility to such an idea. This presented a new concern to the Soviets. If West Germany were rearmed and coupled with NATO forces (through the EDC or any other plan the West might devise), then the West might not only be able to thwart any Red Army invasion of Europe, but it might also produce a striking force with which the West could invade Eastern Europe.⁹

By mid-February, 1952, French and West German parliamentary approval had been secured¹⁰ and in Lisbon (February 20-February 25) the North Atlantic Council (NATO) set out ambitious guidelines for a NATO military force:

50 divisions, 4000 aircraft, and strong naval forces by the end of 1952¹¹

⁷Adam B. Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968), p. 496-497.

⁸Ibid., p. 518-519.

⁹Herbert S. Dinerstein, War and the Soviet Union (Revised edition; New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1962), p. 92-93, 125-126.

¹⁰F. Roy Willis, France, Germany, and the New Europe 1945-1963 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1965), p. 138, 152, 155. W. Germany - February 8, 1952; France - February 19, 1952.

¹¹NATO: Facts about the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, NATO Information Service, Paris? 1949?, p. 26.

Twelve of these divisions were to be German within a European army in the European Defense Community (EDC).¹²

Hoping that the "capitalists' contradictions" would outweigh their unity, the U.S.S.R. in a note on March 10, 1952 presented the Big Three¹³ a proposal urging immediate discussion of the question of a peace treaty with Germany "with a view to preparing in the nearest future an agreed draft peace treaty."¹⁴ This peace treaty was to have "direct participation of Germany in the form of an all-German Government."¹⁵ Enclosed with this note was a Soviet draft for a peace treaty. The draft included a theme which was to become quite familiar in the years to come:

Conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany has an important significance for the strengthening of peace in Europe. A peace treaty with Germany will permit final decision of questions which have arisen as a consequence of the second world war. The European states which have suffered from German aggression, particularly the neighbors of Germany, have a vital interest in the solution of these questions. Conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany will aid improvement of the international situation as a whole and at the same time aid the establishment of a lasting peace.

The necessity of hastening the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany is required by the fact that the danger of re-establishment of German militarism which has twice unleashed world wars has not been eliminated in as much as appropriate provisions of the Potsdam conference still remain unfilled. A peace treaty with Germany must guarantee elimination of the possibility of a rebirth of German militarism and German aggression.¹⁶

¹² Willis, p. 135.

¹³ The Big Three are France, U.K., and U.S.A.; the Big Four are France, U.K., U.S.A., and U.S.S.R. All notes concerning the Big Three were sent to each one individually and replied to individually, but since the language is the same in all cases, this paper will refer to notes as "to" or "from the Big Three."

¹⁴ Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1952 (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1953), p. 248. (Hereinafter referred to as Documents, 1952.)

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 249.

All armed forces of occupying powers were to be withdrawn within one year of the peace treaty's entry into force and Germany was to be rearmed, but neutral. Also, "The territory of Germany is defined by the borders established by the provisions of the Potsdam Conference of the Great Powers."¹⁷ Due to the ambiguities of the provisions for a German government and proposals such as the territory settlement, the Big Three were not interested in the Soviet proposal. The Big Three felt the Potsdam Conference left the territory boundaries to be decided in the final peace treaty negotiations, but the Soviets had considered that a closed issue once the Potsdam Conference allowed them to occupy the Eastern German lands. After some consideration the Big Three replied in their note of March 25, 1952. The Big Three called for free elections to set up an all-German government and proposed that such a government should have the freedom "both before and after the conclusion of a peace treaty to enter into associations compatible with the principles and purposes of the United Nations (i.e., NATO, EDC)."¹⁸

The Soviets quickly replied to the Big Three on April 9, 1952 with another call for a Four Power conference to discuss a German peace treaty and formation of an all-German Government.

It is just now that the question is being decided whether Germany will be reestablished as a united, independent, peace-loving state entering into the family of peace-loving peoples of Europe or whether the division of Germany, and connected with it the threat of war in Europe, will remain.¹⁹

Apparently the Soviets were getting more and more concerned as the time of signing the European Defense Community Treaty approached.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 251.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 252.

¹⁹Ibid., p. 253-254.

The Big Three replied on May 13, 1952 in a note that declared that more concrete proposals were necessary before the Big Three could proceed with any negotiations. Further they made a detailed proposal for starting the process in motion to conduct free elections in all of Germany.²⁰ The Soviets initiated another note to the Big Three on May 24, 1952 calling for immediate talks on a German peace treaty.²¹

On May 27 the European Defense Community treaty was signed by France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. Also a protocol to the NATO treaty was signed to include EDC members under NATO protection.²²

On July 10, 1952 the Big Three replied to the May 24 Soviet note by calling for a Four Power meeting to set up a Commission to investigate to determine whether the conditions necessary for free elections exist, and to reach agreement on formation of an all German-government.²³

On August 23, 1952 the Soviets countered with a call for a meeting in October and proposed that "the German Democratic Republic and the German Federal Republic take part in a meeting to examine appropriate questions."²⁴ The Big Three responded one month later with a call for a Four Power meeting with free elections as the primary issue.²⁵

Preparation for the XIX Party Congress (first since before World War II and first in thirteen years) and a growing sense that neither the British nor

²⁰ Ibid., p. 254-256.

²¹ Ibid., p. 256-258.

²² Ibid., p. 239-246.

²³ Ibid., p. 258-259.

²⁴ Ibid., p. 259-260.

²⁵ Ibid., p. 260-261.

the French cabinet appeared confident enough of its strength to secure ratification of the EDC treaty caused the Soviets to discontinue diplomatic efforts for the rest of the year.²⁶

Throughout 1952, in addition to the German situation, the Big Three had also attempted to achieve some resolution of the unsettled Austrian peace treaty. The U.S.S.R. linked the Austrian question with the Trieste situation and avoided any meetings on the Austrian settlement.

The XIX Party Congress was held from October 5 - October 15, 1952. The three major documents of the Congress were: Stalin's "Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R.," Malenkov's Central Committee report, and Stalin's Concluding Remarks.²⁷ Stalin's "Economic Problems ..." and Malenkov's speech both stressed the contradictions between capitalists being at least as great as those between capitalism and Communism; and the conclusion that the next war would be between capitalist states.²⁸ Stalin's Concluding Remarks gave emphasis to the peaceful nature of the U.S.S.R.

With the U.S. detonation of a hydrogen bomb (technically, thermonuclear device) on November 1, 1952,²⁹ the U.S.S.R. was more concerned than ever about the relation of forces (i.e., deterrence, likelihood of a new war). More and more the Soviet foreign policy seemed interested in world peace and "what to do until the deterrent comes."³⁰ Soviet international efforts waned in early

²⁶Shulman, p. 193.

²⁷Leo Guliow (ed.), Current Soviet Policies, Vol. I, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1953), p. 1-20, 99-124, 235-236, respectively. (Hereinafter referred to as Current Soviet Policies, I.)

²⁸Ibid., p. 7-8 and p. 101-106, respectively.

²⁹Richard P. Stebbins, et al, The United States in World Affairs, 1952 (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1953), p. 414.

³⁰Shulman, p. 253.

1953 probably because of Stalin's involvement with the "Doctor's Plot" and other aspects of a new purge he was planning.³¹

Against this background in March, 1953, Stalin died; thus both the U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. had new leadership and new approaches to their foreign relations.³² This paper will now trace the foreign relations of these two countries up to the Twentieth Party Congress as they vied for control of the future of Europe, especially their struggle over Germany. The reader will observe that disarmament, though often linked with this period, is mentioned only in passing. This was a deliberate omission as disarmament only clouds the issues involved, and as Jan Librach observed in 1965: "Disarmament negotiations, within the framework of the United Nations, or in various ad hoc bodies, were resumed in 1946. For the next seventeen years, their practical result was virtually nil."³³

³¹See Abdurakhman Avtorkhanov, Stalin and the Soviet Communist Party (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1959), p. 249-258.

³²Leo Grulio in the Introduction, p. iv, of Current Soviet Policies, I. observed that the death of Stalin did not signal a change in foreign policy. The conciliatory gestures of the new regime were a continuation of the policy Stalin had laid down several years previously, only the tactics were different. This observation was made April 22, 1953.

³³Librach, p. 243. Alvin Z. Rubinstein (ed.), The Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union (2nd Ed; New York: Random House, 1966), p. 310-311, draws the same conclusion.

II. OUT OF STALIN'S BLIND ALLEY

Joseph Stalin died on March 6, 1953, and the new "collective leadership" immediately came under careful observation by a world hoping for a relaxation of international tensions.¹ These hopes were soon realized, though indirectly, as the Chinese Communists on March 28, 1953 indicated their acceptance of the U.S. proposal (February 22) on exchange of sick and wounded prisoners of war and further indicated willingness to resume armistice negotiations.² (This action led to renewed negotiations and finally the signing of the Korean armistice agreement on July 27, 1953.³) With this as a beginning, Western hopes for further Soviet foreign policy changes seemed to be well-founded.

With these hopes in mind, President Eisenhower on April 16 made a major foreign policy speech before the American Society of Newspaper Editors.⁴ The President reviewed U.S. foreign policy precepts emphasizing the principles of just peace and self-determination then went on to suggest that the opportunity for future agreements depended on the Soviet Union.

The world knows that an era ended with the death of Joseph Stalin....

Its (Soviet Union's) future is, in great part, its own to make....

With all who will work in good faith toward such a peace (neither partial nor punitive), we are ready, with renewed resolve, to strive to redeem the near-lost hopes of our day.⁵

¹Current Soviet Policies, I, p. 246-247.

²Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XXVIII, April 6, 1953, p. 494-495. (Hereinafter referred to as State Bulletin.)

³Ibid., Vol. XXIX, August 3, 1953, p. 132-140.

⁴Ibid., Vol. XXVIII, April 27, 1953, p. 599-603.

⁵Ibid., p. 600-601.

Two days later Secretary of State Dulles, in a speech to the American Society of Newspaper Editors stressed the need for renewing interest in the European Defense Community treaty ratification efforts and the unity of Western Europe (NATO), and the prospects for peace that President Eisenhower's speech offered.⁶ Following this same theme, Prime Minister Churchill stated on May 11, 1953 in a House of Commons speech concerning recent foreign affairs:

The supreme event...is...the change of attitude and, as we all hope, of mood which has taken place in the Soviet domains and particularly in the Kremlin since the death of Stalin.⁷

After recalling the 1925 Locarno Treaty and suggesting a modern parallel, he went on to suggest "that a conference on the highest level should take place between the leading Powers without delay."⁸

The hopes of the West were subdued by the U.S.S.R. statement that it was not interested in attending an Austrian Treaty meeting on May 27.⁹ The impetus for this attempt to restart Austrian talks had come from the United Nations resolution of December 20, 1952 urging renewed efforts on Austria.¹⁰ The Big Three responded on June 11 in a note that refused to accept the Soviet position and asked the Soviet Government to state "the exact text" that it was prepared to sign.¹¹ Another setback to efforts for settlement of European problems occurred when the Soviet satellites experienced internal riots in June--first on June 1 - 4 in Pilsen, Czechoslovakia, then on June 16 - 17 in East Berlin.¹²

⁶Ibid., p. 603-608.

⁷Documents, 1953, p. 244.

⁸Ibid., p. 246.

⁹State Bulletin, Vol. XXVIII, June 8, 1953, p. 814-815.

¹⁰Documents, 1952, p. 382.

¹¹State Bulletin, Vol. XXVIII, June 22, 1953, p. 873-874.

¹²Robert Bass, Eastern Europe: A New Orbit? (Headline Series No. 168; New York: Foreign Policy Association, December, 1964), p. 17.

The intervention of Soviet troops was required to quell the East Berlin riots and this led to charges and countercharges between the U.S.S.R. and Big Three Commandants in Berlin.¹³

Despite the above problems, the Big Three Foreign Ministers meeting of July 10 - 14 decided to continue attempts to reopen negotiations with the Soviet Union on both the German and the Austrian questions.¹⁴ On July 15 the Big Three delivered a note to the U.S.S.R. proposing a Big Four Foreign Ministers' meeting in late September on the subjects of: free elections in Germany, a free all-German Government, and agreement on the Austrian Treaty.¹⁵ On July 30 the U.S.S.R. answered the Big Three note of June 11 by ignoring the request and asking whether the Big Three were ready to set aside their "abbreviated treaty" proposal.¹⁶ The U.S.S.R. also replied on August 4 to the Big Three note of July 15 by expanding the concept of the proposed Foreign Ministers' conference to include consideration "of measures which promote a general lessening of tension in international relations, including...(the) impermissibility of foreign military bases on territory of other states." (Underlining mine.) Additionally the note stated:

...It also follows that the participation of the Chinese Peoples' Republic is necessary in a discussion of questions concerning measures for lessening tension in international relations.¹⁷

With reference to the Austrian treaty the U.S.S.R. pointed out:

¹³State Bulletin, Vol. XXVIII, June 29, 1953, p. 897-898, and Vol. XXIX, July 6, 1953, p. 8-9.

¹⁴State Bulletin, Vol. XXIX, July 23, 1953, p. 104-106.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 107.

¹⁶Ibid., August 31, 1953, p. 282-283.

¹⁷Ibid., September 14, 1953, p. 352.

It goes without saying that possible successes in settlement of the German problem could also contribute to a decision of the Austrian treaty as well.¹⁸

On August 8, 1953 Premier Malenkov gave a major speech to the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. which called for some changes in foreign policy and a major departure from previous domestic policy:

Hitherto we have not had the opportunity to develop light and food industry at the same rate as heavy industry. Now we can and consequently we must accelerate the development of light industry in every way in the interests of securing a faster rise in the living standard and cultural levels of the people.¹⁹ (Underlining mine.)

Then in a move apparently designed to indicate that the U.S.S.R. had the deterrent answer to the U.S. hydrogen bomb threat and thus quiet the anxiety of any who might have felt the new domestic policy would weaken Soviet defenses, Malenkov announced:

The government considers it necessary to report to the Supreme Soviet that the United States has no monopoly of production of the hydrogen bomb.

It is necessary to realize that in the present configuration of forces and in the face of the firm resolve of the Soviet Union and the countries of the democratic camp to defend their vital interests in the international arena, application of the policy of peaceful coexistence of the two systems is the duty not only of the democratic camp but of all countries.²⁰

This announcement prior to initial testing was another departure by the new "leadership" from Stalinist policies;²¹ in fact Stalin did not even announce the initial Soviet atomic bomb tests, the United States did.²² Official

¹⁸Ibid., p. 353.

¹⁹The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, September 5, 1953, p. 4. (Hereinafter referred to as Current Digest.)

²⁰Ibid., p. 11, p. 26.

²¹The term, leadership, will be used to generally refer to the Presidium of the Party and other influential people who were involved in the succession struggle, but are not clearly identified in any sources that this writer has reviewed.

²²Henry A. Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1957), p. 369.

Soviet announcement of their testing of a hydrogen bomb came within two weeks.²³

In speaking of other foreign policy matters, Malenkov viewed the Korean truce as a Soviet victory. The riots in East Berlin "could have led to extremely serious international consequences," but "the liquidation of the Berlin venture" also signified "an important victory for the cause of peace."²⁴ Normalization of relations with Yugoslavia and Greece was put forth as a goal, while renewed diplomatic relations with Israel was described as another Soviet success in easing general international tension. The United States' attitude and policies were blamed for the cold war, while the Soviet Union's "general line in the sphere of foreign policy" was "the cause of strengthening peace and safeguarding the security of the peoples."²⁵

On August 15 the U.S.S.R. initiated a new note to the Big Three and proposed a peace conference on Germany be held within six months with representatives of the existing East and West German governments to act on behalf of Germany until a provisional all-German government could be formed.²⁶ Further, the East and West German parliaments could act as a Provisional government with only limited functions until "creation of an all-German Government on the basis of really free all-German elections."²⁷ Explanation of the phrase, really free all-German elections, then was provided:

A chief task of the provisional all-German Government furthermore must be the preparation and carrying out of all-German free

²³Current Digest, September 5, 1953, p. 3.

²⁴Ibid., p. 9.

²⁵Ibid., p. 12.

²⁶State Bulletin, Vol. XXIX, September 14, 1953, p. 354-356.

²⁷Ibid., p. 356.

elections as a result of which the German people itself without interference of foreign powers will decide the question of social and state structure in a democratic Germany.²⁸

In other words, no impartial international supervision was to be permitted. "Free elections" were never to be held unless clearly the conditions favored the Communists. This new German state was to be rearmed, but be neutral. The Soviets then launched a propaganda effort to immediately affect the upcoming West German elections (September 6) by suggesting the financial burden of both of the German governments be eased by ending reparations payments on January 1, 1954 and by reducing the charges to each German government for occupation troops to not more than five per cent of the East and West German state budgets and in any event not more than the occupation expenditures of 1949 "when the extent of the occupational expenditures had not yet been affected by the formation of the North Atlantic Bloc."²⁹ The significance of this becomes clear when one realizes the Federal German Republic paid 35% of its budget for occupation troops³⁰ and the Big Three were already straining to pay for their military forces, therefore unlikely to reduce the German payments.

On August 17 the Big Three invited the U.S.S.R. to an Austrian Treaty meeting on August 31.³¹ The Big Three agreed to drop their proposed "abbreviated treaty" in order to maximize the opportunity for agreement on a treaty draft. The U.S.S.R. did not accept the invitation to attend the August 31 meeting.

²⁸Ibid.

²⁹Ibid.

³⁰New Times, 1953, No. 36, September 2, 1953, p. 12.

³¹State Bulletin, Vol. XXIX, August 31, 1953, p. 282.

Following up on its own proposal for reducing German expenses, the U.S.S.R. met in Moscow with representatives of the German Democratic Republic August 20 - 22 and then issued a communique and protocol concerning agreements on economic and diplomatic relations.³² The effect of the negotiations was to eliminate several German debts, reduce other German payments, provide a generous loan, and expand the current trade agreement.³³ Agreement to exchange of ambassadors, thus upgrading the respective diplomatic missions to embassies, constituted the diplomatic aspect of the negotiations. Apparently the June riots and continuing financial problems of the East Germans made this absolutely necessary and the forthcoming German elections offered a possible political advantage to such action at this time. Worthy of note is the fact that the Soviets retained control of the East German uranium mines.³⁴

On September 2 the Big Three reply to the Soviet August notes refused to accept the Soviet justification for the Chinese Peoples' Republic attending a future conference, denied that an Austrian solution needed to be linked with a German solution, and stated that "progress is more likely to be made by (face to face) discussion...than by a further exchange of notes."³⁵ The Soviet Government was then invited to a Big Four Foreign Ministers conference at Lugano, Switzerland on October 15. The suggestion of discussion, vice notes,

³²Current Digest, October 3, 1953, p. 6-7.

³³The U.S.S.R. cancelled reparations of \$2,537,000,000. in 1938 world prices, gave the GDR properties worth 2,700,000,000 marks, cancelled a 430,000,000 mark debt on 66 industrial enterprises, limited occupation costs to a maximum of 5% of the GDR budget (West Germany's costs were about 35%), and made a 590 million ruble trade agreement and a 485 million ruble loan. Current Digest, October 3, 1953, p. 6-7, contains the full text of the agreement.

³⁴U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations, Subcommittee on National Security and International Operations, The Warsaw Pact: Its Role In Soviet Bloc Affairs, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., 1966, p. 13.

³⁵State Bulletin, Vol. XXIX, September 14, 1953, p. 351-352.

went unheeded and more notes were exchanged with no new proposals being made by either side.³⁶ The principal points of contention were the matters of the Chinese People's Republic participation and the scope of the conference; the Big Three wanted a Big Four conference on European problems, while the U.S.S.R. wanted European problems to be merely one aspect of a Five Power conference. The Soviet Union finally gave in on November 26 to the Western intransigence and proposed a Big Four Foreign Ministers meeting in Berlin.³⁷ (The U.S. State Department's view was that the foreign policy debate in the French parliament was the event that resulted in the Soviet acceptance of the West's position, in hopes that EDC ratification would be held up.³⁸ If so, it worked.) In the same note, the U.S.S.R. declared that it would bring up the matter of a five power conference at the Big Four meeting. After three more notes on convening date, the Foreign Ministers Conference was set for Berlin on January 25, 1954.³⁹

The Big Three leaders met in Bermuda from the 4th to the 7th of December, 1953 and renewed their support of EDC and NATO.⁴⁰ President Eisenhower addressed the United Nations the next day and discussed nuclear power for

³⁶For the texts of the notes, see State Bulletins, Vol. XXIX, as follows:
 Soviet note of September 28 p. 548-550.
 Big Three note of October 18 p. 547-548.
 Soviet Note of November 3 p. 745-748.
 Big Three note of November 16 p. 745.

³⁷State Bulletin, Vol. XXIX, December 21, 1953, p. 853-854.

³⁸Ibid., December 7, 1953, p. 786.

³⁹The Big Three note of December 8 proposed January 4. (See State Bulletin, Vol. XXIX, December 21, 1953, p. 853.) The Soviet note of December 26 proposed January 25. (See State Bulletin, Vol. XXX, January 11, 1954, p. 44.) The Big Three accepted, on January 1, 1954, January 25 as convening date. (See Ibid., p. 43.)

⁴⁰State Bulletin, Vol. XXIX, December 21, 1953, p. 851-852.

peace and for war. He spoke of "the probability of civilization destroyed-- the annihilation of the irreplaceable heritage of mankind..." "Surely no sane member of the human race could discover victory in such desolation."⁴¹ He then proposed an International Atomic Energy Agency be set up under the aegis of the United Nations to promote peaceful uses of nuclear power.

In seeming contradiction to President Eisenhower's "atoms for peace" speech of December 8, 1953, Secretary of State Dulles made a tough speech to the Council on Foreign Relations on January 12, 1954. This became known as the "massive retaliation" speech because of the following statements:

We want for ourselves and the other free nations, a maximum deterrent at a bearable cost....

Local defense will always be important. But there is no local defense which alone will contain the mighty landpower of the Communist world. Local defenses must be reinforced by the further deterrent of massive retaliatory power. Otherwise, for example, a potential aggressor, who is glutted with manpower, might be tempted to attack in confidence that resistance would be confined to manpower. He might be tempted to attack in places where his superiority was decisive....

The way to deter aggression is for the free community to be willing and able to respond vigorously at places and with means of its own choosing....

The basic decision (that has changed military planning in the U.S.) was to depend primarily upon a great capacity to retaliate, instantly, by means and at places of our choosing....

As a result it is now possible to get, and share, more basic security at less cost.⁴² (Underlining mine.)

Ratification of the EDC received a specific comment:

Until the goals of EDC are achieved, NATO, and indeed future peace, are in jeopardy.⁴³

With this busy ten months since the death of Stalin as a prelude, the Big Four Foreign Ministers' meeting convened on January 25, 1954. Before considering the events of the next period a summary of this period is in order. Stalin

⁴¹Ibid., p. 848-849.

⁴²State Bulletin, Vol. XXX, January 25, 1954, p. 108.

⁴³Ibid., p. 109.

died in March and a succession struggle in the U.S.S.R. then developed in which Malenkov appeared to have the upper hand as evidenced by his speech on August 8. The Korean War armistice had finally been signed and Soviet satellites had demonstrated to some degree their internal unrest, and the U.S.S.R. had come to the financial assistance (rescue?) of the German Democratic Republic. Soviet efforts for increased recognition of the importance and legitimacy of the Chinese Peoples' Republic and the German Democratic Republic had been to no avail. Surprise, but not alarm, had resulted in the West from the Soviet announcement of their hydrogen bomb (thermonuclear) capability.⁴⁴ Prime Minister Churchill's call for a top level conference had not been answered, but for the first time since 1949 the Big Four Foreign Ministers were to sit down and discuss the problems of Germany and Austria. Hope for some kind of easing of European tensions existed for the first time since the end of World War II.

⁴⁴For an impression of the alarm and concern over the Soviet's first atom bomb test (1949), read Hans J. Morgenthau, In Defense Of the National Interest (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951).

III. ALL EYES ON FRANCE

The second period opens with the Berlin Conference of Foreign Ministers and continues through the defeat of the EDC treaty in the French Parliament. The Berlin Conference lasted from January 25 to February 18, 1954. It was the first Big Four Foreign Ministers' meeting in five years; the last one was the Council of Foreign Ministers meeting of May 23 - June 10, 1949 in Paris.¹

Three items were agreed upon as the agenda for the Berlin Conference: a Five Power conference on the easing of international tension, the German question, and the Austrian question. After some haggling, agreement was reached on the first item. The result was the calling of a conference at Geneva, participants to be the Five Powers plus others who were interested. With respect to Germany, British Foreign Secretary Eden presented the Western plan and the Russians countered with a proposal by Foreign Minister Molotov.² The principal points of disagreement continued to be the "free all-German elections" (i.e., whose definition of "free" would be used) and whether Germany was to be neutral in the future.

With negotiations stalemated, on February 10 the U.S.S.R. presented a new proposal on Germany and a draft of a general European collective security treaty.³ The new proposal on Germany called for withdrawal of all occupying forces within six months (except for limited protective contingents) and convening of a collective security conference of appropriate European states to

¹State Bulletin, Vol. XXX, February 8, 1954, p. 179.

²Eden Plan: State Bulletin, Vol. XXX, February 8, 1954, p. 186-187.
Initial Molotov Plan: Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1954
(New York: Harper and Brothers, 1955), p. 204-207.
Supplementary Molotov Proposal: State Bulletin, Vol. XXX, February 15, 1954, p. 228.

³State Bulletin, Vol. XXX, February 22, 1954, p. 269-270.

conclude a treaty to assure peace in Europe. The inference of the proposal was that eventually a German peace treaty would be concluded, but peace would be assured no matter what the final German status was. The European collective security treaty draft would have replaced the EDC treaty and even perhaps the North Atlantic treaty. Soviet efforts for recognition of the German Democratic Republic were continued by including them as a party to the treaty. Recognition of the Chinese People's Republic was supported in the same treaty by paragraph 9:

9. Recognizing the special responsibility of the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council for the maintenance of peace and security, the parties shall invite the Governments of the U.S.A. and the Chinese People's Republic to send their representatives to the bodies set up under the treaty, as observers.⁴ (Underlining mine.)

As might have been expected the Big Three rejected the proposal.⁵ These proposals of February 10 were to become a recurring Soviet position in the months and years to come--reunification of Germany was linked to a general European collective security treaty in which the U.S.S.R. was the principal power and the U.S. was excluded in varying degrees in various proposals. As one writer put it:

Seeing no prospect of German unification on its own terms, and being unwilling to accept unification on Western terms, Moscow may already have been preparing to subordinate the solution of the German problem to the larger objective of eliminating U.S. influence from Western Europe and thus demolishing the entire Western Security system.⁶

⁴Ibid., p. 270.

⁵Ibid., p. 268-269.

⁶Richard P. Stebbins et al, The United States in World Affairs, 1954 (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1956), p. 124. (Hereinafter referred to as The U.S. in World Affairs - 1954.)

On February 12 the U.S.S.R. proposed that Deputy Foreign Ministers work on an Austrian treaty, similar to previous ones, but which would now make Austria a neutral and require Austria "not to permit the establishment on its territory of foreign military bases and not to permit the use of foreign military instructors and specialists in Austria."⁷ This new Austrian treaty draft was, as previously, linked to settlement of the Trieste problem and occupation troop withdrawals from Austria were linked to "the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany."⁸ Soviet obstinacy on the question of troop withdrawals in Austria made it impossible to conclude the Austrian Treaty despite a variety of Western concessions.⁹

After meeting for three weeks the Conference ended with no progress on Germany or Austria and with only one tangible agreement by all sides--to call a conference at Geneva on April 26 on the subjects of Korea and Indochina. The U.S., U.K., France, U.S.S.R., Chinese People's Republic, Republic of Korea, People's Democratic Republic of Korea and other participants in the hostilities in Korea were invited to meet on the Korean question. The Big Four, Chinese People's Republic, and other interested states were to be invited to the Indochina discussions. The ticklish problem concerning diplomatic recognition of those invited was handled by the following statement:

It is understood that neither the invitation to, nor the holding of, the above-mentioned conference shall be deemed to imply diplomatic recognition in any case where it has not already been accorded.¹⁰

⁷State Bulletin, Vol. XXX, March 1, 1954, p. 318-319.

⁸Ibid.

⁹The U.S. in World Affairs - 1954, p. 125-126.

¹⁰Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1954, p. 219. (Hereinafter referred to as Documents, 1954.)

The results of the Berlin Conference, rather than stimulating ratification of the EDC treaty, served to justify postponement of consideration of the EDC ratification until after the Geneva Conference had been completed.¹¹

On February 24 Secretary of State Dulles reporting on the Berlin Conference results stated:

(Molotov) ...told Germany that the price of unification was total Sovietization....

Gone was the post-Stalin 'new look.'...

The Soviet position admitted of no real negotiation.¹²

Mr. Dulles' comment on the demise of the post-Stalin "new look" was, however, undermined in the coming months by several Soviet actions as will be seen.

The attention and alarmed concern of the world now focused on U.S. nuclear testing when U.S. Representative W. Sterling Cole revealed in February, 1954 that the November 1, 1952 Eniwetok Atoll thermonuclear test had torn a mile wide crater in the ocean floor and completely devastated a six mile diameter area.¹³ Then on March 1, a new U.S. test exceeded expectations and resulted in 300 persons being unexpectedly exposed to nuclear radiation.¹⁴ This was followed by criticism of the "massive retaliation" policy both at home and abroad.

Various Soviet leaders joined in the above criticism in their Supreme Soviet pre-election speeches in mid-March by speaking of preventing a new war in Europe.¹⁵ Premier Malenkov on March 12 in his "campaign" speech opposed

¹¹The U.S. in World Affairs - 1954, p. 128.

¹²State Bulletin, Vol. XXX, March 8, 1954, p. 344.

¹³The U.S. in World Affairs - 1954, p. 51-52.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 52.

¹⁵See Current Digest, April 21, 1954, p. 8-9, 11 (Suslov); Ibid., p. 11 (Voroshilov); Ibid., p. 15, 39 (Molotov); Current Digest, April 28, 1954, p. 9-10 (Pervukhin).

"the policy of cold war, for this is a policy of preparation for fresh world carnage, which, with modern methods of warfare, means the ruin of world civilization."¹⁶ (Underlining mine.) He also worked in the subject of the post-Stalin "new look," flavored with Stalin's "capitalist contradiction" theory, by stressing that the Soviet Union desired peaceful competition between East and West. There was and would continue to be contradiction and strife between the capitalists; i.e., within the EDC, "German militarism will seize in the West what it was unable to obtain by war."¹⁷

The Soviets pursued the war theme further in a Pravda editorial on March 17 by discussing the increasing U.S. interest in Indochina, and by citing statements of numerous U.S. leaders (Eisenhower, Dulles, Senator Stennis--to name a few) as evidence of the U.S. desire to expand the Indochina war. The editorial even speculated that the U.S. at the forthcoming Geneva Conference would avoid the conclusion of any peace agreement.¹⁸ With U.S. aircraft carriers in the South China Sea and high level Western diplomatic activity as omens,¹⁹ the U.S.S.R. may have feared the Geneva talks would be aborted before they had begun.²⁰ Had this happened the Communists would have lost the

¹⁶Current Digest, April 28, 1954, p. 8.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 6-8.

¹⁸Ibid., p. 20-21.

¹⁹For concise discussions of the degree to which U.S. intervention was almost a reality, see Chalmers M. Roberts "The Day We Didn't Go To War" pp. 57-66 in Marcus G. Raskin and Bernard B. Fall (ed.) The Viet-Nam Reader (New York: Random House, Inc., 1965) and Joseph Buttinger, Vietnam: A Dragon Embattled, Vol. II. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1967), p. 818-824.

²⁰Herbert S. Dinerstein, War and the Soviet Union (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1959), p. 110, suggests a Soviet analyst's view: "Since the Americans had intervened in Korea after they had indicated that they probably would not, how could one be sure that they would not intervene in Indochina when they had already threatened to do so?"

military advantage they held over the French at that time, plus the Chinese People's Republic would have been denied the chance to attend an international conference--a loss of prestige for the Communists in their continuing effort to achieve recognition of the Chinese People's Republic as the rightful representative of China.

In support of the diplomatic recognition issue as it concerned the German Democratic Republic (and perhaps to focus attention in Europe once again), the U.S.S.R. on March 26 purported to grant sovereignty to the German Democratic Republic. However, "temporary stationing of Soviet troops on territory of the German Democratic Republic" was stipulated.²¹ On April 8 the Big Three High Commissioners for Germany stated they recognized that "the Soviet Government still retains effective control there (East Germany)" and that the "Allied High Commission will continue to regard the Soviet Union as the responsible power for the Soviet Zone of Germany."²²

On March 31 the U.S.S.R. initiated a note to the Big Three reopening the subject of European collective security and opposing the EDC with statements like:

...the peace-minded nations of Europe, especially West Germany's neighbors, cannot but feel a legitimate anxiety for their security, in view of the danger stemming from a reviving German militarism and the incorporation of West Germany in a European Defense Community.

Reviving German militarism and forming military groups in Europe, far from promoting peace, means paving the way for another war.²³ (Underlining mine.)

The U.S.S.R. then made a concession by "seeing no obstacles in the way of a favorable adjustment of the problem of United States participation in a

²¹New Times, 1954, No. 13, March 27, 1954, p. 1.

²²State Bulletin, Vol. XXX, April 19, 1954, p. 588.

²³Ibid., May 17, 1954, p. 758.

general European treaty for collective security in Europe." Then the most surprising proposal of the Cold War was advanced as the Soviet Government

...guided by the unchanged principles of its foreign policy of peace and desirous of relaxing the tension in international relations, states its readiness to join with the interested governments in examining the matter of having the Soviet Union participate in the North Atlantic treaty.

In such a case the North Atlantic Treaty Organization would cease to be a closed military group of states; it would be open to other European countries and this, along with the establishment of an effective system of collective security in Europe, would be highly important in consolidating world peace.²⁴

Not only was the U.S.S.R. proposing to join NATO, but she wanted to bring her satellites in also. The Big Three delayed their reply until May 7, thus allowing NATO consultations at the North Atlantic Council meeting of April 23-25.

Western pre-Geneva coordination efforts intensified as Dulles visited the U.K. and France on April 12, 13 and 14. On April 13 a joint U.S. - U.K. statement declared concern over Southeast Asian developments and proposed setting up a collective defense organization "to assure the peace, security and freedom of Southeast Asia and the Western Pacific."²⁵ On April 14 a joint U.S. - French statement followed the same theme and also supported a collective defense.²⁶ (After the Geneva Conference these statements were developed into what became the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization - SEATO.) These two statements were the most the U.S. could get in support of its desire for allied intervention, since the U.K., France and others contacted were hesitant to do anything prior to the conference.²⁷

²⁴Ibid., p. 759.

²⁵Ibid., April 26, 1954, p. 622.

²⁶Ibid., p. 622-623.

²⁷The others contacted were: Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, and the three Associated States of the French Union. See The U.S. in World Affairs - 1954, p. 220-225 and Buttinger, p. 822.

EDC treaty ratifications began to be completed in this post-Berlin Conference period. The Netherlands approved the treaty on February 25, 1954; Belgium did so soon thereafter; then Luxembourg followed on April 6.²⁸ The Federal German Republic had ratified the EDC treaty on March 31 and it appeared that if France would ratify it, Italy would also.²⁹ To offset continuing French apprehension over the West German's increasing strength, the U.K. and U.S. pledges of May 27, 1952 to maintain military forces on continental Europe to the degree they might "deem necessary and appropriate" were renewed by more concrete statements. The U.K. on April 13 in Paris signed a U.K. Association with the EDC Agreement with the representatives of six EDC member governments.³⁰ This agreement provided for close coordination between U.K. and EDC--both politically and militarily. This was supplemented by a unilateral British declaration "containing the invaluable assurance that Great Britain had 'no intention of withdrawing from the Continent of Europe so long as the threat exists to the security of Western Europe and of the European Defense Community'."³¹ The United States reaffirmed its support of the EDC and its commitment to European defense on April 15 by a Presidential message to the Prime Ministers of the EDC member nations. Like the British, the U.S. pledged itself to a prolonged European commitment by indicating that it regarded the NATO treaty "as of indefinite duration rather than for any definite number of years. The United States calls attention to the fact that for it to cease to be a party to the North Atlantic Treaty would appear quite contrary to our

²⁸Keesing's Contemporary Archives, Vol. IX, (London: Keesing's Publications Limited, 1954), p. 13570.

²⁹The U.S. in World Affairs - 1954, p. 133.

³⁰Documents, 1954, p. 82-85.

³¹The U.S. in World Affairs - 1954, p. 136.

security interests when there is established on the Continent of Europe the solid core of unity which the European Defense Community will provide."³²

The U.S.S.R. then introduced a new international cooperation aspect into their foreign policy by a series of actions. They joined UNESCO on April 21.³³ On April 23 the U.S.S.R. ratified the four Geneva Red Cross conventions of December 12, 1949.³⁴ On April 27 the U.S.S.R. became a fully participating member of the International Labor Organization (ILO) by dropping the reservations they had made when they originally joined it.³⁵ Finally on May 3 the U.S.S.R. ratified the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.³⁶

The Geneva Conference opened April 26 with consideration of the Korean problem and quickly bogged down. The primary obstacle was the question of "free elections" throughout Korea; the German parallel was painfully obvious.

On May 7 the Big Three answered the Soviet note of March 31 (the U.S.S.R. admission into NATO proposal) to the surprise of no one:

It is unnecessary to emphasize the completely unreal character of such a suggestion.³⁷

The Big Three also reiterated their European goals and willingness to sign an Austrian treaty. The same day Dien Bien Phu fell to the Vietminh after a fifty-five day siege.³⁸

³²State Bulletin, Vol. XXX, April 26, 1954, p. 620.

³³Keesing's, IX, p. 13549.

³⁴Ibid., p. 13664. The Red Cross conventions dealt with the protection of civilians in wartime, the treatment of war prisoners, and of military personnel suffering shipwreck, and the improvement of conditions for the sick and wounded in war.

³⁵Ibid., p. 13585.

³⁶Ibid., p. 13748.

³⁷State Bulletin, Vol. XXX, May 17, 1954, p. 756.

³⁸Ibid., p. 745.

The Geneva talks on Indochina began on May 8 while the talks on Korea labored on until British Foreign Secretary Eden suggested the talks be terminated because of the futility of efforts to reach agreement.³⁹ On June 15 the non-Communist nations "reluctantly and regretfully" concluded "further consideration and examination of the Korean question by the conference would serve no useful purpose."⁴⁰

On June 12 the French cabinet under Premier Laniel resigned and the new French government was headed by Premier Mendes-France who, on June 17 in his investiture speech, promised an acceptable Indochina cease-fire within four weeks or his resignation if no satisfactory solution by July 20 and "definite proposals (regarding the EDC)... will be introduced in the Assembly before it recesses (in August)."⁴¹ The Geneva talks virtually reduced to France and the Communists until some headway could be made.

During this lull Prime Minister Churchill visited the United States to discuss a variety of Anglo-American misunderstandings, including the important issue of nuclear weapons. Also of concern were the June 10 references of Dulles to the EDC ratification:

The time for unity (European) is fast running out.

If Western Europe is to remain divided and hence perpetually weak, then there may have to be a basic shift in United States policy. But it would be foolish not to recognize the gravity of the issues which now test the North Atlantic Organization.⁴² (Underlining mine.)

On June 28 Prime Minister Churchill and President Eisenhower issued a joint statement of principles:

³⁹The U.S. in World Affairs - 1954, p. 235.

⁴⁰State Bulletin, Vol. XXX, June 28, 1954, p. 974.

⁴¹Vital Speeches of the Day, Vol. XX, July 15, 1954, p. 585-587.

⁴²State Bulletin, Vol. XXX, June 21, 1954, p. 938.

We are agreed that the German Federal Republic should take its place as an equal partner in the community of Western nations, where it can make its proper contribution to the defense of the free world.

It is our conviction that further delay in the entry into force of the EDC and Bonn Treaties would damage the solidarity of the Atlantic nations.

We will press forward with plans for collective defense (of Southeast Asia)...

We are both convinced if at Geneva the French Government is confronted with demands which prevent an acceptable agreement regarding Indochina, the international situation will be seriously aggravated.⁴³

It is noteworthy that the statement on Germany's equal partnership did not refer to the EDC. Perhaps prompted by the U.S. and U.K. actions, West German Chancellor Adenauer stated on July 2 that French ratification was a necessity; for if EDC were not approved, then the only course remaining would be to form a German national army even if it led to fears of German militarism.⁴⁴

The Communists at this same time were pursuing their efforts to thwart the EDC treaty. A referendum was held by the East Germans from June 27 to June 29, 1954, choosing between fifty years of occupation and the EDC or the withdrawal of troops and a peace treaty; 93.5% voted against the EDC.⁴⁵ On July 2, 1954 former Field Marshal von Paulus in East Berlin at a press conference sponsored by the Committee for Unified Germany, made a statement supporting the Soviet Union's "line" completely.⁴⁶

The U.S. kept the pressure on France also by a Mutual Security Act amendment, approved by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on July 10, calling "for the cessation of all U.S. aid to countries which failed to ratify

⁴³Documents, 1954, p. 62-65.

⁴⁴Keesing's, IX, p. 13653-13654.

⁴⁵Ibid., p. 13768.

⁴⁶Current Digest, August 18, 1954, p. 18.

the EDC treaty or an acceptable alternative by December 31, 1954."⁴⁷ Meanwhile in Geneva Premier Mendes-France was approaching his self-imposed deadline. There is the strong possibility that the U.S.S.R. may have made a deal with Premier Mendes-France sometime after Dien Bien Phu fell. Bernard Fall states:

Because Russia was trying to strike a bargain with Pierre Mendes-France (who had taken over the premiership on June 19 from Laniel and acted as his own Foreign Minister at Geneva) over France's membership in the European Defense Community, the Viet-Minh accepted a cease-fire on conditions a great deal less advantageous than those it could have obtained on the strength of its military successes.⁴⁸

On July 18 formal sessions of the conference were resumed. Agreement was reached by July 20 on a partition and cease fire, and on July 21 the armistice agreements were signed (the U.S. and Vietnam did not sign).⁴⁹ The Indochina War was over as far as France was concerned and the U.S.S.R. could relax its concern over the possibility of U.S. intervention.⁵⁰ Attention now focused on the pending French consideration of ratification of the EDC treaty.

The U.S.S.R. re-initiated the diplomatic maneuvering against the EDC with a lengthy note on July 24 to the Big Three restating its opposition to NATO and EDC and renewing the call for an all-European collective security system (as it had done at Berlin on February 10). An All-European system also would "contribute to the solution of the Austrian question."⁵¹ (The Austrian

⁴⁷The U.S. in World Affairs - 1954, p. 147.

⁴⁸Bernard B. Fall, The Two Vietnams (Second Revised Edition; New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967), p. 229. Buttinger, p. 812-814, takes a similar position.

⁴⁹The U.S. in World Affairs - 1954, p. 253.

⁵⁰Dinerstein, p. 160, supports the idea that U.S.S.R. concern over Indochina was genuine: "Thus Khrushchev contended that the present danger of general war (Spring, 1957) was more serious than at any time since the settlement of the Indochina question in the spring of 1954."

⁵¹State Bulletin, Vol. XXXI, September 20, 1954, p. 398-410.

government in a note to the Big Four on July 22 had suggested establishing a five power committee of Big Four ambassadors and Austrian representatives to try to resolve their situation.⁵²) It concluded with proposing the "calling within the next few months of a conference of all European states who wish to take part in it, and also the United States of America."⁵³ The U.S.S.R. also stated the Chinese People's Republic should send observers to the conference. On July 30 the U.S. Senate, recognizing the difficulties of the EDC ratification efforts, unanimously approved a resolution on German sovereignty stating:

Resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate that the President, if he judges that future developments make this desirable and in the national interest, should take such steps as he deems appropriate and as are consistent with United States constitutional processes to restore sovereignty to Germany and to enable her to contribute⁵⁴ to the maintenance of international peace and security.

While this resolution may not have affected the events of the next month, it proved to be very valuable after August 30. On August 4 the Soviets made a supplementary statement that reduced the diplomatic level of involvement by proposing a Big Four conference of Foreign Ministers "to be held approximately in August-September of this year."⁵⁵ This conference was to consider "in a preliminary way the question of calling of such a conference (all-European) and of measures contributing to its success." Finally "it would be expedient in the opinion of the Soviet Government to make new efforts in order to reach agreement in the first place with regard to several separate questions having to do with the German problem which could be resolved at the present time in

⁵²Ibid., August 30, 1954, p. 309-310.

⁵³Ibid., September 20, 1954, p. 401.

⁵⁴Ibid., August 23, 1954, p. 284.

⁵⁵Ibid., September 20, 1954, p. 402.

a manner acceptable to the interested sides."⁵⁶

These two Soviet initiatives caused Prime Minister Churchill to terminate his correspondence with Foreign Minister Molotov since Churchill felt the Soviet notes superseded his efforts to have high level talks with at least the U.K. and U.S.S.R. participating. This correspondence had been started by Churchill right after the U.S.-U.K. talks in June.⁵⁷

The U.S. accepted the Austrian proposal (of July 22) on August 7 stating its willingness to participate in a five power committee, but that "negotiation of such a treaty (Austrian State treaty) would not properly be within the competence of this committee."⁵⁸ The U.S.S.R. countered this by accepting the proposal for a meeting, but asserted the committee should "consider the questions relating to the draft State Treaty which are not yet settled, and other questions connected with the conclusion of this treaty."⁵⁹ Thus the treaty was to be deferred and new issues introduced.

Efforts to block German rearmament and disorganize Western solidarity were also being made by the Soviet satellites. Two important defections to East Germany had occurred and received wide publicity. First, Dr. Otto John--director of the federal Office for Protection of the Constitution (West German state security organization)--made two radio broadcasts and had one press conference in East Germany shortly before the French EDC vote in August, 1954, and claimed there were secret clauses in the EDC treaty.⁶⁰ Then, Christian Democratic

⁵⁶ Ibid.

⁵⁷ The U.S. in World Affairs--1954, p. 142-144.

⁵⁸ State Bulletin, Vol. XXXI, August 30, 1954, p. 310.

⁵⁹ Documents, 1954, p. 239.

⁶⁰ Current Digest, September 15, 1954, p. 17-18 and September 22, 1954, p. 19.

Union deputy Schmidt-Wittmack supported Dr. John's statements and claimed there were secret U.S.-West German negotiations for twenty-four, instead of twelve, divisions of West German's Army.⁶¹ In another divisive maneuver, on August 25 Poland proposed in a note to France that a treaty of alliance and mutual assistance with protection against German militarism be concluded between them. Not wanting to be on an equal footing with a Soviet satellite, France showed no interest.⁶²

Premier Mendes-France's special panel had been unable to agree on modifications for the EDC treaty, so on August 11 he produced his own proposals. They were not favorably received in France (four cabinet ministers resigned) nor abroad.⁶³ On August 19 Mendes-France met with other EDC foreign ministers to consider his proposals which would have required renegotiating the treaty. By August 22 the conference broke up in complete disagreement.

On August 28 debate opened on the treaty with all six committees reporting it unfavorably and Mendes-France showing his lack of support for the treaty by not making the ratification a question of confidence. On August 30, 1954, the French National Assembly voted 319 to 264 to move on to other business with the government deputies not taking part in the vote.⁶⁴ The EDC was dead. German rearmament would have to be sought some other way.

⁶¹Keesing's, IX, p. 13851.

⁶²Philip E. Mosely, Russia After Stalin (Headline Series No. 111; New York: Foreign Policy Association, May, 1955), p. 48.

⁶³F. Roy Willis, France, Germany, and the New Europe 1945-1963 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1963), p. 180. For a history of France's involvement with EDC, see p. 130-184 of this book.

⁶⁴Keesing's, IX, p. 13755.

This complex period began with hope for "new Soviet attitudes" at the Berlin Conference, saw the Geneva Conference reach an armistice agreement and ended with the French refusal to ratify the EDC. The Western Alliance was being sorely tested and the Soviet Union's "peace-loving" policies appeared to be breaking up the solid alignment that had opposed Stalin and "contained" Communism.

IV. ONWARD TO GERMAN REARMAMENT

This period begins with the Western efforts, following the EDC treaty's defeat, to arrive at a new arrangement to restore sovereignty to the Federal Republic of Germany and to provide for its rearming; and ends with the newly sovereign Federal Republic of Germany acceding to the North Atlantic Treaty (May 6, 1955).

Initially, to the Soviet Union's delight, the West seemed dazed and disorganized, but the Soviet jubilation was destined to be short-lived. The U.S. had a commitment to the eight nation conference on Southeast Asian collective security on September 6 and chose to honor that commitment before making further efforts for European security.¹ Dulles did state on August 31 before departing for the Philippines:

The United States stands ready to support the many in Western Europe who despite their valiant efforts are left in grave anxiety.

There is much on which to build, and those foundations should not be shaken by any abrupt or any ill-considered action of our own.²

(The U.S. was later to point out it was stressing "partnership," not "leadership" in this new effort on Germany; i.e., it would let the Europeans take the initiative.³)

On September 8 the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty (SEATO) was signed and with it was signed a protocol including Cambodia, Laos and the free

¹Countries involved were Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, The Philippines, Thailand, the U.K., and the U.S.A. For the announcement see State Bulletin, Vol. XXXI, August 23, 1954, p. 264.

²Ibid., September 13, 1954, p. 364.

³The U.S. in World Affairs--1954, p. 155.

territory under the jurisdiction of the State of Vietnam in the areas protected by SEATO.⁴

With the EDC vote a matter of historical record, on September 10 the Big Three replied to the U.S.S.R.'s note of July 24 and statement of August 4 by pointing out the futility of past negotiations on the still unsettled European questions. The Big Three set forth prerequisite conditions for the U.S.S.R. before any future meetings of foreign ministers could be considered:

(A) signing the Austrian State treaty with the Soviet text of the previously unagreed articles, an offer made at the Berlin Conference by the United States, United Kingdom, France, and Austria which the United States Government (France and the U.K. sent identical notes) now renews;

(B) agreeing to free elections on the basis proposed by the United States Government at Berlin as the essential first step towards German reunification in freedom.⁵

Chancellor Adenauer on September 10 called for German participation in NATO as a full member.⁶ The next day Foreign Secretary Eden began a tour of European capitals to explore prospects for an alternative to the EDC, perhaps an extension of the 1948 Brussels treaty.⁷ This plan as proposed by Mr. Eden was accepted by the Federal German Republic, Italy and the Benelux nations; however, Premier Mendes-France continued his opposition to Germany's membership in NATO.⁸

Armed with the Senate resolution of July 30, Mr. Dulles visited Bonn and London on September 16 and 17 and omitted the rest of Europe, including Paris,

⁴State Bulletin, Vol. XXXI, September 20, 1954, p. 393-396.

⁵Ibid., p. 398.

⁶The U.S. in World Affairs--1954, p. 152.

⁷Willis, p. 186. For the text of the 1948 Brussels treaty, see State Bulletin, Vol. XXXII, October 11, 1954, p. 528-530.

⁸The U.S. in World Affairs--1954, p. 153.

ostensibly because of the beginning of the United Nations General Assembly session the next week.⁹

The trips of Mr. Eden and Mr. Dulles led to a conference of the six former EDC treaty nations, U.K., U.S. and Canada in London on September 28. The conference opened with significant statements by the U.S. and the U.K. The U.S. virtually promised renewal of President Eisenhower's pledge to maintain forces in Europe if a suitable substitute for the EDC were developed.¹⁰ The U.K. made an unprecedented promise:

The United Kingdom will continue to maintain on the mainland of Europe, including Germany, the effective strength of the United Kingdom forces which are now assigned to SACEUR--four divisions and the tactical Air Force--or whatever SACEUR regards as equivalent fighting capacity.

The United Kingdom undertakes not to withdraw those forces against the wishes of the majority of the Brussels Treaty Powers, who should take their decision in the knowledge of SACEUR's views. This undertaking would be subject to the understanding that an acute overseas emergency might oblige Her Majesty's Government to omit this procedure. If maintenance of the United Kingdom forces on the mainland of Europe throws at any time too heavy a strain on the external finances of the United Kingdom, then we would invite the North Atlantic Council to review the financial conditions on which the formations are maintained.¹¹

The U.K. statement, like the U.S. one, was based on the condition that the conference be successful in its deliberations.

The conference was completed on October 3 and produced a collection of documents which provided for West German sovereignty and rearmament and NATO membership.¹² A pair of far-reaching unilateral declarations by the Federal

⁹State Bulletin, Vol. XXXI, September 17, 1954, p. 434.

¹⁰State Bulletin, Vol. XXXI, October 11, 1954, p. 523-525.

¹¹Ibid., p. 526.

¹²Ibid., p. 515-523.

Republic of Germany were included in the documents. One declaration stated:

. . .the German Federal Republic undertakes never to have recourse to force to achieve reunification of Germany or the modification of the present boundaries of the German Federal Republic, and to resolve by peaceful means any disputes which may arise between the Federal Republic and other States.¹³

In the other declaration the Federal Republic undertook not to manufacture an assortment of weapons; included in the prohibited list were atomic, biological and chemical weapons.¹⁴

To quiet fears over Berlin's status the Big Three declared they would maintain armed forces in Berlin to guarantee its peace and safety until a peace treaty relieved them of the responsibility.

With these preliminary agreements completed, the conference adjourned and the nations set about working out the detailed agreements with the intention of completing the agreements in Paris concurrent with the North Atlantic Council meeting scheduled for October 22.¹⁵

On October 5 a settlement of the Trieste problem was announced. This eliminated one of the problem areas the U.S.S.R. had often linked with Austrian and German settlements.¹⁶ A week later the U.S.S.R. informed the President of the United Nations Security Council that the Soviet Government "takes cognizance of the agreement" and the agreement "will promote the establishment of normal relations between them (Italy and Yugoslavia), and thus contribute toward a relaxation of tension in that part of Europe."¹⁷ Perhaps this cooperative

¹³Ibid., p. 520.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 519.

¹⁵Ibid., p. 521-522.

¹⁶Keesing's, IX, p. 13821-13822.

¹⁷Ibid., p. 13822.

attitude on the part of the U.S.S.R. was in response to the Balkan Alliance, a defensive military alliance formed by Yugoslavia, Greece, and Turkey on August 9¹⁸, and the accompanying possibility that Yugoslavia might strengthen its Western ties further; or perhaps it was merely another move toward restoration of good relations with the Yugoslavs.

The U.S.S.R. on October 6 began its campaign against the London agreements. The occasion was the fifth anniversary of the founding of the German Democratic Republic. U.S.S.R. Foreign Minister Molotov gave the principal speech.¹⁹ In it he called for immediate withdrawal of all occupation forces to create more favorable conditions for East and West German rapprochement and thus, reunification. He implied that the U.S.S.R. was more favorably inclined to "free all-German elections" than it had been in the past. On October 17 the East Germans held "elections" (the first since 1950). Though the elections were as fraudulent as ever, the East Germans declared they were "the most democratic in German history."²⁰

On October 12 the Austrian government replied to the U.S.S.R.'s August 12 invitation to Ambassador level discussions with the understanding that occupation troops would have to be withdrawn if a treaty were concluded.²¹

By mid-October the French and West German parliaments had indicated their approval of the general issues of the London agreements.²² This assured the other Western powers that meaningful agreements could be signed in Paris. As

¹⁸The U.S. in World Affairs, p. 183-187, 189-190.

¹⁹Keesing's, IX, p. 13876.

²⁰Ibid., p. 13875.

²¹State Bulletin, Vol. XXXI, December 13, 1954, p. 909.

²²Keesing's, IX, p. 13859 (French vote), 13861 (West German vote).

the North Atlantic Council meeting approached, only one problem area remained--the Saar. On October 19 Dr. Adenauer and Mr. Mendes-France began negotiations within the framework of the "van Naters plan" that had last been discussed by the Laniel cabinet and Dr. Adenauer in May 1954.²³ On October 23 at 3:00 a.m. agreement was reached on the basis of the "van Naters plan" with the newly expanded Western European Union acting for the Saar in foreign and defense matters. Economic arrangements were to be similar for Germany and France, though the French had the more advantageous position.²⁴ The statute was to be submitted to a popular referendum in the Saar and once approved it could not be questioned until the German peace treaty was concluded. No provision was made for the statute not being approved.²⁵

The other necessary agreements--restoration of German sovereignty by the Big Three; the expansion of the Brussels treaty into the Western European Union (to include Germany and Italy); the Convention of Foreign Forces in Germany (German consent for the continued presence of allied forces in Germany); and an invitation to West Germany to accede to NATO (to be issued upon ratification of the Brussels treaty protocols and the Convention of Foreign Forces in Germany)--were agreed on by October 22.²⁶ On October 23 all agreements, henceforth known as the Paris Agreements, were signed. Once again the issue of German rearmament was to be subjected to the ratification process; this time there were fifteen countries involved instead of six.

²³The U.S. in World Affairs--1954, p. 137-139.

²⁴Ibid., p. 165-166.

²⁵Willis, p. 204. For a brief history of the post-war efforts to resolve the Saar, see Willis, p. 190-226.

²⁶State Bulletin, Vol. XXXI, November 15, 1954, p. 719-731.

On the day the Paris agreements were signed, the U.S.S.R. delivered a very lengthy note to the Big Three. Initially belaboring the West for its opposition to the draft for a collective security organization in Europe, the U.S.S.R. then seemed to take a less hostile attitude on the issue of free all-German elections:

The Soviet Government expresses its readiness again to consider, taking into account the new circumstances noted above, the proposals for holding all-German elections which were introduced at the Berlin Conference by England and were supported by the United States and France.

But this was qualified by the next statement:

At the same time the Soviet Government assumes that the pertinent proposals of the Soviet Union will also be taken into consideration.²⁷

Attacking the Paris agreements ("These decisions, which free the hands of German militarists, are dictated by aggressive circles of the power which aim at a world domination on the basis of carrying out the notorious 'policy of strength'."), the U.S.S.R. declared:

Either the four powers who bear special responsibility for the solution of the German problem will do everything in order to begin examination of and decide the most urgent question--the question of the reestablishment of the unity of Germany in which the German people are so interested and along with them all the peace-loving peoples of Europe; or if matters reach the point of reestablishment of German militarism and the involvement of West Germany in aggressive military groupings (read NATO), then the German nation for a long time will remain torn in two, and from a remilitarized West Germany there will be created a direct threat to peace in Europe.²⁸ (Underlining mine.)

The U.S.S.R. then reiterated its proposal for the immediate withdrawal of occupation troops and stated the necessity for both of the German states together with the Big Four to reach agreement on the "size, disposition, and

²⁷Ibid., December 13, 1954, p. 903.

²⁸Ibid., p. 904.

armament of all types of German police in East and West Germany."²⁹ Then a Big Four Foreign Ministers Conference was proposed for November on the subjects of free all-German elections and reunification, withdrawal of occupation troops, and convocation of an all-European conference on collective security. Hope for Austria was held out by the U.S.S.R. query "if the Governments of the three powers agree that their Ambassadors could take part in the conference in Vienna for the examination of questions connected with the conclusion of a state treaty with Austria."³⁰ This was not a proposal to finalize the treaty. Thus, the U.S.S.R. appeared to be offering something to everyone in their effort to delay ratification and confuse the issues.

From October 27 to October 29 Chancellor Adenauer visited the United States for talks with the President and to sign a Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation with the U.S.³¹ In his departure address Chancellor Adenauer stated "his view that the primary Soviet objective was 'to disinterest the United States in European questions'."³²

With Western parliaments beginning debates on the Paris agreements, the U.S.S.R. shifted its tactics away from merely exchanging notes with the Big Three and on November 23 unilaterally invited twenty-three European nations and the United States to a conference on European collective security. Efforts on behalf of the Chinese Communists continued:

Recognizing the special responsibility for maintenance of international peace and security borne by states which are permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, the Soviet Government considers it desirable for the Chinese People's Republic to send its observer to this conference.³³

²⁹ Ibid., p. 905.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ State Bulletin, Vol. XXXI, November 8, 1954, p. 680-683.

³² The U.S. in World Affairs--1954, p. 170.

³³ State Bulletin, Vol. XXXI, December 13, 1954, p. 906.

The conference was to be held on November 29 at either Moscow or Paris. The U.S.S.R. stated it sent the note to those with whom it had diplomatic relations and suggested any of the Big Three could invite other European states (i.e., the Federal Republic of Germany).

On November 19 the Big Three submitted a report to the United Nations General Assembly on the progress of Austrian treaty efforts. The efforts, since the December, 1952 General Assembly resolution appealing to the Big Four to complete the Austrian treaty, were enumerated and the unfinished treaty was blamed on the U.S.S.R.: "Further progress depends upon the attitudes of the Soviet Government."³⁴

Premier Mendes-France concluded a three-day visit to the United States on November 20 with a joint U.S.-French communique covering several issues. Of particular interest was the second paragraph which brushed aside the recent Soviet notes, but suggested that post-ratification negotiations were possible:

With regard to Europe, it was agreed that the early ratification of the Paris agreements by all countries concerned will strengthen the unity of the Western world. It should open the way for consideration of means of improving international relations, in accordance with the spirit and the goals of the Charter of the United Nations, both Governments being ready to enter, not into improvised debates intended mainly for propaganda, but into adequately prepared negotiations, carried on in good faith.³⁵ (Underlining mine.)

The same day in a Pravda interview Foreign Minister Molotov offered to postpone the collective security meeting if the ratification of the Paris agreements was postponed.³⁶ This offer was not accepted.

³⁴ Ibid., p. 907-909.

³⁵ Ibid., November 29, 1954, p. 804.

³⁶ New York Times, November 21, 1954, p. 4.

Premier Mendes-France two days later in addressing the United Nations General Assembly amplified on the U.S.-French joint communique. He first discussed the recent Soviet conference proposals:

I shall be very frank in saying, first that those proposals, in their present form, are neither realistic or reasonable. Without proper preparation--which is essential to such a venture--it is hard to find in such negotiations any concrete basis for success. A request made on 13 November to twenty-five countries, asking those countries to meet two weeks later to discuss a vague, or rather non-existent, agenda, cannot, I submit without hesitation to the Soviet Union representatives, be taken seriously.

Speaking of Molotov's proposed deferral, he said:

That request shows that for the Soviet Union it is less a question of discussing the topics which divide us or the organization of peace in Europe than of hindering the implementation of decisions which the U.S.S.R. has constantly opposed.

. . .there can be no objective and effective discussion in a four-power conference until the countries of West Europe which are directly concerned have ratified the Paris treaty.³⁷

Mr. Mendes-France then proposed a four power conference after the Paris agreements ratification had been completed, perhaps as early as May in Paris. With regard to the Austrian question, he stated that settlement of that issue was up to the U.S.S.R. and could "considerably improve the international atmosphere and create favorable conditions for the success of this (proposed Big Four) conference."³⁸

Perhaps he anticipated the outcome of the November 29 Moscow conference already because he suggested a plan that he felt could lead to future European collective security arrangements:

³⁷Vital Speeches of the Day, Vol. XXX, No. 5, December 15, 1954, p. 900-901.

³⁸Ibid., p. 901.

At the risk of surprising our colleagues who represent those countries here, I affirm that, for my part, I would be quite happy to see the creation of an East Europe defense organization, so long as it adopts the modalities provided for by the West for the publication, limitation, and control of armaments.

If this were done, then:

Later exchanges of information and mutual assurances could take place between the two systems.

and

A flexible regional plan would then gradually be set up, with the field of application of the limitations reductions, and control increasing progressively.³⁹

On November 29 the opening day of the Moscow Conference, the Big Three replied to the Soviet post-Paris agreements' proposals in a note which stated that all NATO members plus the Federal Republic of Germany had been consulted and since no new proposals had been made by the U.S.S.R. it was obvious that:

The Soviet note of November 13 is openly and explicitly aimed at delaying or preventing the ratification of the Paris agreements.⁴⁰

Once again the Big Three set forth specific conditions that the U.S.S.R. must fulfill prior to any future conference being called:

- (1) Agreement to sign the Austrian State Treaty;
- (2) Clarification by the Soviet Government of its position on the question of free elections in Germany which are the essential first steps to German reunification;
- (3) Exchanges through diplomatic channels on any other European questions of common interest which might suitably be examined at a later four power meeting, in particular, questions relating to European security;
- (4) A meeting of the four-power Ministers as soon as it should appear that there is a real prospect of finding solutions and after ratification of the Paris agreements by the countries concerned;

³⁹Ibid., p. 902.

⁴⁰State Bulletin, Vol. XXXI, December 13, 1954, p. 901.

(5) Should it thereafter appear useful, a wider conference of European and other interested powers to consider the remaining aspects of European security.⁴¹

If the U.S.S.R.'s "cooperation" and lack of menacing action had lulled the West into a sense of security that resulted in the failure of the EDC, it now appeared that the U.S.S.R.'s actions could only hasten the ratification of the Paris agreements unless the Soviets were to make some truly significant concession.

Nonetheless the Moscow Conference was held with the U.S.S.R. and its seven satellites attending. Yugoslavia even declined the invitation and Finland made its acceptance conditional on the attendance of all others invited.⁴² The Chinese Communists were present as observers and all nine countries joined in the Declaration of Eight Eastern European Governments issued December 2, 1954. The declaration called for collective security based on all the European states, then it warned the West that "ratification of these (Paris) agreements would be an act aimed against the preservation of peace and making for another war in Europe."⁴³

The Parties to this Conference declare they have decided, should the Paris agreements be ratified, to adopt joint measures in the sphere of organization of their armed forces and their command, as well as other measures required for strengthening their defensive power, protecting the peaceful labours of their peoples, guaranteeing the inviolability of their frontiers and territories, and providing defence against possible aggression.⁴⁴

One week later a U.S.S.R. note to the Big Three warned that the ratification of the Paris agreements, rearmament of West Germany, and entry of West

⁴¹Ibid., p. 902.

⁴²The U.S. in World Affairs - 1954, p. 173.

⁴³Documents, 1954, p. 256.

⁴⁴Ibid.

Germany into NATO "would compel the Soviet Union and other peace-loving countries" to take without delay "every necessary step to oppose the growing armed forces of the aggressive States."⁴⁵ This was the last Soviet note delivered in identical form to the Big Three (i.e., between the principal spokesmen for East and West blocs) until April when the ratification was virtually complete. During the December to April period, Soviet notes were directed at individual nations or groupings such as the Western European Union. Perhaps the U.S.S.R. felt the potential for division and weakening of the Western alliance was greater if each individual nation were contacted separately.

Keeping up the diplomatic barrage, the Soviets sent a note to France on December 16 declaring the Paris agreements were not in keeping with the "Franco-Soviet treaty of alliance and mutual assistance concluded on December 1, 1944."⁴⁶ If the Paris agreements were ratified, that action would cancel and annul the Franco-Soviet treaty, thus full responsibility for that annulment rested with the French government. The next day the U.S.S.R. sent individual notes to each of the thirteen countries (besides the Big Three) that did not attend the Moscow Conference. Each individual note expressed regret that the country did not attend the Conference to work for collective security, then reviewed the Soviet objections to the Paris agreements and rearming of West Germany.⁴⁷ On December 20 the British received a note, similar to the U.S.S.R. note to France, threatening the British with annulment of the "Anglo-Soviet treaty of alliance and mutual assistance of May 26, 1942."⁴⁸ The

⁴⁵ Keessing's, IX, p. 14002.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

British were also accused of pressuring other European countries to speed up the ratification. The next day the British politely stated that Soviets' threatened annulment was in poor taste and not justified.⁴⁹

The North Atlantic Council met on December 17 and 18 and approved the Military Committee report which called for nuclear weapons to be phased into the NATO armed forces and planning.⁵⁰ This would be a new use of nuclear weapons and offered NATO a method for stopping Soviet land forces (though the damage to Europe proper would probably be unacceptable as the NATO powers were to discover during exercise "Carte Blanche" in June 1955.⁵¹) These nuclear weapons were to help offset the weakness which would have resulted during the two to five year period it would take to build up the German army. Otherwise greater expenditures by the other NATO members would have been necessary.

Meanwhile ratification of the Paris agreements was proceeding smoothly in the various countries concerned. A real item of encouragement was the Italian Chamber approval of the agreements on December 23.⁵² However the French vote on December 24 rejected the protocol to the Brussels treaty but approved the other agreements. Mr. Mendes-France then made the matter a vote of confidence. On December 30, 1954 the final vote was taken and the National Assembly passed the Paris agreements.⁵³ The Paris agreements ratification now appeared to be assured.

⁴⁹Ibid.

⁵⁰State Bulletin, Vol. XXXII, January 3, 1955, p. 11.

⁵¹Kissinger, p. 291.

⁵²The U.S. in World Affairs - 1954, p. 179.

⁵³Willis, p. 192-194.

The Soviet Government on January 13 sent a note to each member of the Western European Union (except West Germany) alleging that the Paris agreements violated the Geneva convention of 1925 concerning chemical and biological warfare.⁵⁴ Two days later the Soviets issued a statement wishing for normalization of relations with West Germany and suggesting probability of free elections before the end of 1955--if the Paris agreements were not ratified. However if ratification were to occur, then the U.S.S.R. would have to have closer relations with the German Democratic Republic and a European (read Communist) security organization would be necessary.⁵⁵ In keeping with its call for normalization of relations, the U.S.S.R. ended its state of war with Germany on January 25, 1955.⁵⁶ (The Big Three had terminated the state of war with Germany in 1951.⁵⁷) The next day the U.K. and France rejected the claims of the U.S.S.R.'s December notes threatening annulment of Anglo-Soviet and French-Soviet treaties.⁵⁸ On February 3 the Western European Union nations in rejecting the Soviet note of January 13 pointed out the Soviets had misrepresented the Paris agreements with respect to the Geneva contention on bacteriological and chemical warfare. The Paris agreements were not in violation of the Geneva convention.⁵⁹ On February 1, 1955 East Germany published a statement by a group of eighty-seven former Nazi generals and officers (asserted to be from East and West Germany) publicly condemning the Paris treaties.⁶⁰

⁵⁴Current Digest, February 23, 1955, p. 18.

⁵⁵Ibid., March 2, 1955, p. 23-24.

⁵⁶Ibid., March 9, 1955, p. 33.

⁵⁷Keessing's, X, p. 14027, U.K.-July 9, 1951, France-July 13, 1951, U.S.-October 24, 1951.

⁵⁸Ibid., p. 14028.

⁵⁹Ibid., p. 14039.

⁶⁰New York Times, February 1, 1955, p. 11.

The Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. met from February 3 to February 9, 1955.⁶¹ It proved to be a most interesting session. On February 4 a twelve percent increase in the Soviet military budget was announced⁶² and the next day Izvestia stated that the free all-German elections referred to in the Soviet statement of January 15 meant:

the Soviet Government agrees to all-German elections under international control since it wishes to assist the most rapid unification of Germany on a peaceful and democratic basis.⁶³

On February 8 Premier Malenkov requested to be relieved from his post as Chairman of the Council of Ministers. Defense Minister Nikolai Bulganin was "elected" in his place.⁶⁴ That same day Foreign Minister Molotov's speech threatened that ratification of the Paris agreements:

...would become the principal obstacle in the way of a solution to the German problem.

However, rejection of the Paris agreements and the achievement of a corresponding agreement between the four powers - France, Britain, United States and U.S.S.R. - would make it possible to hold, even this year, all-German elections for the purpose of restoring the unity of Germany on a peace-loving and democratic basis. (Note the qualifying phrase - underlining mine.)

To us it is clear that in the case of ratification of the Paris agreements Western Germany will follow the road of restoring militarism and in fact will find itself in the hands of the German revenge seekers.⁶⁵

This was followed by renewed threats to establish another European military pact and to cancel the alliance and mutual alliance treaties with France and Britain. Molotov asserted that the U.S.S.R. was ahead of the U.S.A. in hydrogen bomb production and equal to the U.S.A. in any balance of power

⁶¹New Times, 1955, No. 7, February 12, 1955, p. 1.

⁶²Ibid., February 4, 1955, p. 1.

⁶³Ibid., February 6, 1955, p. 26.

⁶⁴New York Times, February 9, 1955, p. 2.

⁶⁵Ibid., p. 6.

calculations. Despite the bristling tone of this speech, Molotov did imply that an Austrian peace treaty might finally be possible when he did not link the German and Austrian questions together. This was a major shift of the Soviet position in the Cold War.

Premier Bulganin in his February 9 speech laid the blame for world tension on the West declaring they based their policy, not on friendship and cooperation, but on "positions of strength" while the Soviet Union stood for "negotiations and relations which lead to a reduction of international tension."⁶⁶

On February 28 the Soviets once again threatened the British with annulment of the Anglo-Soviet treaty of 1942.⁶⁷ The next day Dr. Pontecorvo, a British atomic scientist, disclosed his presence in Russia and issued a plea against the use of nuclear weapons and against the threat of revival of the German militarism.⁶⁸

The Western determination to get the Paris agreements ratified, however, was just as great as the Soviet opposition. President Eisenhower on March 10 sent a message to the Prime Ministers of the seven Western European Union signatories. This was the statement that Mr. Dulles had promised in Paris in October and a restatement of the commitment made to the European Defense Community. The President affirmed that ratification of the Paris agreements would mean the U.S. would "continue to maintain in Europe, including Germany, such units of its armed forces as may be necessary and appropriate to contribute its fair share of the forces needed for the joint defense of the North Atlantic

⁶⁶Keesing's, X, p. 14033.

⁶⁷Ibid., p. 14028.

⁶⁸Ibid., p. 14099.

area while a threat to that area exists."⁶⁹ In closing he reaffirmed that the U.S. considered the NATO treaty to be of indefinite duration, not just twenty years. This assurance was helpful in the upcoming French debate in the Council of the Republic. Perhaps it was deemed particularly necessary because once again the French cabinet had changed; Mr. Mendes-France had been replaced by Mr. Faure on February 23.⁷⁰

On March 11 the Soviets issued a new statement on Austrian negotiations. They indicated that they were willing to remove occupation troops if it could be assured that there was no possibility of Anschluss between Germany and Austria.⁷¹ This statement further separated the German and Austrian treaties which until February 8, 1955 had been linked to the German issue. On March 14 the Austrians again stated the need for a conference of the Big Four and Austria.⁷² Five days later the U.S.S.R. again threatened France with annulment of the French-Soviet treaty of 1944.⁷³ In what turned out to be the last Soviet effort to stop the Paris agreements' ratification, the Soviet Foreign Ministry announced on March 21 that there was unanimous agreement between the signers of the Moscow Declaration of December 2, 1954 (including the Chinese People's Republic) on the principles of a mutual defense treaty and an organization of unified command in the event of ratification of the Paris agreements.⁷⁴

⁶⁹State Bulletin, Vol. XXXII, March 21, 1955, p. 464-465.

⁷⁰Keesing's, X, p. 14071.

⁷¹Ibid., p. 14154.

⁷²Ibid.

⁷³Ibid., p. 14028.

⁷⁴Ibid., p. 14111.

Despite these threats as March ended the two parliamentary ratifications that were expected to be the most difficult to obtain were completed: West Germany on March 18 and France on March 27.⁷⁵ The final ratification signatures for both countries came within two weeks. With the French parliament's action finally completed, other nations completed their ratifications in April.

Austrian treaty activity picked up in April as the Big Three made a declaration on April 5 suggesting Ambassadorial talks on the treaty could be held if the U.S.S.R. put forth new proposals at the upcoming meeting in Moscow.⁷⁶ The Austrian government then sent a delegation to Moscow for negotiations from April 11 to April 15. On April 15 the communique on Austrian-Soviet Union talks indicated that the rough spots in the treaty had been resolved and Soviet troops would be withdrawn after the entry into force of the Austria treaty and not later than December 31, 1955. Also Austrian citizens now held in the U.S.S.R. would be repatriated when the treaty was signed.⁷⁷ On April 19 a U.S.S.R. note to the Big Three called for a conference in Vienna of Big Four Foreign Ministers and the Austrian representatives to "consider the question of concluding a state treaty for the restoration of an independent, democratic Austria and to sign this treaty."⁷⁸ On April 22 the Big Three in answering the Soviet note observed that "some preparatory work remains to be done" and therefore proposed Big Four Ambassadorial meetings with the Austrians in Vienna on May 2.⁷⁹

⁷⁵State Bulletin, Vol. XXXII, March 28, 1955, p. 514 (West Germany) and April 11, 1955, p. 605 (France).

⁷⁶Ibid., April 18, 1955, p. 647-648.

⁷⁷Documents on American Foreign Relations, 1955 (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1956), p. 119-121.

⁷⁸State Bulletin, Vol. XXXII, May 2, 1955, p. 734.

⁷⁹Willis, p. 196.

With the Paris agreement ratifications virtually assured and new hopes for the Austrian State treaty, the Big Three announced on April 25 that their Foreign Ministers would meet in Paris on May 8 "to discuss concrete plans for holding a Four Power Conference with the Soviet Government."⁸⁰

The only remaining problem concerning ratification was eliminated on May 4 when the West German Constitutional Court declared the French-West German Saar agreement was constitutional.⁸¹ This legal question had been taken to court by the Social Democrats on March 18 after they lost in their attempt to delay ratification. They believed immediate four power talks would achieve free elections based on their interpretation of the Soviet offers in January and February.⁸² On May 5, 1955 the Federal Republic of Germany regained its sovereignty and the next day it deposited its accession to the North Atlantic treaty.⁸³

Thus ten years after the Germans had been defeated in World War II, provision had been made for at least the Western portion of Germany to rearm and become a sovereign state. The EDC treaty signed on May 27, 1952 had taken twenty seven months to be defeated and the Paris agreements had taken less than seven months to do much the same thing that the EDC treaty was to do plus some things it was not to do (i.e., NATO membership for West Germany). European political unity was unlikely to be achieved very soon but it was not a dead issue. Russian efforts had ranged from defector statements to outright threats, proposed conferences to "offers" of truly "free" all-German elections,

⁸⁰Geoffrey Barraclough and Rachel F. Wall, Summary of International Affairs, 1955-1956 (London: Oxford University Press, 1960), p. 39-43.

⁸¹State Bulletin, Vol. XXXII, May 2, 1955, p. 733.

⁸²Ibid., May 9, 1955, p. 759.

⁸³Ibid., May 16, 1955, p. 791-794.

and yet the Western alliance had refused to be tempted and had pulled together to ratify German rearmament. Attention now turned to exploration of the possibilities of increased détente with the Soviets.

V. PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE TO THE FORE

The final period of this paper covers the events following the Federal German Republic's accession to the NATO treaty to the Twentieth Party Congress (February 14 - February 25, 1956).

After the Federal German Republic acceded to the NATO treaty on May 6, the U.S.S.R. went through the process on May 7 of annulling the Anglo-Soviet treaty of May 26, 1942 and the French-Soviet treaty of December 10, 1944 as they had previously threatened to do.¹

Strengthened by the addition of West Germany to NATO, the West hoped that they could negotiate meaningfully concerning the remaining European problems. With this in mind the Big Three on May 10 sent a note to the U.S.S.R. proposing a new approach to their communications - "a meeting of the heads of Government, accompanied by their Foreign Ministers, for an exchange of views."² This would not result in "substantive answers to the major difficulties facing the world," but hopefully a basis for future detailed efforts could be established.³ The note further proposed:

The forthcoming meeting of Foreign Ministers at Vienna... might provide an opportunity for preliminary discussion of this proposal.⁴

The next day it was announced in Vienna that the Austrian treaty drafting had been completed and it would be signed at the end of the week.⁵

¹Keesing's, X, p. 14239.

²State Bulletin, Vol. XXXII, May 23, 1955, p. 832.

³Ibid.

⁴Ibid., p. 833.

⁵Ibid.

Also on May 11 the Moscow Conference participants met in Warsaw to complete another action threatened if the Paris agreements were ratified--the forming of the Warsaw Pact. In Premier Bulganin's opening speech, he stressed all countries were free to join this collective security organization and then went on to elaborate how the Soviet Union had been forced into this action by hostile Western moves--the Soviet's familiar capitalist encirclement theme.⁶ On May 14, the U.S.S.R. and its seven satellites signed the Warsaw Pact, setting up a military - political organization much like that of NATO on paper.⁷ The Chinese People's Republic also signed the treaty (as observers). The German Democratic Republic was not to furnish armed forces, although they signed the treaty. The Eastern European nations were not anxious to rearm any of Germany.⁸ The rearmament of East Germany also offered the Soviets one more bargaining point for the future.

Following the Warsaw signing, Foreign Minister Molotov flew to Vienna and the next day the Big Four Foreign Ministers signed the Austrian State Treaty.⁹ Austria could rearm, but she would be a neutral in foreign affairs. By June 27 ratification was completed and the last occupation troops left October 14.¹⁰ In response to suggestions that Germany might be reunited and neutralized like Austria, Mr. Dulles on May 24 said it was not realistic to even consider the idea.¹¹

⁶Hollis W. Barber, et al, The United States in World Affairs - 1955 (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1957), p. 37. (Hereinafter to be referred to as The U.S. in World Affairs - 1955.)

⁷U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Documents on Germany, 86th Cong., 1st Sess., 1959, p. 144-147.

⁸For amplification of this statement, see Barraclough and Wall, p. 44-49.

⁹State Bulletin, Vol. XXXII, June 6, 1955, p. 916-932.

¹⁰The U.S. in World Affairs - 1955, p. 44, 46.

¹¹State Bulletin, Vol. XXXII, June 6, 1955, p. 932.

On May 26, 1955 a U.S.S.R. note to the Big Three accepted the invitation to a Heads of Government conference, but cautioned that statements had been made in the West that the Big Three were approaching "this conference 'from a position of strength' which indicates a desire to exert inadmissible pressure on the conference."¹² The note went on to warn that "frustration of the conference, which is already being prepared (positions of strength), would lead to a further deepening of disagreements between the powers and a worsening of the international situation."¹³ The U.S.S.R. then proposed Vienna for the Heads of Government conference with a meeting of Foreign Ministers to follow.

That same day the collective leadership "team" of Bulganin and Khrushchev visited Yugoslavia.¹⁴ Heresy had paid off for Yugoslavia. Seven years after their expulsion from the COMINFORM, they were being wooed by Stalin's successors.

On June 6 the Big Three sent a note to the U.S.S.R. proposing the Heads of Government conference be held in Geneva from July 18 to July 21. The "peace-loving" Soviet Union seemed to be becoming everyone's friend; on June 7 they even proposed establishing diplomatic relations with the Federal Republic of Germany.¹⁵ The transition of the Federal Republic of Germany from foe to friend was very capably handled in the Soviet press. The primary rationalization for the transition was that friendship between the two countries was basic to European peace.¹⁶ On June 13 the U.S.S.R.'s note accepted the Big

¹²Documents, 1955, p. 172-175.

¹³Ibid., p. 174.

¹⁴Adam B. Ulam, Expansion and Coexistence (Frederick A. Praeger, 1968), p. 562-563.

¹⁵Keessing's, X, p. 14272.

¹⁶For an example, see the June 9 Pravda editorial on the subject in Current Digest, July 20, 1955, p. 12.

Three proposal of July 18 as the beginning date and of Geneva as the place for the Heads of Government conference.¹⁷ On June 25 another in the growing list of conciliatory actions was taken by the U.S.S.R. as it expressed, in a memorandum to the United States, willingness to pay fifty percent of the damages to a U.S. plane that Soviet fighters shot down on June 23.¹⁸ The usual Soviet practice had been to claim that the U.S. had violated the air space over its territory and refuse to pay any damages. On June 31 the U.S.S.R. also decided to join the Inter-Parliamentary Union. This was fulfilling the Supreme Soviet declaration of February 9 calling for direct contacts between the Supreme Soviet and Parliaments of other countries.¹⁹

That same day the Federal Republic of Germany accepted the U.S.S.R. proposals for talks, but suggested the subjects ought to be more clearly defined before any high level talks were held. It was proposed that the F.D.R. and U.S.S.R. Embassies in Paris discuss the subjects of a future agenda.²⁰ Further efforts to increase their "cooperation" image occurred on July 8 at a UNESCO meeting. The U.S.S.R. announced it would rejoin the World Health Organization and would make its first contribution to the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF).²¹

On July 18, 1955 the meeting Winston Churchill had called for in May, 1953 and corresponded about in summer 1954 finally occurred; the Big Four Heads of Government met at Geneva. This "summit" conference was not called with specific objectives in mind and about all it did produce was the "spirit of

¹⁷ State Bulletin, Vol. XXXIII, July 4, 1955, p. 20.

¹⁸ Ibid., July 18, 1955, p. 102-103.

¹⁹ Keesing's, X, p. 14293.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Ibid., p. 14335.

Geneva"--an intangible, but apparently desirable accomplishment, at least to the typewriters of the world's press.²² A great number of subjects were brought forth and discussed to varying degrees. A startling proposal came from the U.S.A. when President Eisenhower on July 21 suggested an "open skies" plan to permit aerial inspection of the U.S.S.R. and U.S.A. (each by the other) in the interests of developing mutual confidence by permitting each side to better assess the military capabilities of the other.²³ The U.S.S.R. dismissed the proposal as being impractical. The U.S.S.R. suggested two different versions of European collective security treaties as prerequisites for German reunification, renewed the call for the Chinese People's Republic to take the Chinese seat in the United Nations Security Council, made a sweeping proposal for reduction of armaments and prohibition of atomic weapons, and refused to discuss either their East European satellites or international Communism.²⁴ The U.S.S.R. also invited the Big Three to do as the Soviets planned to do and reduce the strength of their armed forces by demobilizing the military contingents they were withdrawing from Austria.²⁵ This was asserted to be in the interests of relaxing international tensions.

The final act of the conference on July 23 was to issue a directive to the Big Four Foreign Ministers. This directive provided for general subjects to be considered under the following headings--European Security and Germany, Disarmament, and Developments of Contacts between East and West. The Foreign Ministers were to meet in Geneva in October.²⁶

²²Jan Librach, The Rise of the Soviet Empire (Revised edition; New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965), p. 207-208.

²³State Bulletin, Vol. XXXIII, August 1, 1955, p. 173-174.

²⁴Documents, 1955, p. 199-207, 210-211, 212-213, 220-222.

²⁵Ibid., p. 202.

²⁶Ibid., p. 225-227.

On the way back from Geneva the "team" of Bulganin and Khrushchev stopped in East Germany from July 24 to July 26, and in departing emphasized the need for East and West German rapprochement as the key to future reunification hopes.²⁷

On August 3 the Soviets in a note to the Federal Republic of Germany suggested talks in late August - early September in Moscow.²⁸ On August 12 the German reply suggested September 9 and agreed to an agenda of talks on diplomatic, trade, and cultural relations. In addition they proposed adding to the agenda the question of German unity and the release of those Germans who were still held in the U.S.S.R. or "in the Soviet Union's sphere of influence."²⁹ A week later the U.S.S.R. agreed to talks in Moscow on September 9. No mention of German prisoners of war was made by the Soviets, but they agreed to an exchange of views on international questions of interest to both parties.³⁰

On August 12 the U.S.S.R., as it had proposed at Geneva, announced a reduction of 640,000 troops to be completed by December 15, 1955.³¹ This was held to be possible due to a relaxation in international tensions--the spirit of Geneva! The demobilized troops were to be employed in industry and collectivized agriculture the announcement stated. This was soon followed by similar troop reduction announcements by the satellite nations.³²

²⁷ Keesing's, X, p. 14357.

²⁸ Ibid., p. 14393.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Ibid., p. 14394. Further propaganda value was derived by the Soviet announcement of December 12 that the reduction had been completed. Keesing's, X, p. 14599.

³² Ibid., p. 14384, 14441.

At Moscow on September 9 the U.S.S.R. and Federal German Republic representatives began talks. Initial Soviet statements concerned German unity and the problems that the current West German military alignments posed. Chancellor Adenauer responded by observing that "there can be no real security in Europe without restoration of German unity."³³ He emphasized that he could make no bilateral deals, the subject of German unity was for the discussion of the Big Four Foreign Ministers. He then brought up the question of German prisoners of war still in the Soviet Union and their possible return. Finally he agreed that diplomatic, economic, and cultural relations would be of advantage to the two countries. Negotiations became more strained in the days that followed as Premier Bulganin spoke of the fact that there were no German prisoners of war "only 9,626 convicted war criminals from the former Hitlerite Army." If the question of these men were to be discussed, the Soviets felt the German Democratic Republic should be equally represented. Dr. Adenauer countered with comments about terrible things the Soviet Army had done in its advance into Germany. Mr. Khrushchev interrupted to protest this allegation, then on the subject of reunification, "he said, 'You (Dr. Adenauer) must understand our position. We honestly and repeatedly warned you that the Paris Agreements and the entry of the German Federal Republic into NATO would block a solution of problems in the near future'."³⁴

Finally on September 13 a communique was issued stating that diplomatic relations would be established and trade negotiations would be held in the future. Premier Bulganin and Chancellor Adenauer exchanged letters repeating these statements and agreeing to establish diplomatic relations upon ratification by their legislatures.

³³Ibid., p. 14425.

³⁴Ibid.

Premier Bulganin in a final statement claimed there were 100,000 Soviet citizens that were being forced to remain on West German territory.³⁵ Dr. Adenauer at a press conference before leaving Moscow announced that he had sent a second letter to Premier Bulganin stressing that establishment of diplomatic relations in no way changed the Federal Government's opinion that final demarkation of the German borders must await the conclusion of a German peace treaty and the Federal Government considered itself the only legitimate government of all Germany (i.e., only freely elected). Further he stated that he had been given assurances that repatriations of the 9,626 Germans held in the U.S.S.R. would begin immediately. Also at that press conference he declared no secret agreements had been concluded between the two sides.

On September 15 the Soviet Government announced it regarded the frontiers of Germany as final, the question having been solved by the Potsdam agreement, and the German Federal Republic was carrying out its jurisdiction on the territory under its sovereignty.³⁶ This supported the July 6 declaration of Poland and the German Democratic Republic that the Oder-Neisse boundaries were "definite and irrevocably fixed."³⁷

On September 17 the German Democratic Republic and U.S.S.R. commenced negotiations in Moscow and on September 20 they signed a treaty. Parts of some of the articles are of particular interest:

Article 1. The contracting Parties solemnly reaffirm that the relations between them are based on full equality, mutual respect for each other's sovereignty and non-interference in each other's internal affairs.

The German Democratic Republic is accordingly free to decide questions of home and foreign policy, including its relations with the German Federal Republic and the development of relations with other states.

³⁵ Ibid., p. 14426.

³⁶ Ibid., p. 14427.

³⁷ Ibid., p. 14321.

Article 4. The Soviet forces now stationed on the territory of the German Democratic Republic in accordance with existing international agreements shall temporarily remain in the German Democratic Republic with the consent of its Government and on conditions to be defined by supplementary agreement between the Government of the Soviet Union and the Government of the German Democratic Republic.

The Soviet forces temporarily stationed on the territory of the German Democratic Republic shall not interfere in the internal affairs or the social and political life of the German Democratic Republic.³⁸ (Underlining mine.)

This treaty purported to restore sovereignty to East Germany, but Article 4 effectively nullified any claims of sovereignty. The U.S.S.R. also abolished its High Commission and assigned an Ambassador to East Germany to maintain relations with the Big Three on questions of four power concern. Release of East Germans held in the U.S.S.R. was to receive "favorable consideration" and the East German government would retain control of traffic (other than military traffic) across its territory from West Germany to Berlin, and also of the frontiers of the German Democratic Republic.³⁹ The real meaning of Article 4 was clear from this New Times statement:

On September 19 Herr Ulbricht said Soviet troops would remain in Eastern Germany 'so long as the Western Powers are unwilling to withdraw their troops from Western Germany and to liquidate their military bases there'.⁴⁰

Concurrently in Moscow there were negotiations between the U.S.S.R. and Finland (September 17 - September 19). They concluded an agreement for U.S.S.R. withdrawal from the Porkkala naval base and its return to Finland.⁴¹

³⁸ New Times, 1955, (Document Supplement) No. 39, September 22, 1955, p. 6-7.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 7-8.

⁴¹ Current Digest, November 2, 1955, p. 19-20.

On September 26 the U.S.S.R. announced a trip by top Soviet leaders would be made to the uncommitted nations of India, Burma, and Afghanistan.⁴² The next day Egypt disclosed the trade agreement it had previously announced (July 19) with Czechoslovakia was a barter arrangement of Egyptian cotton for Czechoslovakian arms.⁴³ On October 17 came the announcement of a Soviet offer of a \$200 million loan payable in Egyptian cotton and rice over a 30 year period, at two percent interest.⁴⁴ This represented one-third of the estimated cost of the Aswan dam--a project the Egyptians were having trouble financing.⁴⁵ Soviet emphasis was turning increasingly from Europe to Asia and the Middle East.

The Soviets announced their decision to repatriate the East and West German "war criminals" on September 28.⁴⁶ This was completed by the end of November.

The Big Four Foreign Ministers Conference (October 27 - November 16) was of little consequence. The Big Three felt they were able to accomplish one thing; they exposed the Soviet attitude on Germany very clearly. They offered that if free elections were held (the Eden plan from Berlin, 1954) and a united Germany was achieved, then a 100 to 150 mile zone would be established on Germany's eastern frontier in which equal limitation of armaments would be in effect. Radar networks would be established by each side in the other's territory to serve as a precaution against surprise attack. Finally the Big Three would undertake to defend the Eastern countries in the event of German

⁴²Barraclough and Wall, p. 177.

⁴³Librach, p. 208-209.

⁴⁴Keesing's, X, p. 14486.

⁴⁵Barraclough and Wall, p. 302-310.

⁴⁶The U.S. in World Affairs - 1955, p. 70-71.

aggression. This last item was aimed directly at the Soviets' claimed fears of aggression by Germany.⁴⁷ The Soviet Union rejected the whole plan. The West then claimed that this meant the U.S.S.R. wanted an all-Soviet Germany or at least as much of Germany Sovietized as possible (i.e., two Germanies). While this is no doubt true, the Western condition that "the final stage (of implementing the treaty) would become effective when a reunified Germany decides to enter NATO and the Western European Union" seemed to prejudice the situation just as much as the Soviet concept of "free elections."⁴⁸ The other issues of disarmament and increasing East-West contacts were uneventful. As an indicator of the degree to which disagreement existed, the final communique did not even have any of the customary reassuring diplomatic clichés about the positive aspects of the conference. It merely stated:

The Foreign Ministers agreed to report the result of their discussions to their respective Heads of Government and to recommend that the future course of the discussions of the Foreign Ministers should be settled through diplomatic channels.⁴⁹

From November 18 to December 19 the "team" of Bulganin and Khrushchev toured India, Burma, and Afghanistan, dispensing foreign aid and occasional invectives at the West as they traveled.⁵⁰ In terms of foreign aid they pledged to build a steel plant in India, set up a technical institute in Rangoon and in exchange for Burmese rice agreed that the U.S.S.R. would construct industrial plants and aid in the development of agriculture; and in Afghanistan they granted a \$100 million credit for economic purposes.⁵¹

⁴⁷State Bulletin, Vol. XXXIV, November 7, 1955, p. 729-732, and The U.S. in World Affairs - 1955, p. 75.

⁴⁸State Bulletin, Vol. XXXIV, November 7, 1955, p. 730.

⁴⁹Ibid., November 28, 1955, p. 886.

⁵⁰Ulam, p. 561-562.

⁵¹Barracough and Wall, p. 181, 182.

Though these were small ventures by Western standards, they were not from the former colonial powers and no political strings were attached and those two features alone made them valuable and important to these countries and others who saw what was being done. The Bandung Conference in April, 1955 had indicated the degree to which anything that resembled colonialism was hated.⁵² Special provisions, like the two or three percent interest rates with no repayments initially and overall loan periods of thirty years, while they did not make good economics for the U.S.S.R., did make good politics.

After this highly successful tour both Bulganin and Khrushchev reported to a session of the Supreme Soviet. Bulganin reported on the trip itself and its meaning for those who advocated "peaceful coexistence." He also directed a few pointed remarks at the colonial powers and exploiters.⁵³ Then Khrushchev berated colonizers and exploiters, especially countries like U.S.A., Britain, and France. Then turning to the entire world situation he spoke of the Communists' efforts at "peaceful coexistence" and how they had been able to prevent a new war. With regard to the German question, he said:

That under the present circumstances there is no real possibility of reuniting these two German states which differ so much.⁵⁴

He closed by saying:

The friendship of peoples throughout the world is a mighty source of strength for the peoples, barring the way to the unleashing of a new war.⁵⁵

The Communist efforts to get recognition for the German Democratic Republic received a setback in December with the announcement in Bonn of what

⁵²The U.S. in World Affairs - 1955, p. 104-108.

⁵³Current Digest, January 8, 1956, p. 14-20.

⁵⁴Ibid., January 15, 1956, p. 18.

⁵⁵Ibid., p. 20.

became known as the "Hallstein doctrine." It declared that the Federal Republic of Germany would break off diplomatic relations with all countries that recognized the East German regime, and would refuse to enter into diplomatic relations with any Communist country except the Soviet Union.⁵⁶

On January 18 the East Germans passed a law setting up a National People's Army. Though no official announcement was made, it was understood that the East German paramilitary force, the "Barracked People's Police" (estimated 100,000 strong) were to be incorporated into this National People's Army.⁵⁷

On January 23, 1956, Premier Bulganin sent a letter to President Eisenhower proposing a bilateral treaty of friendship and cooperation.⁵⁸ On January 28 President Eisenhower answered the proposal and rejected it stating that it was unnecessary as all items were provided for in the United Nations charter that they both had signed.⁵⁹ He then suggested Soviet deeds would be far more effective in improving relations. This Soviet effort apparently was aimed at reducing the sense of frustration that was present at the end of the Geneva Foreign Ministers' Conference--certainly it was in keeping with the "peaceful coexistence" policy announced at the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

The Twentieth Party Congress (February 14 - February 25, 1956) brings this period to a close. At this Congress First Secretary of the Communist Party Central Committee Khrushchev in the keynote speech declared: "war is not a fatalistic inevitability." He went on to say:

⁵⁶Keesing's X, p. 14606.

⁵⁷Ibid., p. 14701.

⁵⁸State Bulletin, Vol. XXXIV, February 6, 1956, p. 192-195.

⁵⁹Ibid., p. 191-192.

Indeed, there are only two ways: either peaceful coexistence or the most destructive war in history. There is no third way.

As far back as on the eve of the great October socialist revolution, V. I. Lenin wrote: 'All nations will arrive at socialism - this is inevitable - but not all will do so the same way'.⁶⁰ (Underlining mine.)

Clearly the attitude of the Soviet Union's leadership had changed since Stalin's death.

This period from NATO membership for the Federal German Republic to the Twentieth Party Congress made it increasingly clear that Germany was to stay divided unless it was united on Soviet terms. It also saw the Soviet's two top leaders become international figures by traveling outside the boundaries of Soviet control to Geneva and throughout Asia--a practice Stalin never engaged in.

The Soviet Union during this period recognized the opportunity for new gains, at least in influence, if not control in the bloc of neutral nations and began efforts to that end.

⁶⁰ Leo Gruliov (ed.) Current Soviet Policies, Vol. II (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1957), p. 37.

VI. CONCLUSIONS

The four years from Stalin's death to Khrushchev's non-inevitability of war and peaceful coexistence statements at the Twentieth Party Congress constitute one of the most important periods of the Twentieth Century, excluding the World Wars. West opposed East in a struggle over the future of Europe, manifested primarily in the question of Germany and its rearmament. This struggle resulted in the finalizing of a stalemate over Europe, a stalemate that has continued for fifteen years.

Under Stalin the Soviets had tested Western resolve in the post-war years and in so doing had united the West in opposition to them. After Stalin's death the West, though united against the Soviets, seemed eager for a relaxation of tensions. The Soviets, hoping for a deterioration of the West's unity, accommodated the West by actions such as: the ending of the Korean War and agreeing to the first Foreign Ministers' Conference in five years. The Soviets further supported every spokesman or group that could create a divisive force in the Western bloc; every effort was made to exploit the contradictions of the capitalists.¹ Throughout this period the Soviets gave particular emphasis to the theory that West Germany once rearmed would soon dominate the other nations in Europe, especially France and Italy.² All these factors promoted delays of French debate on the EDC treaty and finally aided in the EDC treaty's defeat. As has been suggested, perhaps the Soviets even made a deal with the

¹For example: Herr Ollenhauer, the leader of the West German Social Democratic party, continually placed reunification as the first priority and often was taking positions counter to Chancellor Adenauer's policy (Christian Democratic Union); these received thorough coverage in the Soviet press. Statements by anti-Hitlerite groups on Germany were likewise supported.

²Examples of this theme are found in Current Digest, September 5, 1953, p. 12; July 28, 1954, p. 10; October 13, 1954, p. 11; October 20, 1954, p. 13, 15; and November 17, 1954, p. 13. Also New York Times, February 7, 1955, p. 7 quotes a Pravda article of the same date.

French concerning the EDC defeat in return for a less favorable (to the Communists) Indochina settlement.³ A continuation of these tactics followed the EDC defeat. Despite their acquiescing to the Trieste settlement, agreeing to work seriously for an Austrian treaty, and making overtures to the "reunification first" factions in West Germany, the Soviets were unable to prevent ratification of the Paris agreements. The issues were too clear and the only concession that could have prevented ratification was too costly for the Soviets to allow--that is, "free elections." The risks of Western style free elections throughout Germany were just too great for the Soviet Union to be willing to take any chances.⁴ The West German Communist Party was inconsequential;⁵ memories of the June, 1953 East Berlin riots plus the continuing problem of people "voting with their feet" made the possibility of Communist success in Western-style free elections in Germany out of the question.⁶ Even some form of coalition government based on population or territory (therefore East inferior to West) was too risky for the Soviets. Thus, the NATO allies' unified stand on the rearmament of West Germany meant that the Soviet goal of domination or control of all of Germany was not to be achieved, nor was Germany to be neutralized as the Soviets occasionally suggested.

Though this must be categorized as a defeat for Soviet foreign policy, there were some considerations that offset the magnitude of the defeat. Soviet

³See page 30 and footnote 48, Chapter III.

⁴For the Soviet view of what "free elections" means, see the Soviet editorial on p. 18 of Current Digest, February 24, 1954.

⁵West German National Election results for the West German Communist Party (Keesing's, IX, p. 13142):
 1949 - 1,361,706 votes (5.7%) - 15 seats
 1953 - 607,413 votes (2.2%) - 0 seats

⁶Adenauer stated that from September 21, 1949 to September 30, 1954, 1,149,973 people had left East Berlin and East Germany; from the death of Stalin until September 30, 1954, 420,890 people had left East Berlin and East Germany. (Keesing's, IX, p. 13897.)

control over East Germany meant the threat of Western influence in Eastern Europe would remain minimal. The rearmament of West Germany provided justification for the Warsaw Pact, with its political and military potential, thus enabling the U.S.S.R. to continue to maintain control over its satellites. Cries of West German revanchism are still heard today. Furthermore, Poland realized that the Oder-Neisse border's final settlement still depended on the U.S.S.R. That same Oder-Neisse border question offered the Communists a future bargaining point with the West. The status of Berlin and access to it were more future bargaining points with the West. By granting "sovereignty" to the German Democratic Republic and letting it guard "its frontiers" and control civilian access to Berlin, the U.S.S.R. had a convenient pinprick to use to agitate for recognition of the German Democratic Republic and to present a continual nuisance problem for the West. Already this had proven its harassment value to the Soviets; in March, 1955 the truck tolls were raised eleven-fold.⁷ The U.S.S.R. had refused responsibility for control of these commercial charges, despite Western demands. After rearmament (in June), a token reduction was made in the tolls.⁸ After the U.S.S.R.-German (West, then East) talks in September, the U.S.S.R. had vexed the West by reiterating the question of German borders was settled and control of non-military access to Berlin was the East German government's responsibility.⁹ To emphasize this even further, in late November a U.S. Army vehicle driven by a U.S. Army officer and occupied by a U.S. Congressman, his wife, and another U.S.

⁷The U.S. in World Affairs - 1955, p. 73.

⁸Ibid.

⁹State Bulletin, Vol. XXXIII, October 17, 1955, p. 616 and November 7, 1955, p. 734-735.

Congressman had been detained in East Berlin at gunpoint for violating East German law by having a radio telephone in the vehicle.¹⁰

With the Warsaw Pact, the Soviet Union had provided itself a "Cordon Sanitaire."¹¹ With Finland, Sweden, and Austria neutral and Tito appearing to be neutral or pro-Soviet, a buffer zone had been established. If in the future West Germany or at least part of West Germany could be neutralized, the buffer zone would be extended that much further West in Europe.

With return of Porkkala to Finland (and Port Arthur to the Chinese People's Republic), the Soviets could claim that they had liquidated their overseas bases--why did the West (read U.S.A.) refuse to?¹² The matter of Western overseas bases had been a continuing target of Soviet criticism.¹³ The Red Army's presence in Europe, of course, was a completely different situation.

With regard to Austria, the Soviets had never been entrenched there as they had in Germany, so the "loss" was not too great, especially since the manpower the troops represented was needed in the Soviet farms and factories.¹⁴ With a neutralized Austria, the Soviets forced north-south NATO land supply lines to go via France (a military advantage for the Communists in the event of a limited type war in Europe). Removing Soviet troops from Austria also reduced the "surrounded" feeling Yugoslavia must have had prior to this time,

¹⁰ Ibid., December 19, 1955, p. 1012-1014.

¹¹ Vaclav Benes, Andrew Gyorgy, and George Stambuk, Eastern European Government and Politics (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), p. 9.

¹² Donald W. Treadgold, Twentieth Century Russia (Second ed. Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1964), p. 472.

¹³ John S. Reshetar, Jr., A Concise History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Revised ed.; New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1964), p. 266.

¹⁴ Ulam, p. 570.

thus possibly contributing to the rapprochement with Yugoslavia. As for the satellites, the West had begrudgingly accepted that they were completely within the Soviet sphere of influence at the Geneva Conference.¹⁵ Thus by 1956 the European commitments of the U.S.S.R. and the West were more clearly defined than at any previous time since 1945.

On the international scene the most important change of the period was the break with the Stalinist bipolar concept of the world and the recognition of the usefulness of the "neutrals" as potential allies against the West (in the United Nations, etc.). The decolonization actions of the West made Communist gains possible and likely. Western actions such as setting up SEATO made it plain that the West was anxious to maintain and extend its influence in the Third World, but the memories of and association with colonialism were a millstone with which only the West had to contend. It is worthy of note that the U.S.S.R., though it criticized SEATO in its press, did not do as Stalin had done with NATO--bitterly attack it in a memorandum to its members that united them even more.¹⁶ The April 20 - April 27, 1954 Supreme Soviet meeting marked the start of an intensified effort to improve the Communist international peace-loving, non-aggressive image by increased participation in the United Nations (see page 27). The Ukrainian and Belorussian Republics and European satellites had followed this example shortly thereafter.¹⁷ To counter

¹⁵Ibid.

¹⁶Documents on American Foreign Relations XI, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950), p. 607-609.

¹⁷Dates of joining:

UNESCO: Ukraine and Belorussia - May 12

ILO: Ukraine and Belorussia - May 13

Keessing's IX, p. 13549, 13585.

any claims of exploitation of the satellite countries, the U.S.S.R. had turned over their interest in the various joint stock companies to the satellites.¹⁸

In keeping with the Soviet's peace-loving and non-exploiting message, the Soviets propagandized the idea that the peoples of the West were peace-loving, but their pleas were not being heeded by the aggressive, war-mongering, ruling classes. For example, Premier Malenkov in his August 8, 1953 speech to the Supreme Soviet praised President Eisenhower's speech of April 16, 1953 (to American Society of Newspaper Editors), especially Eisenhower's statement that there was not a single disputed issue "whether it be great or small, which is insoluble if there is the desire to respect the rights of all other countries." Malenkov then credited Eisenhower with being a reasonable and concerned individual, but "the actual policy of the ruling circles in the United States of America is an irreconcilable contradiction to the statement by President Eisenhower."¹⁹

An added stimulus for Soviet efforts in the Third World was the success of the Chinese Communists at the Bandung Conference in April 1955, lest the Chinese acquire hegemony in the Third World. The Geneva conference and Asian trip of 1955 helped the Communists' image immensely. They appeared as smiling, ordinary men, not at all as the West had described them. Hugh Seton-Watson writing in the 1960's observed:

From this time (Autumn, 1955) onwards the main emphasis of Soviet foreign policy, and the main direction of Soviet expansion, has been towards the under-developed societies.²⁰

Mr. Seton-Watson overstated his point somewhat as events in Europe since 1955

¹⁸Keessing's, IX, p. 13935, 13879, 13801.

¹⁹Current Digest, September 5, 1953, p. 11.

²⁰Hugh Seton-Watson, The New Imperialism (Chester Springs, Pennsylvania: Capricorn Books Edition, 1967), p. 103.

have demonstrated. The high priority of European affairs in Soviet foreign policy has never diminished, nonetheless the Soviet actions in 1955 mark the watershed of developing attention to the affairs of the Third World.²¹

The various Soviet policy shifts throughout this period can be seen by analyzing the May Day and the Anniversary of the October Revolution slogans from 1952 to the end of this period. They indicate a slow, but steady build-up against German militarism, against nuclear weapons, large armaments, the possibility of new war, and for European collective security--culminating in the May Day 1955 slogans. A shift then occurs. Themes of European collective security, peaceful coexistence, and arms' reduction are presented in the 1955 October Revolution slogans and in the 1956 May Day slogans. Increasing interest in the Third World is also indicated. (See Appendix for text of the slogans.)

In conclusion it may be said that after Stalin's death Soviet foreign policy emphasized peaceful coexistence practices which finally gave way to the peaceful coexistence pronouncements of Khrushchev supported by growing Soviet nuclear strength and developing efforts in the Third World.²² The Communists recognized the need to respond to changing world situations and opportunities, and not tie themselves down to an inflexible, negative policy.²³

The West must continue to remember in its dealings with the Soviet Union that although the Soviets say they despise "positions of strength," this is

²¹Oleg Penkovskiy, The Penkovskiy Papers (New York: Avon Books, 1966), p. 69.

²²The effectiveness of this new effort is alarmingly brought out in Vernon V. Aspaturian, "The Challenge of Soviet Foreign Policy," The Revolution in World Politics ed. Morton A. Kaplan (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1962), p. 209-232, especially p. 231-232.

²³Shulman, p. 10 states: "In 1961 Mikoyan disclosed that the line advanced at the Twentieth Congress in 1956 had evolved through two years of thought and action beforehand."

only because they understand its significance as an instrument of foreign policy.²⁴ Future challenges by the Soviets now, as then, will not be just on the periphery of their empire, but throughout the world as the United States and the Soviet Union engage in a continuing struggle for influence over the future of every nation in the world.

²⁴For amplification of this, see Brewster C. Denny's "The Soviet Evaluation of the Instruments and Intentions of Post-War American Foreign Policy, 1952-1956." Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, 1959, p. 65-66.

APPENDIX

1952

MAY DAY SLOGANS OF CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF
THE SOVIET UNION

(Pravda and Izvestia, April 22, p. 1.)

1. Long live May First, the day of the international solidarity of the working people, the day of the brotherhood of the workers of all countries!
2. Fraternal greetings to all the peoples struggling against the aggressors and instigators of a new war, for peace, for democracy, for socialism!
3. Fraternal greetings to the working people of the people's democracies, successfully building socialism!
4. Fraternal greetings to the great Chinese people, who have won new successes in construction of the people's democratic China! Long live the unbreakable friendship of the peoples of China and the Soviet Union, a mighty force in the struggle for peace throughout the world!
5. Fraternal greetings to the valiant Korean people, heroically defending their freedom and independence in the struggle against the foreign aggressors!
6. Greetings to the democratic forces of Germany, struggling against the criminal plans to turn Western Germany into a base of imperialist aggression in Europe! For a united, independent, democratic, peace-loving German state!
7. Greetings to the glorious patriots of Yugoslavia, waging the struggle for liberation against the fascist regime of the Tito-Rankovic clique, for the independence of their motherland from the imperialists!
8. Greetings to the Japanese people, valiantly struggling against the foreign occupation, for the rebirth and independence of their motherland, for the maintenance of peace!
9. Long live the friendship of the peoples of Britain, the United States of America and the Soviet Union in their struggle to avert war and ensure a lasting peace throughout the world!
10. Working people of all countries! Peace will be maintained and made lasting if the peoples take the cause of maintaining peace into their own hands and stand by it to the end! Strengthen the unity of the peoples in the struggle for peace, multiply and rally the ranks of the peace partisans!
11. Peace partisans throughout the world! Expose and thwart the criminal plans of the imperialist aggressors, do not allow the warmongers to confuse the masses with lies and drag them into a new world war!
12. Long live the foreign policy of the Soviet Union, a policy of peace and security, equal rights and friendship among peoples!
13. Glory to the Soviet Army and Navy, standing on guard for peace and security, equal rights and friendship among peoples!
14. Men of the Soviet armed forces! Stubbornly increase your technical and political knowledge, improve your fighting skill! Strengthen the might of the armed forces of the Soviet Union!
15. Long live the Soviet frontier troops, the vigilant sentinels over the sacred boundaries of our motherland!

(The remaining slogans, 16-59, were concerned with domestic affairs and were not relevant to this paper.) Current Digest, May 17, 1952, p. 3.

1952

PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE SLOGANS FOR 35TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE
GREAT OCTOBER SOCIALIST REVOLUTION

(Pravda and Izvestia, Oct. 30, p. 1)

1. Long live the 35th anniversary of the great October revolution!
2. Long live peace among peoples of all nations! Down with warmongers!
3. Fraternal greetings to all peoples fighting against the imperialist aggressors and warmongers, for peace, for democracy and for socialism!
4. Fraternal greetings to the peoples of the colonial and dependent countries, struggling against the imperialist enslavers for their freedom and national independence!
5. Fraternal greetings to the working people of people's democracies, who are successfully building socialism! Long live and strengthen the unbreakable friendship and cooperation of people's democracies and the Soviet Union!
6. Fraternal greetings to the great Chinese people who have achieved new successes in the building of the powerful people's democratic Chinese state! May the great friendship of the Chinese People's Republic and the Soviet Union grow strong and flourish--the firm bastion of peace and security in the Far East and throughout the world!
7. Fraternal greetings to the heroic Korean people, courageously defending the freedom and independence of their motherland in their struggle against foreign marauders!
8. Greetings to the German people, who are fighting for a united, independent, democratic and peace-loving Germany, for a speedy conclusion of a peace treaty in the interest of the German people and for peace throughout the world!
9. Greetings to the fraternal Communist Parties, which are leading the peoples' struggle in capitalist, colonial and dependent countries for peace, democracy, socialism and national independence!
10. Greetings to the patriots of Yugoslavia, fighting for the liberation of their country from the fascist oppression of the Tito-Rankovic clique and imperialist slavery!
11. Greetings to the Japanese people, courageously fighting against foreign occupation for national regeneration, for the freedom and independence of their motherland and for the maintenance of peace!
12. Long live the friendship of the peoples of Great Britain, the United States of America and the Soviet Union in their struggle for the prevention of war and the maintenance of a firm peace throughout the world!
13. Working people of all countries! Peace will be maintained and strengthened if the peoples take the cause of maintaining peace into their own hands and defend it to the end! Fortify the peoples' unity in their struggle for peace! Rally and multiply the ranks of the peace partisans!
14. Peace partisans throughout the world! Expose and undermine the criminal plans for the imperialist aggressors! Do not allow the warmongers to confuse the masses with lies and involve them in a new world war!
15. Long live the foreign policy of the Soviet Union--the policy of peace, security, international cooperation and the development of trade with all countries!

16. Glory to the Soviet Army and Navy, standing guard over peace and the security of our motherland!

17. Soviet warriors! Persistently increase your military and political knowledge, and perfect your combat skill! Untiringly strengthen the defensive might of the socialist state!

18. Long live the Soviet frontier troops--the vigilant sentinels of the sacred frontiers of our motherland!

(The remaining slogans, 19-67, were concerned with domestic affairs and were not relevant to this paper.)

Current Digest, Dec. 13, 1952, p. 9.

1953

MAY DAY SLOGANS OF CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF
THE SOVIET UNION

(Pravda and Izvestia, April 22, p. 1)

1. Long live May Day, the day of the international solidarity of the working people, the day of the brotherhood of the workers of all countries! Higher the banner of proletarian internationalism!
2. Long live peace among peoples! There is no controversial or unresolved issue which cannot be solved peacefully on the basis of mutual understanding of the countries concerned!
3. Working people of all countries! Peace will be preserved and consolidated if the peoples take the cause of preserving peace into their own hands and defend it to the end! Strengthen the unity of the peoples in the fight for peace, increase and rally the ranks of the peace partisans!
4. Fraternal greetings to the working people of the people's democracies, successfully building socialism! May the indissoluble friendship and cooperation of the people's democracies and the Soviet Union flourish and grow stronger!
5. Fraternal greetings to the great Chinese people, who have scored new successes in building a mighty, people's democratic Chinese state! May the great friendship of the Chinese People's Republic and the Soviet Union, firm bulwark of peace and security in the Far East and throughout the world, grow stronger and flourish!
6. Fraternal greetings to the heroic Korean people, fighting for the freedom and independence of their homeland!
7. Greetings to the German people, fighting for the most rapid conclusion of a peace treaty, for formation of a united, independent, peace-loving, democratic Germany!
8. Greetings to the Japanese people, courageously fighting for national rebirth, for an independent, democratic and peace-loving Japan!
9. Fraternal greetings to the peoples of the colonial and dependent countries, fighting against imperialist oppression, for their freedom and national independence!
10. Long live the friendship of the peoples of Britain, the United States of America and the Soviet Union in their struggle to avert war and ensure lasting world peace!
11. Long live the foreign policy of the Soviet Union, an unshakeable policy of maintaining and consolidating peace, of combating the preparation and unleashing of a new war, a policy of international cooperation and development of commercial relations with all countries!
12. Fraternal greetings to all peoples fighting for peace, for democracy, for socialism, against the instigators of a new war!
13. Soviet fighting men! Stubbornly increase your military and political knowledge and improve your fighting skill! Tirelessly strengthen the defense capacity of the socialist state! Glory to the Soviet armed forces, standing guard over the peace and security of our homeland!

(The remaining slogans, 14-47, were concerned with domestic affairs and were not relevant to this paper.) Current Digest, May 23, 1953, p. 5.

1953

PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE SLOGANS FOR THE 36TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE
GREAT OCTOBER SOCIALIST REVOLUTION

(Pravda and Izvestia, Oct. 25, p. 1)

1. Long live the 36th anniversary of the great October socialist revolution!
2. Long live the international solidarity of the working people in every country!
3. Fraternal greetings to all people fighting for peace, democracy and socialism!
4. Long live peace among peoples! There is no dispute or unsolved question which cannot be settled by peaceful means on the basis of mutual understanding among the countries concerned!
5. Working peoples of all countries! Strengthen the peoples' unity in fight to ease international tension, for peace and against the aggressive forces trying to unleash a new world war! Multiply and rally the ranks of the peace partisans!
6. Fraternal greetings to the working people of the people's democracies, who are successfully fighting to advance national economy and raise the people's material and cultural living standards, to construct a socialist society! Long live and strengthen the unbreakable friendship and cooperation between the people's democracies and the Soviet Union!
7. Fraternal greetings to the great Chinese people, who are fighting successfully to industrialize their country, to develop further the economy and culture, to strengthen thoroughly their people's democratic state! Long live and flourish the indestructible fraternal friendship and close cooperation between the Soviet Union and the Chinese People's Republic for the good of our countries' peoples and the consolidation of peace and international security!
8. Fraternal greetings to the heroic Korean people, who have defended their native land from the interventionists, who are fighting for the re-establishment of the national economy, for peace, for national unity!
9. Greetings to the democratic forces to Germany fighting against the criminal plans for transforming Western Germany into a center for a third world war! Long live the German Democratic Republic--a bastion in the struggle for a united, independent, peace-loving and democratic Germany!
10. Greetings to the Japanese people, who are courageously fighting for national independence, for the peaceful and democratic development of their motherland, against the conversion of Japan into a military springboard of the imperialists!
11. Fraternal greetings to the peoples in colonial and dependent countries fighting against the imperialist yoke, for their freedom and national independence!
12. Long live the friendship of the peoples of Great Britain, United States of America and the Soviet Union in their struggle for the prevention of war and the maintenance of a firm peace throughout the world!
13. Long live the friendship between the peoples of the Soviet Union and the peoples of France and Italy!
14. Long live the foreign policy of the Soviet Union--a firm policy for the maintenance and consolidation of peace, for the struggle against the

preparation and unleashing of a new war, policy of international cooperation and the development of trade with all countries!

15. Soviet armed forces! Persistently increase your military and political knowledge and perfect your combat skill! Untiringly strengthen the defense might of the socialist state! Glory to the Soviet armed forces, standing on guard of peace and the security of our motherland!

(The remaining slogans, 16-57, were concerned with domestic affairs and were not relevant to this paper.)

Current Digest, Dec. 9, 1953, p. 3.

1954

MAY DAY SLOGANS OF CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF
THE SOVIET UNION

(Pravda and Izvestia, April 21, p. 1)

1. Long live May Day, day of the international solidarity of the working people, day of brotherhood of the workers of all countries! Higher the banner of proletarian internationalism!

2. Fraternal greetings to all peoples fighting for peace, for democracy, for socialism!

3. Working people of all countries! Peace will be preserved and strengthened if the peoples take the cause of maintaining peace into their own hands and defend it to the end! Strengthen the unity of the peoples in the fight for peace, increase and rally the ranks of the peace partisans! Long live lasting peace among peoples!

4. May the solidarity of the peoples grow stronger in the struggle against the revival of German militarism, against the establishment of aggressive military groupings! For a lasting peace and collective security for all European peoples!

5. Fraternal greetings to the working people of the people's democracies, who are building a new, socialist life, who are struggling successfully for the further development of industry and agriculture, for a constant rise in the welfare of the people! Long live and prosper the indissoluble friendship and cooperation between the people's democracies and the Soviet Union!

6. Fraternal greetings to the great Chinese people, who are fighting successfully for the socialist industrialization of the country, for an economic and cultural advance, for the further development and strengthening of their people's democratic system! Long live and flourish the indissoluble, fraternal friendship and cooperation of the Soviet and Chinese peoples--a mighty factor in maintaining peace and safeguarding the security of the peoples of all countries!

7. Fraternal greetings to the heroic people of the Korean People's Democratic Republic, who have defended their native land from the interventionists, who are fighting for economic restoration, for peace and for the national unification of Korea on democratic lines!

8. Greetings to the democratic forces of Germany, fighting against criminal plans to make Western Germany the nidus of a third world war! Long live the German Democratic Republic--a reliable stronghold in the struggle for a united, peace-loving, democratic Germany, for the preservation and strengthening of peace!

9. Greetings to the Japanese people, courageously fighting for national independence, for democratic development of the motherland, against the revival of Japanese militarism and the conversion of Japan into a military springboard of the imperialists in the Far East!

10. Fraternal greetings to the peoples of the colonial and dependent countries, fighting against the imperialist yoke, for their freedom and national independence!

11. Long live the friendship of the peoples of Great Britain, the United States of America and the Soviet Union in their struggle to ease world tension, avert war and secure lasting peace throughout the world!

12. Long live the friendship between the peoples of the Soviet Union and the peoples of France and Italy!

13. Long live the foreign policy of the Soviet Union--a consistent policy of maintaining and strengthening peace, a policy of struggle against the preparation and unleashing of a new war, for the establishment of normal relations and business ties among all countries!

14. Fighting men of the Soviet Army and Navy! Constantly increase your military and political knowledge, perfect your combat skill, master new equipment and arms! Long live and prosper the Soviet armed forces, covered with the glory of victories, standing guard over the peace and security of our motherland!

(The remaining slogans, 15-61, were concerned with domestic affairs and were not relevant to this paper.)

Current Digest, June 2, 1954, p. 12.

1954

PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE SLOGANS FOR THE 37TH ANNIVERSARY OF
THE GREAT OCTOBER SOCIALIST REVOLUTION

(Pravda and Izvestia, Oct. 24, p. 1.)

1. Long live the 37th anniversary of the great October socialist revolution!
2. Long live the international solidarity of the working people throughout the world!
3. Fraternal greetings to all peoples fighting for peace, democracy, socialism!
4. Working people of all countries! Peace will be maintained and consolidated if people take the matter of maintaining peace into their own hands and defend it to the end! Strengthen unity among peoples in the struggle for peace! Long live lasting peace among peoples!
5. Long live the mighty movement of peace partisans throughout the world! Working people of all countries, struggle actively against the threat of a new world war and for peaceful cooperation among peoples!
6. Working people of all countries! Struggle for the banning of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass annihilation and for a general curtailment of armaments!
7. May the solidarity of the peoples strengthen in the struggle against the revival of German militarism, against the formation of aggressive military alliances! For lasting peace and collective security for all European peoples!
8. Fraternal greetings to the working people of the people's democracies, who are successfully fighting for the further development of national economy, for a steady increase in peoples' well-being and for the construction of a socialist society! Long live and strengthen the indestructible friendship and cooperation between the people's democracies and the Soviet Union.
9. Fraternal greetings to the great Chinese people, who are successfully struggling for the development of their national economy and culture, for the industrialization of the country, for the construction of the bases of socialism! Long live and prosper the indestructible friendship and cooperation between the Soviet and Chinese peoples--a powerful factor for peace throughout the world!
10. Fraternal greetings to the heroic people of the Korean People's Democratic Republic, who are struggling for the restoration of its national economy, for peace, for the national unification of Korea on democratic foundations!
11. Fraternal greetings to the heroic people of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, who are struggling for peace and democracy and for the restoration of the national economy of their motherland!
12. Greetings to the peace-loving forces of Germany, which are struggling against the criminal plans for converting West Germany into the center of a third world war! Long live the German Democratic Republic--a reliable stronghold in the struggle to create a united, independent, democratic and peace-loving Germany. May the indestructible friendship between the German and Soviet peoples grow and strengthen for the good of consolidating peace in Europe!

13. May the friendship and cooperation between the peoples of the Soviet Union and India extend and strengthen for the good of peace throughout the world!

14. Fraternal greetings to the peoples of colonial and dependent countries, who are fighting against imperialist oppression, for their freedom and national independence!

15. Long live the friendship between the peoples of Britain, the U.S.A. and the Soviet Union in their struggle for further easing international tension, for averting a war and for guaranteeing lasting peace throughout the world!

16. May the friendship and cooperation between the peoples of the Soviet Union and the peoples of France and Italy strengthen in their struggle for peace, against the revival of German militarism and for the establishment of collective security in Europe!

17. Greetings to the Japanese people, who are courageously struggling for national independence, for the democratic development of their motherland, against the revival of Japanese militarism and the conversion of Japan into a military stronghold of the imperialists in the Far East!

18. Long live the peace-loving foreign policy of the Soviet Union--an unwavering policy of the preservation and consolidation of peace, a policy of struggle against the preparation for and unleashing of a new war, a policy of international cooperation and the development of business relations with all countries!

19. Servicemen of the Soviet Army and Navy! Persistently raise your military and political knowledge, perfect your combat skill, master new equipment and armaments! Long live and strengthen the glorious victories of the Soviet Armed Forces, which are standing guard over the peace and security of our motherland!

(The remaining slogans, 20-66, were concerned with domestic affairs and were not relevant to this paper.)

1955

MAY DAY SLOGANS OF CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY
OF THE SOVIET UNION

(Pravda and Izvestia, April 21, p. 1.)

1. Long live May Day--day of the international solidarity of working people, day of brotherhood of the workers of all countries! Up with the banner of proletarian internationalism! Proletarians of all countries, unite!

2. Fraternal greetings to all peoples struggling for peace, democracy and socialism!

3. Working people of all countries! Peace will be preserved and strengthened if the peoples take the cause of preserving peace into their own hands and defend it to the last! Long live the unity of the peoples in the struggle for peace! Long live lasting peace among peoples!

4. Long live the powerful movement of partisans of world peace! Working people of all countries, strive actively against the threat of a new world war, for the peaceful cooperation of peoples! Augment and unify the ranks of the partisans of peace!

5. Working people of all countries! Struggle for the banning of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass annihilation, for the universal reduction of armaments!

6. May the solidarity of the peoples in the struggle against the revival of German militarism be strengthened! For lasting peace and collective security for all European peoples!

7. Working people of the Soviet Union and the people's democracies! Let us answer the intrigues of the enemies of peace with further unification of our force, increasing the economic and defensive might of the countries in the democratic camp! Let us unite our efforts more closely in the struggle for peace, against the threat of aggression!

8. Fraternal greetings to the Chinese, who are successfully struggling to fulfill the First Five-Year Plan for the development of their national economy, for the industrialization of the country and for building the bases of socialism! Long live and flourish the indestructible friendship and cooperation of the Soviet and Chinese peoples--a powerful factor in world peace!

9. Fraternal greetings to the working people of the people's democracies, who are struggling successfully for the further upsurge of national economy and culture, for strengthening the might of the people's democratic states and steadily improving the well-being of the peoples, for building socialism! Long live and flourish the indestructible friendship and cooperation of the people's democracies and the Soviet Union!

10. Fraternal greetings to the heroic people of the Korean People's Democratic Republic, struggling for the restoration of their national economy, for peace and for the national unification of Korea on democratic principles!

11. Fraternal greetings to the heroic people of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, struggling for peace and democracy, for the restoration of the national economy of their country!

12. Greetings to the peace-loving forces of Germany, struggling against the policy of turning Western Germany into the breeding ground of a third world war! Long live the German Democratic Republic--the reliable stronghold of the struggle for the setting up of a single, independent, democratic and peace-loving Germany!

13. Greetings to the people of India! May the friendship and cooperation between the people of the Soviet Union and India become stronger for the good of world peace!

14. Greetings to the peoples of colonial and dependent countries, struggling against the imperialist yoke and for their freedom and national independence.

15. Greetings to the peoples of Asia and Africa, struggling against colonial and racial oppression and for the easing of international tension!

16. Long live the friendship and cooperation of the peoples of Britain, the United States of America and the Soviet Union in their struggle to ease international tension and to ensure peaceful coexistence between states and lasting world peace!

17. May the friendship and cooperation between the peoples of the Soviet Union and those of France and Italy become stronger in their struggle for peace, against the revival of German militarism and for collective security in Europe!

18. Greetings to the Japanese people, courageously striving for national independence, for the democratic development of their country, against the revival of militarism and the conversion of Japan into a military springboard of the imperialists in the Far East!

19. Greetings to the Austrian people, who stand in favor of a democratic, independent and peace-loving Austria!

20. Long live the U.S.S.R.'s peace-loving foreign policy--a consistent policy of maintaining and consolidating peace, a policy of struggle against the preparation and launching of a new war, a policy of international co-operation and the development of business relations with all countries!

21. Servicemen of the Soviet Army and Navy! Steadily increase your military and political knowledge, perfect your combat skill, master the latest military equipment and modern armaments! Long live and flourish the valiant Soviet armed forces, crowned with the glory of their victories, who are standing guard over the peace and security of our motherland!

(The remaining slogans, 22-69, were concerned with domestic affairs and were not relevant to this paper.)

1955

PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE SLOGANS FOR THE 38TH ANNIVERSARY OF
THE GREAT OCTOBER SOCIALIST REVOLUTION

(Pravda and Izvestia, Oct. 25, p. 1.)

1. Long live the 38th anniversary of the great October socialist revolution!
2. Working people of all countries! Peace will be preserved and strengthened if the peoples take the cause of preserving peace into their own hands and defend it to the last! Strengthen the unity of peoples in the struggle for peace!
3. Fraternal greetings to all peoples fighting for peace, democracy and socialism!
4. Fighters for peace in all countries! Rally the mighty front of the defenders of peace against the instigators of a new war; draw ever wider masses of the people into the front; be vigilant against the intrigues of the enemies of peace! Lift higher the banner of the struggle for peace and co-operation among peoples!
5. Working people of all countries! Strive for the curtailing of armaments! Demand the banning of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass annihilations! Atomic energy--in the service of the cause of peace and the progress of mankind!
6. For lasting peace and collective security for all European peoples!
7. Working people of the Soviet Union and the people's democracies! Unceasingly strengthen the might of the camp of socialism and democracy--the impregnable stronghold of peace; develop and strengthen fraternal friendship and cooperation among the peoples of our countries!
8. Fraternal greetings to the working people of the people's democracies of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Rumania, Albania and the Mongolian People's Republic, which are unselfishly struggling for the further increase in the national economy and culture, for a steady rise in the well-being of the masses of the people, for peace and for the building of socialism!
9. Fraternal greetings to the great Chinese people, who are successfully struggling to fulfill the First Five-Year Plan for the development of their national economy, for the industrialization of their country and cooperative reform of its agriculture, for the construction of the foundations of socialism! Long live the Chinese People's Republic--a mighty world power! Long live and flourish the indestructible friendship and cooperation between the Soviet and Chinese peoples--a powerful factor for world peace!
10. Fraternal greetings to the heroic people of the Korean People's Democratic Republic, who are struggling for the restoration and further development of their national economy, for peace, for the national unification of Korea on democratic foundations!
11. Fraternal greetings to the heroic people of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, who are struggling for the restoration of their national economy, for peace, for the national unification of Vietnam on democratic foundations!
12. Long live the German Democratic Republic--the stronghold of the peace-loving forces of all Germany, who are struggling against the revival of militarism, for the unification of their motherland on peaceful, democratic foundations! May the friendship and cooperation between the German and Soviet peoples grow strong and develop!

13. Greetings to the peoples of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia! May the fraternal friendship and cooperation between the people of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia grow strong and prosper!

14. May the friendship and cooperation between the Soviet Union and the Republic of Finland, based on equal rights, mutual trust and respect for the peoples, grow strong and prosper!

15. The Soviet people welcome the treaty restoring an independent and democratic Austria! May the friendly relations between the peoples of Austria and the Soviet Union grow strong and develop in the interests of lasting peace in Europe!

16. Greetings to the great Indian people! May the friendship and cooperation between the peoples of the Soviet Union and India grow strong and develop in the interests of peace throughout the world!

17. Greetings to the peoples of colonial and dependent countries, struggling against imperialist oppression and for their freedom and national independence!

18. Long live friendship and cooperation among the peoples of Britain, the United States of America and the Soviet Union in their struggle to ease international tension and to ensure peaceful coexistence among states and lasting world peace!

19. May the friendship and cooperation between the peoples of the Soviet Union and those of France and Italy grow stronger in their struggle for peace, against the revival of German militarism and for collective security in Europe!

20. Greetings to the working people of the German Federal Republic, who are struggling against the forces of reaction and for peace and the security of the peoples of Europe!

21. Greetings to the Japanese people, who are struggling against a revival of militarism and for national independence and the democratic development of economic and cultural relations with all countries!

22. Long live the U.S.S.R.'s peace-loving foreign policy--a consistent policy of maintaining and consolidating peace, a policy of international cooperation and the development of economic and cultural relations with all countries!

23. Servicemen of the Soviet Army and Navy! Steadily increase your military and political knowledge, perfect your combat skill, master the latest military equipment and modern armaments!

(The remaining slogans, 24-73, were concerned with domestic affairs and were not relevant to this paper.)

1956

MAY DAY SLOGANS OF THE PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE

(Pravda and Izvestia, April 19, p. 1.)

1. Long live May Day--day of the international proletarian solidarity of working people, day of brotherhood of the workers of all countries! Up with the banner of proletarian internationalism! Proletarians of all countries, unite!
2. Fraternal greetings to all peoples struggling for peace, democracy and socialism!
3. Working people of all countries! War can and must be averted! Up with the banner of the struggle against the danger of war and for peace and cooperation between peoples!
4. Working people of all countries! Strive for reductions in armaments and armed forces! Demand the prohibition of atomic, hydrogen and other weapons of mass annihilation!
5. May the cooperation between Communists, Socialists and all progressive forces grow stronger in the struggle for peace and democracy and the independence of peoples!
6. Working people of the Soviet Union and the people's democracies! Tirelessly strengthen the great collaboration between the countries of socialism; develop and strengthen brotherly friendship between the peoples of our countries!
7. Fraternal greetings to the great Chinese people, who are successfully carrying out socialist reforms in their country! Long live the Chinese People's Republic! May the indestructible friendship and cooperation of the Soviet and Chinese peoples flourish, as a mighty factor for world peace!
8. Fraternal greetings to the working people of the people's democracies: Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Rumania, Albania and the Mongolian People's Republic, who are fighting for the further advance of their national economy and culture, for a steady rise in the well-being of the masses of the people, for peace and the building of socialism!
9. Fraternal greetings to the heroic peoples of the Korean People's Democratic Republic and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, who are struggling for the restoration and further development of their national economy, for peace, for the national unification of their countries on democratic principles!
10. Long live the German Democratic Republic--the bulwark of the peace-loving forces of all Germany, struggling against the revival of militarism and for a rapprochement between the two German states and the unification of their homeland on a peaceful, democratic basis! May the friendship and cooperation between the German and Soviet peoples strengthen and develop in the interests of peace in Europe!
11. Fraternal greetings to the people of the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, who are building socialism! Long live the indestructible friendship and cooperation between the peoples of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia!
12. Fraternal greetings to the great Indian people, fighting for the progress of their homeland, for peace in Asia and throughout the world! May the friendship and cooperation between the peoples of the Soviet Union and India strengthen and develop.

13. Long live the friendship and cooperation of the peoples of Britain, the United States of America, France and the Soviet Union in their struggle to ease international tension and to ensure the peaceful coexistence of states, collective security in Europe and a firm peace throughout the world!

14. May the friendship and cooperation between the peoples of the Soviet Union and Italy grow stronger!

15. Long live the friendship and cooperation between the Soviet Union and the Republic of Finland, based on equality of rights and mutual trust and respect for the peoples!

16. May the friendly relations between the Soviet Union and Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Iceland strengthen and develop!

17. Long live the friendship and cooperation between the peoples of the Soviet Union and neutral, independent, democratic Austria, for the sake of strengthening peace in Europe!

18. Greetings to the Japanese people, fighting against the revival of militarism and for national independence and the democratic development of their country!

19. Warm greetings to the peoples of the East who have thrown off the chains of colonial oppression, who are fighting for peace, freedom and the strengthening of their national independence!

20. Greetings to the people of colonial and dependent countries struggling against imperialist oppression and for their freedom and national independence!

21. Long live the Leninist policy of the peaceful coexistence of differing social systems--the general line of the Soviet Union's foreign policy, a policy of maintaining and strengthening peace and of developing economic and cultural ties with all countries!

22. Servicemen of the Soviet Army and Navy! Steadily increase your military and political knowledge, perfect your combat skill, master modern military equipment and armaments! Long live the valiant Soviet armed forces, crowned with the glory of their victories and standing guard over the peace and security of our motherland!

(The remaining slogans, 23-75, were concerned with domestic affairs and were not relevant to this paper.)

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THE POST-KHRUSHCHEV "COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP"
AND SOVIET YOUTH

by

Richard N. Johannes

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for a Master of Public Administration degree
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PREFACE

This study is an inquiry into the Soviet programs for the control of its young people. The Soviets profess an interest in creating the "new Soviet man" and state that the youth, if molded properly, will develop into the "new Soviet man." Three fine studies have been published on this subject: Merle Fainsod's Komsomol chapter in his book, How Russia is Ruled; Ralph Talcott Fisher, Jr.'s study of Komsomol Congresses 1918-1952 Pattern for Soviet Youth; and Allen Kasoff's The Soviet Youth Program which critically looks at Soviet efforts to mold their youth.

This paper will investigate the post-Khrushchev period of Komsomol development with emphasis on the individual political leadership, the objectives and current programs of the Komsomol, and this student's observations on the successes and failures of the Komsomol. It is hoped that the reader will find this paper not a repetition of known data, but rather a synthesis of the current available primary information in the field. Since the student does not read Russian, translations are utilized throughout. Adequate relevant information appeared to be available through these sources.

At the XXII Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) Congress, a new Program for the Communist Party was announced. The Program ended:

UNDER THE TESTED LEADERSHIP OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY, UNDER THE BANNER OF MARXISM-LENINISM, THE SOVIET PEOPLE HAVE BUILT SOCIALISM.

UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF THE PARTY, UNDER THE BANNER OF MARXISM-LENINISM, THE SOVIET PEOPLE WILL BUILD COMMUNIST SOCIETY.

THE PARTY SOLEMNLY PROCLAIMS: THE PRESENT GENERATION OF SOVIET PEOPLE WILL LIVE UNDER COMMUNISM!¹

When the current collective leadership of the CPSU ousted Nikita Khrushchev in October, 1964, this commitment became part of their problems. Though the time factor has been conspicuous by its absence from official statements, the emphasis on communist construction has remained ever present in official statements in the post-Khrushchev period.

There has been a steady increase of emphasis on ideological matters, thus causing increased conflict with the intellectuals who had obtained some degree of freedom under Khrushchev. Often closely associated with the intellectuals is that potentially volatile segment of the population -- the young people. This paper proposes to investigate the current regime's relations with the Soviet young people, particularly as reflected by the activities of the mass youth organizations -- the All-Union Leninist Communist League of Youth (often referred to as the Y.C.L. or Komsomol), the Young Pioneers, and the Octobrists.²

¹Charlotte Saikowski and Leo Gruliov (ed.), Current Soviet Policies, IV (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), p. 31.

²The Komsomol became officially the "All-Union Leninist Communist League of Youth at its Seventh Congress. It was the second name change from the original, see Ralph Talcott Fisher, Jr., Pattern for Soviet Youth (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), p. 113. "Komsomol" was derived from the first syllables of the original name -- Communist League of Youth -- Kommunisticheskii souiz molodezhi. Fisher, p. 11.

Though the "older" young people have been in some degree volatile especially with regard to the writers' trials of the 1966-1968 period,³ the larger mass of young people are seen as being apolitical by the regime.⁴ To the regime they are as unsatisfactory as the rebellious ones, perhaps more so. Speech after speech exhorts the young people to recognize the values for which their fathers have made so many sacrifices and to vigorously strive to carry on the unfinished "communist construction." At the 15th Y.C.L. Congress held in May, 1966, Brezhnev put it this way:

The farther the great days of October recede into the past and the greater the number of youths and girls entering the Communist ranks who have not experienced severe trials in life, the more responsible become the tasks of ideological upbringing.

...

It is not, of course, a matter of exactly copying today the revolutionaries of the early years of Soviet rule. Each new generation of revolutionaries solves new historical tasks and finds appropriate methods for this, its own style of struggle and life which no one else can work out for it. We should not copy the heroes of the past, but adopt the essence of their revolution-tempered characters, adopt their revolutionary passion, their deep Communist conviction and boundless devotion to the great cause of our party, their fiery romanticism and unquenchable hatred for the enemies of the revolution (applause); adopt all this and apply it to the accomplishment of the diverse tasks of communist construction that confront us today.⁵

The Party recognizes the young people are the future and their beliefs and values are a serious matter. Brezhnev at the XXIII Party Congress

³Adam Brumberg, "Preface to In Quest of Justice, Part I," Problems of Communism, XVII (July-August, 1968), p. 1-5.

⁴See Current Digest of the Soviet Press, XX (1968), No. 43, p. 9 and XXI (1969) No. 22, p. 8-9. (Hereinafter referred to as CDSP.) Also New York Times, November 17, 1967, p. 12; March 2, 1969, p. 4; and September 2, 1969, p. 49. (Hereinafter referred to as NYT.)

⁵CDSP, XVIII (1966), No. 19, p. 3. See Appendix I for a list of CPSU and Y.C.L. Congresses and dates.

stated that over half the population of the Soviet Union was under twenty-six years old; roughly speaking that would be 120 million people.⁶ What ties do those 120 million have with the Party? The Octobrists are 15 million strong,⁷ the Young Pioneers have 23 million members,⁸ and the Y.C.L. has 24 million members.⁹ Thus 52 million young people or about half the young people are committed to some degree to the present Soviet system. However, numbers alone do not indicate the true picture; membership and belief are two very different concepts. By closer analysis of the youth organizations, perhaps a better understanding of the Soviet youth can be obtained.

The Octobrists are made up of ages 7-9 and could hardly be considered a meaningful political force.¹⁰ A survey of translated Soviet Press articles from 1964 to the present finds virtually no mention of them.

The Young Pioneers, ages 10-14, constitute one of the most successful aspects of the Soviet youth work.¹¹ Practically all students belong to the Young Pioneers; it is difficult not to.¹² Sergei Pavlov, Y.C.L.

⁶Ibid., No. 13, p. 6.

⁷Ibid., XX, No. 5, p. 5. Also referred to as Little Octobrists, they were re-established in 1957 after disappearing on the eve of World War II. Allen Kassof, The Soviet Youth Program (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965), p. 20-21.

⁸CDSP, XX, No. 5, p. 5.

⁹Ibid., XXI, No. 17, p. 10.

¹⁰Kassof, p. 21.

¹¹Ibid., p. 20.

¹²Richard V. Allen (ed.), Yearbook On International Communist Affairs, 1968 (Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1969), p. 583.

First Secretary, in 1967, stated all school children belonged, but this was a generalization.¹³ Entry into the Pioneers is a ceremonial occasion, including a "solemn promise" -- a sort of loyalty oath to the Party, taken in the presence of one's schoolmates.¹⁴

The Young Pioneers are the only group that has a distinctive uniform.¹⁵ Their interests are readily adaptable to patriotic ends, i.e. hikes to museums and battlefields, parades, study of revolutionary heroes, etc. However, shortcomings do exist. In 1958 a Central Council was set up by the Y.C.L. to coordinate Young Pioneer activities nationwide; previously Young Pioneer troops had been dependent on local Y.C.L. groups.¹⁶ In 1960 the Y.C.L. decided to renovate Artek -- the showplace summer camp in the Crimea.¹⁷ These last two actions may have gone awry over the years. A Pravda article in June, 1969, discussed how Artek has become overcrowded, its activities formalized and stilted, and the Central Council has become "numbers conscious" in its summer programs.¹⁸ Turnover of Artek's staff workers has been 75 percent in the past five years; two-thirds of its unit counselors are replaced annually.¹⁹ Rather than maintaining its dynamic

¹³ For Pavlov's speech, see CDSP, XIX (1967), No. 5, p. 7. Allen, p. 583 indicates this is not true. Also statistics on school population in 1968 indicate Pavlov exaggerated. CDSP, XX, No. 43, p. 10.

¹⁴ Leonid Vladimirov, The Russians (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1968), p. 38.

¹⁵ The uniform was redesigned in 1966. CDSP, XVIII, No. 47, p. 38.

¹⁶ Ibid., XIX, No. 5, p. 34.

¹⁷ Ibid., XXI, No. 26, p. 29.

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 29-30.

¹⁹ Ibid.

qualities, its programs have ossified. Nor is this the only area of trouble in Young Pioneer activities. Y.C.L. leadership of and participation in the Young Pioneer program has been criticized for several years -- particularly in 1966.²⁰ There is little interest in working with the Pioneers and the burden of leadership has fallen on the schoolteachers.²¹ Only one sixth of the country's teachers are Y.C.L. members;²² one wonders how enthusiastically most Young Pioneers are led. After the increased attention of the Y.C.L. Central Committee was directed to the Young Pioneers, Y.C.L. interest should have improved.²³ Some indication that it has not come in spring 1968. The Y.C.L. announced the First All-Union Atheist Young Pioneer Convention would be held at Artek. Province Y.C.L. committees did such a shoddy job of picking representatives that only 50 of the 950 sent showed some knowledge of the subject and even some "believers" were sent!²⁴ The low level of political awareness of the Young Pioneers is probably the only reason the regime does not have serious problems in this age group.

Advancement to Y.C.L. membership (for ages 14-28 plus those who hold "elected" offices) is another ceremonial occasion in the Soviet youth program.²⁵ Admission standards are higher than for the Young Pioneers,

²⁰Ibid., XVIII, No. 19, p. 33 and No. 21, p. 10-11.

²¹Ibid., No. 19, p. 33. In 1967 the N. K. Krupskaya medal for teachers and workers in public education and pedagogy who achieve particular distinction in the instruction and upbringing of youth was established. Thirty medals per year were to be awarded. Ibid., XIX, No. 31, p. 28.

²²Ibid., XVIII, No. 21, p. 11.

²³Ibid., p. 10-11.

²⁴Current Abstracts of the Soviet Press, II (1969), No. 1, p. 15.

²⁵Merle Fainsod, How Russia is Ruled (Revised Ed.; Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963), p. 294.

but it is far from being exclusive.²⁶ The number of Y.C.L. members in the 14-17 year old bracket has risen in recent years,²⁷ perhaps in recognition of the fact that a Y.C.L. card is essential if one is to have any hope of getting into a higher school and remaining in it. An emigre from the Ukraine interviewed in Israel stated:

I do not believe you have one single student in the Soviet Union who is not a Comsomoletz or Comsomolka. In theory, all one needs to enter a university is good marks, not a Comsomol ticket. But in actual practice, one is not allowed to register for exams without a letter of recommendation from the Comsomol bureau. Expulsion from the Comsomol brings about instant expulsion from the University too, and vice versa.²⁸

One recent case was reported where an individual was expelled from the Y.C.L., then dropped from his last year at the institute. He went to work in a chemical plant, joined another Y.C.L. organization, and attempted to get reinstated at the institute. His past was discovered and he was promptly expelled from the Y.C.L. again.²⁹

In September, 1967, the Y.C.L. revealed "70% of the members of the Y.C.L. are under 22 years of age, including more than 30% who are under eighteen."³⁰ This also supports the contention that Y.C.L. membership during school years is essential.

²⁶Kassof, p. 20.

²⁷CDSP, XVIII, No. 21, p. 3. Y.C.L. committees are often involved in "rigging" entrance examinations, NYT, September 21, 1969, p. 13 and CDSP, XVII, No. 12, p. 32 and CDSP, XVIII, No. 29, p. 34-35.

²⁸Leo Heiman, "Ukrainian Universities: Dreams and Reality," The Ukrainian Quarterly, XXV (1969), No. 2, p. 150.

²⁹NYT, November 18, 1969, p. 18.

³⁰CDSP, XIX, No. 38, p. 32.

Having indicated that Y.C.L. membership may be less than sincerely motivated, a consideration of the tasks assigned this organization is in order. Sergei Pavlov, the then First Secretary, said at the 15th Y.C.L. Congress:

The main content of the work of the Leninist Young Communist League has been and continues to be:

- the rearing of thoroughly developed and educated young people loyal to the revolutionary ideals, to the fighting and working traditions of the Soviet people and the Communist Party; the molding of a Marxist-Leninist world outlook, of high moral qualities and of deep ideological conviction among young people;

- thorough intensification of the social and political activeness of the young generation, intensification of its practical participation in communist construction, in the development of the economy, science, and culture;

- inculcation of Soviet patriotism, of the noble feeling of friendship of the peoples of the U.S.S.R. and of readiness to defend the achievements of October and the sacred frontiers of the socialist homeland with arms in hand;

- inculcation of loyalty to internationalist duty to the working people of the world and of militant irreconcilability in the struggle against bourgeois ideology and imperialism's intrigues.³¹

The Party Central Committee (in 1968) passed a resolution commemorating the 50th Anniversary of the Y.C.L. that said basically the same thing, only in more verbose language. One of the phrases does get more explicit:

to train a generation of comprehensively developed and highly educated people, staunch and selfless fighters for the victory of communism, people capable of managing the affairs of society and the state.³²

In summary the Y.C.L. tasks are ideological indoctrination of the young people and intensification of the production efforts of the economy. In the reality of day-to-day existence, these broad tasks get specified to the point that every task that arises and every resolution that is announced includes the Y.C.L. (and usually trade unions, Soviets, etc.)

³¹Ibid., XVIII, No. 21, p. 3.

³²Ibid., XX, No. 41, p. 11.

as part of those responsible for accomplishing the task.³³ Rather than burdening down the Y.C.L., often a situation of ambiguous responsibility is created that results in many tasks merely being paid lip service or started with enthusiasm only to have interest wither away.³⁴ Herein lies part of the problem of the Y.C.L. Initially it was an elite group with highly motivating tasks -- the Civil War, the collectivization of agriculture, the early industrialization of the state. In 1936 the organization was changed to a mass organization and thereby lost much of its elite appeal.³⁵ The Great Patriotic War and the Virgin Lands program did provide some motivation for the Y.C.L. members and maintain their dedication to the Y.C.L. In recent years the tangible motivating cause has been construction of public works in the underdeveloped areas of the country. There are more than one hundred of these projects currently active.³⁶ These have a certain glamour and prestige and instill a sense of adventure, but their many associated shortcomings have tended to produce negative attitudes in the Soviet youth.

³³Here, for example, are some sample tasks: Y.C.L. "through their creative labor, will multiply even more the economic and military might of the country," CDSP, XIX, No. 1, p. 14; Y.C.L. "must expand socialist competition among public-catering workers," Ibid., XIX, No. 10, p. 10-11; Y.C.L. was expected to insure that the 1969 harvest would be excellent, Ibid., XXI, No. 24, p. 15; Y.C.L. was to help improve tourist facilities, Ibid., XXI, No. 26, p. 14; and Public Health Legislation charged Y.C.L. for observance of working conditions of adolescents, Ibid., XXII (1970), No. 1, p. 12.

³⁴Ibid., XVII, No. 15, p. 9-10; XIX, No. 5, p. 5; and XXI, No. 4, p. 13-15.

³⁵Herbert McClosky and John E. Turner, The Soviet Dictatorship (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1960), p. 268.

³⁶CDSP, XX, No. 43, p. 9.

Perhaps the most serious incident occurred in 1959 when frustration over the poor food at the Karaganda Industrial Complex project resulted in a three-day riot led by fifty of the Komsomol recruits there. The riot was finally quelled by army troops; more than one hundred were reported killed.³⁷ No recent accounts of violence have come to light, but the Soviet press has carried many reports of bad living conditions, inadequate equipment, lack of supplies, and instability in the labor force. For example; at an Irkutsk project, only one-tenth of those sent in the last seven years have remained at the project.³⁸ On the Khrebtovaya-Ust-Ilem railroad project, 937 arrived and 726 left in 1966. In the first six months of 1967, 378 arrived, 507 left.³⁹ In light of these figures, the statement that "more than 1,800,000 young men and women have worked at the country's new construction projects on Y.C.L. assignments" in the past twelve years loses some of its impressiveness.⁴⁰ It has been suggested that these Y.C.L. contingents are the modern replacement for the secret police's slave labor of the 1930's.⁴¹ Some credence for that idea comes from the reports of poor recruitment practices that have resulted in people recently released from prison being sent to the projects.⁴² The

³⁷ John Scott, "Soviet Youth Today," Bulletin (Institute for the Study of the USSR), XIV (December, 1967), p. 13. (Hereinafter the periodical will be referred to as Bulletin.)

³⁸ CDSF, XIX, No. 26, p. 21.

³⁹ S. Voronitsyn, "Review of the Month Section," Bulletin, XV (January, 1968), p. 46-47.

⁴⁰ CDSF, XX, No. 43, p. 9.

⁴¹ Scott, p. 13.

⁴² CDSF, XX, No. 9, p. 36 and No. 26, p. 21.

attitudes of some local jurisdictions have also supported this "free labor" idea. In 1969 Izvestia reported that in some areas administrators would not allow "their" students to be sent outside "their" domain. The economic manager then had a manpower reserve that he did not have to devote attention or resources to because they were from the same locality. Lack of interested guidance and poor working conditions then resulted in low productivity -- as much as five times lower than when students went out of "their" area.⁴³ Despite these problems, the Y.C.L. is committed to supporting construction projects for some time to come.⁴⁴

One last observation with regard to the summer construction projects must be made. Marina Zhuravleva, then a Y.C.L. Central Committee Secretary, in January 1967, complained that the higher school construction detachments worked productively and responsibly all summer only to return to school and be dictated to and "not allowed to take one step independently in the institute."⁴⁵ This received support from non-Party spokesmen in the months that followed.⁴⁶ This policy of dependence on students' output as summer worker, followed by the democratic centralism of the Y.C.L. organization, is not likely to develop a love for the communist way of life as practiced by the current regime. However, the essence of the criticism goes much deeper than a matter of "trust." The whole attitude

⁴³Ibid., XXI, No. 22, p. 20.

⁴⁴Ibid., XX, No. 43, p. 9.

⁴⁵Ibid., XIX, No. 2, p. 33-34.

⁴⁶Ibid., XIX, No. 3, p. 23-24 and XIX, No. 26, p. 20-21.

of the officials both in the Party and in the Y.C.L. is involved; formalism and routine approaches to all tasks are too often the general practice.

Leonid Vladimirov in The Russians wrote that Komsomolskaya Pravda conducted public opinion polls in 1960, then suppressed the results because they were so upsetting -- they indicated Komsomol activities were considered dull and yielded only "meetings, dues, and paper forms."⁴⁷ In February, 1965 an article written by a Y.C.L. Central Committee member criticized the lack of official attention to the "aspirations and concerns of the Young Communists themselves." "The Young Communists do not exist for the meetings, but the meetings for the Young Communists, for discussing their hopes and their needs." Agendas were too often "spotted with such 'urgent' questions and 'burning' issues as 'On tasks in the light of -, ' 'On the course of the fulfillment of -, ' 'On summing up the results of -, ' 'On improving -.'"⁴⁸ Participation was limited to Y.C.L. officials and representatives of the administration. Little wonder the Y.C.L. attendance figures are poor -- Tula province had 37 Y.C.L. organizations whose meetings were attended by fewer than half the membership.⁴⁹ This was not an isolated example.⁵⁰ Forms of coercion have often been employed to assure attendance. Y.C.L. cards are collected at the factory entrance and returned at the Y.C.L. meeting.⁵¹ At a plenary session of the Zhitomir City

⁴⁷Vladimirov, p. 44.

⁴⁸CDSP, XVII (1965), No. 15, p. 7-8.

⁴⁹Ibid., No. 15, p. 9.

⁵⁰Ibid., XVII, No. 15, p. 9; XVIII, No. 3, p. 29; XIX, No. 2, p. 34; and XIX, No. 48, p. 33.

⁵¹Ibid., XVII, No. 15, p. 9.

Y.C.L. Committee in 1966, the doors were locked to prevent participants from leaving.⁵²

The dissatisfaction is not limited to meetings. One public opinion poll in Smolensk indicated that students were complaining of heavy home-work loads (a complaint not peculiar to the U.S.S.R.) that left them with no interest in doing anything at all once their studies were completed. The analyst concluded "boredom and laziness" were being fostered.⁵³ Another study stated that five to nine hours a week were spent watching television for lack of anything else to do.⁵⁴ These and other polls produce the general impression that the youth have inadequate facilities to pursue their interests or to develop new interests.⁵⁵ This leads to boredom and drinking, producing eventually troublemakers or "social dropouts."

The regime has reacted by calling for better use of existing facilities and for more ideologically oriented work in the various media. Television and the theater have been criticized for not presenting more programs concerning ideological and patriotic themes.⁵⁶ The Y.C.L. in 1969 participated in a joint plenary session of the boards of the U.S.S.R. creative unions in Moscow where it was concluded that: "Taught by the

⁵²Ibid., XVIII, No. 29, p. 40.

⁵³Ibid., XVII, No. 31, p. 13.

⁵⁴Ibid., XXI, No. 22, p. 8.

⁵⁵Ibid., XVII, No. 31, p. 13; XVII, No. 46, p. 14; XX, No. 4, p. 12-13; and XXI, No. 22, p. 8-9.

⁵⁶Ibid., XVII, No. 37, p. 42; XVII, No. 46, p. 9; XVII, No. 51, p. 35-36; XIX, No. 5, p. 6; XIX, No. 34, p. 10; XIX, No. 47, p. 27; XXI, No. 13, p. 31; and XXI, No. 36, p. 17-18.

Party and following its policy on art, the writers help our people to realize the historic tasks of the building of a communist society."⁵⁷ Time and again the Y.C.L. has indicated that the proper upbringing of the "new Soviet man" requires a proper model be presented in the media.⁵⁸

The writers, particularly those published in Yunost and Novy Mir, have been accused of presenting disparaging descriptions of Soviet youth and their ideals.⁵⁹ "Bourgeois" influences are seen in the actions of youth -- the transistor radios, miniskirts, the "twist," etc.⁶⁰ In the post-Khrushchev era, both Pavlov and Tyazhelnikov have pointed out the dangers of bourgeois influences and the massive efforts the "imperialists" are putting forth in an effort to influence the Communist youth.⁶¹ The trials of Daniel and Siniavsky, followed by the underground publications -- such as Phoenix 66, and culminating in the trials of Ginsburg, Galanskov, and others demonstrated to the current regime the validity of their concern.⁶² The trials of the young writers had hardly been completed when the Czechoslovakian situation began building to a crisis. After the Czechoslovakian invasion, in remarks at the Y.C.L.'s 50th Anniversary celebration (October, 1968), Brezhnev proclaimed the wisdom of the regime's recent increased emphasis on the strengthening of patriotic internationalism,

⁵⁷ Ibid., XXI, No. 51, p. 30.

⁵⁸ Ibid., XVII, No. 10, p. 19-20; XVII, No. 48, p. 5-6; XVIII, No. 8, p. 20; XVIII, No. 19, p. 5; and XXI, No. 11, p. 15.

⁵⁹ CDSP, XVIII, No. 1, p. 9-12 and XXI, No. 36, p. 3-6.

⁶⁰ NYT, May 7, 1967, IV, p. 2; August 13, 1969, p. 13; October 26, 1968, p. 3; CDSP XX, No. 37, p. 17-18; and No. 43, p. 26.

⁶¹ CDSP, XVIII, No. 1, p. 9; XX, No. 43, p. 9; and XXI, No. 28, p. 12.

⁶² NYT, November 17, 1967. CDSP, XX, No. 22, p. 11.

ideological staunchness, and the ability to ward off all forms of bourgeois influence: "The course of events in the world in recent months has quite convincingly shown how well-founded and timely these tasks are . . ."⁶³

Two items of focus for the regime's attention regarding bourgeois influences within the Soviet Union have been the organization known as SMOG (Society of Young Geniuses) and the individuals described as stilyagi.⁶⁴ SMOG first came into prominence for its activities in demonstrations protesting the arrest and trial of Daniel and Siniavsky. These demonstrations continued until early 1968 (Ginsberg et al. trials).⁶⁵ Little has been written about the organization recently; one incident was reported in May, 1969 in Moscow concerning two Scandinavian girls who claimed to be members of an organization associated with SMOG.⁶⁶ SMOG has become known to the non-Communist world as a clandestine, dissident intellectual youth group located principally in Moscow with sections in Odessa, Leningrad, and the Urals.⁶⁷

The stilyagi are the non-conformists in dress that wear tight pants, fancy shirts, etc.⁶⁸ They have received excessive abuse from the

⁶³CDSP, XX, No. 43, p. 9.

⁶⁴Vladimirov, p. 44-45. SMOG also can represent the first letters of the Russian words for courage, youth, image, and genius. NYT, October 7, 1969, p. 4.

⁶⁵Blumberg, p. 1-5.

⁶⁶NYT, October 7, 1969, p. 4.

⁶⁷Allen, p. 593.

⁶⁸Vladimirov, p. 45.

druzhinniki, volunteer auxiliary police under Y.C.L. leadership.⁶⁹ The regime supports these Y.C.L. activists in their fight against "bourgeois" decadence; no criticism, or even mention of the druzhinniki, is seen in the Soviet press. Only general comments of militia leaders concerning their need for Y.C.L. support and cooperation are voiced.⁷⁰

The Communists do not release any meaningful figures on the problems of youth and crime, but the comments of the press and the frequency of meetings on the subject indicate there is a real problem with juvenile delinquency.⁷¹ Juvenile delinquency is highly related to the significant problem of "dropouts" from the Soviet education system.⁷² The Party was committed to universal secondary schooling by 1970, but they are still calling for Y.C.L. help in achieving this.⁷³ It is doubtful that this goal will be accomplished in the near future.

One area that has received increased emphasis in the post-Khrushchev period is that of military-patriotic upbringing. In late 1967 a new

⁶⁹ Ibid., p. 45-47; Scott, p. 13-14; and NYT, February 21, 1968, p. 2.

⁷⁰ CDSP, XIX, No. 47, p. 20.

⁷¹ Ibid., XVII, No. 5, p. 9-12; XVIII, No. 16, p. 44-45; XIX, No. 31, p. 5-6; and XXI, No. 18, p. 8-14.

⁷² Ibid., XXI, No. 40, p. 20. In 1968 the U.S.S.R. Minister of Education stated about 80% of all students finished eight year schools. That means greater than 20% "drop out." Ibid., XX, No. 11, p. 30

⁷³ Ibid., XXI, No. 18, p. 5-6. For a detailed treatment of the recent problems of the Soviet educational system, see Jeremy Azrael, "Bringing Up the Soviet Man: Dilemmas and Progress," Problems of Communism, XVII (May-June, 1968), p. 23-31.

Universal Military Service law was adopted.⁷⁴ It reduced actual active military service, but added pre-induction training which offset the liberalization of the law. The bureaucracy was not able to keep up with the change; Izvestia pointed out in September, 1967 many shortcomings in training facilities and organization of the pre-induction program.⁷⁵

The military have made many claims about the high percentages of Party and Y.C.L. members in both officer and enlisted ranks; 93 percent and 80 percent, respectively.⁷⁶ These percentages are so much higher than any of the figures for civilian classifications that it seems a great deal of pressure to join the Party or Y.C.L. must be put on people once they are in the Armed Forces. The traditional Party desire for complete control of the military is one explanation of the situation; another is that having personnel in the Y.C.L. while they are in the Armed Forces makes it easier to pressure them into "volunteering" to work on Y.C.L. construction projects or in agriculture when they leave the service.⁷⁷ Whether the people do "volunteer" upon leaving the service or not, the regime feels the more ideological training it subjects people to while in the service, the better citizens they will be in later life.

The Y.C.L. is interested in recruiting people to send to the countryside because it is there that it is the weakest. Only 8 million Y.C.L.

⁷⁴CDSP, XIX, No. 45, p. 4-10.

⁷⁵Ibid., XXI, No. 37, p. 10, 12.

⁷⁶Ibid., XVIII, No. 17, p. 13 and XXI, No. 20, p. 6.

⁷⁷Ibid., XVII, No. 27, p. 6; XVIII, No. 18, p. 18; and XIX, No. 42, p. 20.

members are in the rural areas.⁷⁸ This is only one-third of the Y.C.L. membership. Overall Soviet population percentages indicate 46.2 percent of the population are located in the rural areas.⁷⁹ At the November 1969 All-Union Congress of Collective Farmers, Tyazhelnikov (Y.C.L. First Secretary) committed the Y.C.L. to more intensive efforts in its rural work:

We promise the Party Central Committee and the Soviet government that in the very near future new thousands of Y.C.L. members will be machine operators and land-reclamation specialists and will take up the other technical professions that are so necessary to agriculture.⁸⁰ (underlining mine)

The meaning of the "promise" is not altogether clear. It is the only time in post-Khrushchev period that this writer has seen a Y.C.L. First Secretary go so far as to "promise" anything, especially something that on the surface seems so difficult to fulfill. He did hedge with regard to the time involved, but the speech on the whole seemed to convey a more concerned attitude toward rural work.⁸¹

The continuing migration to the city by the young rural worker seeking a better life exacerbates the problem of improving agriculture,⁸² (one of those "specific" tasks that has been imposed on the Y.C.L. by the

⁷⁸ Ibid., XXI, No. 48, p. 8.

⁷⁹ Warren W. Eason, "Population Changes," Prospects for Soviet Society, ed. Allen Kassof (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1968), p. 235.

⁸⁰ CDSP, XXI, No. 49, p. 11.

⁸¹ Pavlov, in 1966 when he was Y.C.L. First Secretary, had vigorously supported the idea of more machine operators, but he never "promised" anything. Ibid., XVIII, No. 21, p. 8.

⁸² Ibid., XXI, No. 33, p. 30-31.

Party⁸³). The dream of high wages and a five day work week plus the many cultural advantages readily draw the rural worker to the cities.

The five day work week has introduced further problems for the regime. Despite the subbotnik practice and other demands on the worker's time, he has leisure time he has never known before.⁸⁴ There are not enough leisure facilities and boredom has resulted. Unable to make use of this new leisure time, the worker has turned to drinking which the Party feels leads to potential criminal tendencies.⁸⁵ To make up for the lack of leisure facilities, the Party has turned to the trade unions and Y.C.L. and directed them to promote pursuit of educational opportunities after work.⁸⁶ This additional education is to raise the level of ideological and moral upbringing of the labor generation, thus the regime takes care of two problems at once. Whether the worker will participate as the regime desires remains to be seen.

What can be said of CPSU-Y.C.L. relations? The Y.C.L. officially is a "mass, non-Party" organization that is independent of the Party but acts as its faithful assistant and loyal reserve.⁸⁷ In practice, as has been indicated in this paper, the Y.C.L. is subservient to the Party. While being in the Y.C.L. does not insure Party membership, it does help. Since the XXIII Party Congress, the Y.C.L. is the only method of entry into the

⁸³Ibid., XX, No. 45, p. 14-15.

⁸⁴Ibid., XXI, No. 17, p. 24; XXI, No. 23, p. 31, and XXI, No. 48, p. 32-33.

⁸⁵Ibid., XXI, No. 40, p. 20.

⁸⁶Ibid., XXI, No. 17, p. 24 and XXI, No. 48, p. 32-33.

⁸⁷"Questions from Readers," Soviet Life, November, 1969, p. 17.

Party below age 23.⁸⁸ In 1967 the Party published statistics on the number of Y.C.L. members accepted to candidate membership in the CPSU:⁸⁹

	<u>Y.C.L.</u>		<u>Overall</u>	
1952 - 1955	605,164	out of	2,494,052	accepted
1956 - 1961	1,694,023	out of	3,557,596	accepted
1962 - 1966	1,670,546	out of	4,240,381	accepted

(More recent figures are not available.)

The article implied the Y.C.L. drop in the 1962 - 1966 period was due to a tightening of membership standards. Brezhnev indicated at the XXIII Congress that there would be tightening of standards for Party membership in the future; whether this was also to apply for membership in the Y.C.L. is unknown.⁹⁰ A drop in the growth rate of the Y.C.L. itself has occurred as shown by the following table:

<u>Date</u>	<u>Total Members</u>	<u>Growth Rate</u>
April, 1962	19,400,000	} - - - 900,000 per year - - - 333,000 per year
May, 1966	23,000,000	
April, 1969	24,000,000	

(For information on the size of the Y.C.L. through the years, see Appendix II.)

Apparently the Y.C.L. has also been trying to improve the quality of its membership. The increased emphasis on ideological matters in the Y.C.L. supports this speculation.

Y.C.L. work is considered to be one of the most dependable ladders for promotion to positions in the Party or government hierarchy.⁹¹ Perhaps the

⁸⁸ T. H. Rigby, Communist Party Membership in the U.S.S.R. 1917-1967 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), p. 321.

⁸⁹ CDSP, XIX, No. 43, p. 10, 12.

⁹⁰ Ibid., XVIII, No. 13, p. 7.

⁹¹ S. Voronitsyn, "The Present Composition of the Party Central Committee: A Brief Sociological Analysis," Bulletin, XVI (June, 1969), p. 27.

best case study is the Y.C.L. First Secretaryship. The Y.C.L. First Secretary has been identified a Category II (out of a possible three) assignment within the nomenklatura system.⁹² A typology of the First Secretary can be suggested from a study of the known biographical data of the six men who have held the office (see Appendix III for the biographies). A brief comparison is presented here for the reader's benefit:

	First Sec. <u>Komsomol</u>	CPSU <u>Member</u>	<u>Born</u>	Age in <u>Office</u>	<u>Tenure</u>	<u>Previous Yrs.</u>	
						<u>CPSU</u>	<u>Y.C.L. Work</u>
Unidentified	1918-1929						
*Kosarev	1929-1938	1919	1903	26-35	9 years	10	11
Mikhailov	1938-1952	1930	1906	32-46	14 years	8	6?
Shelepin	1952-1958	1952	1918	34-42	8 years	12	16?
Semichastny	1958-1959	1956	1924	34	5 months	14	17
Pavlov	1959-1968	1954	1929	30-39	9 years	5	18?
Tyazhelnikov	1968-Present	?	1928	40-41+	1½ years	?	?

*Kosarev was purged by Stalin in 1938.⁹³

The First Secretary works his way up through the Y.C.L., usually including one assignment in the Moscow area and a period of training as a Secretary of the All-Union Y.C.L. Central Committee before becoming First Secretary. Once "elected" (at an age of 30-34) as First Secretary, he remains in the post about 9 years. CPSU membership has been enjoyed for up to 10 years prior to being elected. The first two Secretaries had no formal higher education, but the last four have had some or full university education.⁹⁴ Many ex officio titles are associated with the First Secretaryship

⁹² Andrei Lebed, "The Soviet Administrative Elite: Selection and Deployment Procedures," Studies on the Soviet Union (New Series), V, No. 2, 1965, p. 51-52. The author credits Professor Avtorkhanov with having provided him with the "Categories." A brief description of the nomenklatura system is provided on pages 50-51.

⁹³ Fisher, p. 212-213.

⁹⁴ It is not known whether Tyazhelnikov has a university education, but it is assumed he does based on the fact that he was Rector at Chelyabinsk Pedagogic Institute.

-- Full Member of Central Committee of the CPSU, Deputy of the Supreme Soviet, and other less important titles. Upon completing the Y.C.L. First Secretary assignment, a promotion usually into Party or government work is received. Within a few years after leaving the Y.C.L. work, his career peaks, then declines to some fairly stable position in the bureaucracy (the retention in the bureaucracy is due to the nomenklatura system). Currently, Mikhailov is Chairman of the State Press Committee; Shelepin is Chairman of the All-Union Central Trade Unions Council; Semichastny is Deputy Premier of the Ukrainian Republic's Council of Ministers; and Pavlov is Chairman of the Committee for Physical Culture and Sport of the Council of Ministers which represents a promotion from Chairman, Central Council of Union of Sports Societies and Organizations, his first job after being Y.C.L. First Secretary.⁹⁵ He may still be on the way up, but because of his educational background -- Moscow Institute of Physical Training -- he probably has reached his peak.

Though little is known of Tyazhelnikov, he does appear to be a significant variation from the typology. He was forty years old when elected First Secretary and had no Y.C.L. experience for at least the ten previous years. He had been in Chelyabinsk for at least ten years and since 1964 had been merely a secretary on the Party oblast committee. His election violated the Y.C.L. Statutes since he did not belong to the All-Union Y.C.L.

⁹⁵ Pavlov's transfer was announced, CDSP, XX, No. 24, p. 27. The current assignments of the former Y.C.L. First Secretaries were obtained from the September, 1968 and September, 1969 Supplements to the September, 1968 and September, 1969 Bulletins, respectively. It is worthy of note that Shelepin was replaced as head of the KGB by Semichastny. Pavlov's post-Y.C.L. assignments indicate that the Y.C.L. is not to become a training ground for KGB leaders.

Central Committee.⁹⁶ A tenuous link to Brezhnev can be made through N. N. Rodionov, the Chelyabinsk obkom first secretary.⁹⁷ Tyazhelnikov has, to date, achieved some of the ex officio positions associated with being Y.C.L. First Secretary. In August, 1968 he was "elected" as a Deputy to the Council of Union of the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet to fill the vacancy created by the death of the Orenburg City Deputy.⁹⁸ In December he was elected as a member of the Council of Union's standing committee on youth affairs.⁹⁹ He has not been elected to the CC,CPSU, but this will probably be accomplished at the XXIV CPSU Congress (when it is finally held). He was elected as one of the 96 members of the Presidium of the All-Union Congress of Collective Farmers,¹⁰⁰ the same Congress at which he made a "promise" for the Y.C.L.¹⁰¹ It has been noted that Tyazhelnikov was responsible for the development of a "city scientific society of pupils" in Chelyabinsk which was very successful and popular with the students; however, there has been

⁹⁶Christian Duevel, "Shake-Up of the Komsomol Leadership," Radio Liberty Dispatch (June 18, 1968), p. 2.

⁹⁷Ibid., p. 6-7.

⁹⁸CDSU, XX, No. 50, p. 3.

⁹⁹Ibid., XX, No. 51, p. 8-9.

¹⁰⁰Ibid., XXI, No. 48, p. 41.

¹⁰¹Ibid., XXI, No. 49, p. 11-12.

no indication of this kind of initiative by him since he became First Secretary.¹⁰²

Tyazhelnikov has appeared as Y.C.L. leader at various official conferences, meetings, etc., dutifully providing the Soviet young people with "representation," but actually repeating the Party line and committing the Y.C.L., and Soviet youth, to the position the Party desires supported. This "role" of the Y.C.L. First Secretary as the representative of Soviet youth is but one of the many "roles" the Y.C.L. First Secretary plays in his day-to-day existence. He is the communications link between the CPSU Secretariat and the Y.C.L. Central Committee. He is chief spokesman for the Y.C.L. Central Committee and the 24 million Y.C.L. members, and to some extent the younger youth movements. He heads Soviet youth delegations to international youth conferences. He and the Y.C.L. Central Committee are also the Party's handy "whipping boys" for any shortcomings of the Y.C.L. or Soviet youth work.

The First Secretary's speeches laud the Party for its guidance,

¹⁰²Duevel, p. 5. A Y.C.L. Secretary, Torsuyev, in Fall, 1968 proposed that an alliance of schools, science, production, and the Y.C.L. be set up. It was to be called the All-Union Young People's Scientific and Technological Society (CDSP, XX, No. 34, p. 30.). But in January, 1967 Zhuravleva had proposed an All-Union Student Scientific Society be established (CDSP, XIX, No. 2, p. 34.). Therefore, it is unlikely that Tyazhelnikov was trying to repeat his Chelyabinsk success, though Torsuyev's proposal may have been a trial balloon to see if there was any support for the general concept. Nothing more has been heard about the proposal; it would have to be considered a dead issue.

occasionally asking for even more guidance (read "dictation").¹⁰³ The speeches are filled with ample amounts of criticism of various governmental agencies that are involved with young people. Criticism is also made of the work of the lower Y.C.L. bodies. Seldom does he criticize the Y.C.L. Central Committee itself. Rarely do the speeches indicate any initiative or propose new programs that have not already been proposed by the Party. Occasionally foreign affairs are referred to, especially if an international youth meeting is soon to be held. Thus the role of the First Secretary can be seen on the surface as being relatively easy in that he merely repeats the Party line as it comes down from "on high."

However, the subject of young people is so politically sensitive and so complex that the Y.C.L. First Secretaryship must be considered a very demanding assignment. To obtain the assignment some political favor appears to be required. To use the assignment as a political stepping stone requires no small degree of political dexterity and propitious timing, especially since the advantage in the constant struggle within the CPSU can easily shift to a faction that may be at odds with the latest public statement that the Y.C.L. First Secretary has made. Due to its amorphous nature, the Y.C.L. is a handy scapegoat; some shortcoming is always available for criticism. This, in turn, means the Y.C.L. leadership is always available

¹⁰³ This typology of the First Secretary's speeches is based on those of the post-Khrushchev period plus those at the CPSU Party Congresses made by the then Y.C.L. First Secretaries: Mikhailov - XIX Congress, Leo Gruliow (ed.) Current Soviet Policies (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1953), p. 147-148; Shelepin - XX Congress, Leo Gruliow (ed.) Current Soviet Policies, II (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1957), p. 144-146; Semichastny - XXI Congress, Leo Gruliow (ed.), Current Soviet Policies, III (New York: Columbia University Press, 1960), p. 87-89; Pavlov - XXII Congress, Current Soviet Policies, IV, p. 159-160; and Pavlov - XXIII Congress, CDSP, XVIII, No. 18, p. 12-13.

for criticism. Y.C.L. tasks are primarily qualitative, not quantitative. This qualitative aspect makes it very difficult to be any kind of real success as First Secretary, particularly with regard to ideological work which has been stated again and again as the Y.C.L.'s principal task.¹⁰⁴ Thus while the Y.C.L. First Secretaryship may be a valuable opportunity for an aspiring young Communist, it may well hinder his later progress. Only one real success story has had the assignment -- Shelepin.

With the election of Tyazhelnikov, who was at least six years older (age 40) than any other First Secretary at the time of election, there may be a new trend toward an older medium-grade Party official who will play a routine role and not rise much above the Y.C.L. First Secretaryship ever in his career. This speculation, however, may be premature.

The post-Khrushchev collective leadership has been subjected to many demonstrations of protest from the young people and this may have caused reappraisals of their approach to Soviet youth. Nevertheless, the regime remains committed to the Y.C.L. as the leader of Soviet youth. Various efforts have been made to support the Y.C.L. and aid it in its relations with young people. At the XXIII Party Congress the CPSU Statutes were changed to state:

Young persons up to 23 years of age inclusive may join the Party only via the Young Communist League. Y.C.L. members entering the C.P.S.U. shall submit a recommendation from a district or city Y.C.L. committee, which is equal to the recommendation of one Party member.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰⁴For example, CDSP, XVIII, No. 19, p. 3 and XX, No. 41, p. 11.

¹⁰⁵Ibid., XVIII, No. 15, p. 9.

This probably indicated the need for better ideological background in the 20 to 23 year olds and fits with the Party's tightening up of its standards.

The nationwide slogans for May Day and the Anniversary of the October Revolution provide more indications of the Party's intention to remain committed to the Y.C.L. and its work with Soviet Youth. For the Anniversary of the October Revolution in 1967, the number of slogans were reduced from over one hundred and ten to fifty-seven and the format was rearranged to de-emphasize the foreign policy aspects the slogans had become known for. The standard three slogans concerned with young people -- one about the Y.C.L., one about young men and women, and one about Young Pioneers and school children -- were promoted from the very end of the list to the middle of the list, Numbers 24, 25, and 26, respectively. The overall number of slogans has varied from fifty-two to fifty-seven since October, 1967. From May Day 1968 to the October 1969 list of slogans, the Y.C.L. slogan has been Number 15 or 16 while the other two have varied from Number 33 and 34 to Number 37 and 38. (See Appendix IV.)

Within the Y.C.L. itself, the major shakeup of the All-Union Y.C.L. Central Committee in June, 1968, including the election of a new First Secretary, may also be related to the idea of a renewed commitment to the Y.C.L.¹⁰⁶ To the disappointment of the Soviet Union's liberal elements, the Y.C.L. since June, 1968, has emphasized anew the ideological and military-patriotic themes.¹⁰⁷ The military-patriotic theme may be merely due

¹⁰⁶Ibid., XX, No. 24, p. 21 and Duevel, p. 1, 5.

¹⁰⁷CDSP, XX, No. 41, p. 10-13; XX, No. 43, p. 8, 11; and XXI, No. 46, p. 5-6.

to the new Universal Military Service Law, but it may be part of a return to the heavy industry-strong military attitudes that were associated with Stalin and with Khrushchev when he struggled with Malenkov.

Other manifestations of the Party's concern over its control of the young people were provided in October, 1968 by the CPSU's Central Committee resolution "On the 50th Anniversary of the Y.C.L. and Tasks of Communist Upbringing of Young People."¹⁰⁸ It called for the establishment of standing committees on the affairs of young people. These were to be created by all Soviets, from the U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet on down. It also proposed a higher Y.C.L. School be created. More emphasis was to be given to Party work with Y.C.L. organizations to promote the communist upbringing of the younger generation, specifically the Party and Y.C.L.

must constantly develop and guide young people's interests toward political knowledge and their desire for profound understanding of the processes of social life.¹⁰⁹

An increased number of promotions, in all phases of the Soviet society, were to be given to those Y.C.L. members who had "proven" themselves.¹¹⁰

The U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet meeting in December, 1968 "elected" a Committee on Youth Affairs in each Council. Tyazhelnikov was elected to the Council of the Union's committee and Boris Pastukhov (a Y.C.L. Central Committee Secretary) was elected to the Council of Nationalities' committee.¹¹¹

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., XX, No. 41, p. 13.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., p. 13, 11.

¹¹⁰ Ibid., p. 13.

¹¹¹ Ibid., XX, No. 51, p. 8-9.

Meetings of the Supreme Soviet committees were held in early 1969.¹¹² Lower level Soviets also established Committees on Youth Affairs.¹¹³ Apparently, the idea of the Committees was hastily conceived since the "tasks" of the Supreme Soviet Committees were not published until December, 1969.¹¹⁴

Those "promotions" to the loyal Y.C.L. members who had proven themselves came rapidly. In May, 1969 it was noted in a joint meeting of the Supreme Soviet Committees on Youth Affairs that almost 500,000 young people had been elected to local Soviets in recent elections -- this represented one-fourth of all the Deputies to the local Soviets.¹¹⁵ It also was an increase of about 150,000 Deputies over the statistics that had been quoted at the Y.C.L. 50th Anniversary celebration.¹¹⁶ That the Y.C.L. was to maintain control over these Deputies was indicated by the statement:

To unify the efforts of the young Deputies in solving major questions and to improve their leadership by city and district Y.C.L. committees, Y.C.L.-Young Deputy groups are being set up in the local Soviets.¹¹⁷

On November 1, 1969, the higher Y.C.L. School was opened. It is the first Y.C.L. higher educational institution and its stated purpose is educating its students "in the Marxist-Leninist world view."¹¹⁸

¹¹²Ibid., XXI, No. 21, p. 23-24.

¹¹³Ibid., No. 17, p. 24.

¹¹⁴Ibid., No. 52, p. 16.

¹¹⁵Ibid., No. 21, p. 23.

¹¹⁶Ibid., XX, No. 43, p. 8.

¹¹⁷Ibid., XXI, No. 21, p. 24.

¹¹⁸Ibid., No. 44, p. 27.

The only one of the Party's "proposals" for which evidence of implementation cannot be cited is the one concerning Party members' work with the Y.C.L. The extent to which Party members were not interested in Y.C.L. work was indicated in September, 1965 at a Moscow Province Party Committee plenary meeting at which the number of Party workers in Y.C.L. organizations was reported to be declining -- only 25 out of 105 secretaries of Y.C.L. organizations were Communists. Only 2.5 percent of the Communists under 30 years of age worked in the Y.C.L.¹¹⁹ Further, Brezhnev complained at the XXIII Party Congress that "of the 2,500,000 Communists under the age of 30, only about 270,000 work in the Y.C.L."¹²⁰ No reports since then have indicated that conditions have improved.

What are the effects of the increased concentration on ideology and increased attention to the affairs of young people? What is the outlook for the future?

The Communists will continue to be firmly entrenched in the U.S.S.R. With the youth movement membership added to its membership, the CPSU controls some 75 million of the 234 million population of the U.S.S.R.¹²¹ Though they are not all activists, they are in some fashion or other committed to the present regime. Rarely are they found in the ranks of the current Soviet dissenters who can be considered to represent only a small portion of the population, albeit a vocal one (though they do not get the mass media publicity that other countries give to their dissenters).¹²²

¹¹⁹ Ibid., XVII, No. 38, p. 31.

¹²⁰ Ibid., XVIII, No. 13, p. 6.

¹²¹ Ibid., XIX, No. 4, p. 33.

¹²² Ibid., XX, No. 22, p. 11.

Even the Soviet dissenters have no quarrel with the basic system, they just want it to operate the way the written laws say it should.¹²³ The Soviet press has soundly criticized the practices of foreign youth that call for destruction of the existing society, so it is apparent that they recognize the threat such practices could represent if they developed in the Soviet youth.¹²⁴ Further indication of their concern about uncontrolled youth groups comes from the articles that discuss how no youth group can exist without Communist controls of some kind.¹²⁵ Whenever one arises, it is taken over or snuffed out rapidly. As the magazine Soviet Life said in November, 1969:

There are other mass youth organizations in the Soviet Union, in the sports, the trades and professions, but there is no other mass organization like the Komsomol.¹²⁶

For the Communists it is far better to have an apolitical youth than one that questions the values of the society that the Communists have built. The new Soviet man may never be developed, but the regime appears willing to appear to compromise or make concessions rather than polarize their youth. The apolitical nature of most of the Soviet youth results in their being swept along by the inertia of the Soviet system until they finally take their place in the Soviet society. Public protest could ruin their lives and careers, as the writers and active dissidents have found out.

This does not mean the Soviet system will not change; it already has changed in many respects -- more tourism, more military personnel returning

¹²³Brumberg, p. 4.

¹²⁴CDSP, XX, No. 47, p. 17-19.

¹²⁵Ibid., XVII, No. 15, p. 9-11; and XIX, No. 36, p. 11-12.

¹²⁶"Questions from Readers," Soviet Life, November, 1969, p. 17.

from East Europe, more electronic communications forcing the regime to reveal to its people more than ever before.¹²⁷ All these contacts with the outside world cannot help but add to the pressure on the regime for the good life now. This brings up the crucial problem that the Communists have failed to answer: who is going to run the Soviet Union in 1984 and thereafter? The present Politburo of the CPSU is old and getting older -- the ages of its eleven members range from fifty-two to seventy-one.¹²⁸ The election of Tyazhelnikov can be viewed as more of the same attitude -- maintain control in the older ranks of the Party. The long term effects can only be speculated about. If Tyazhelnikov lasts nine or ten years, there can hardly be any doubt that the "generation gap" in the Y.C.L. will become quite serious. This great gulf between the Party and Y.C.L. leadership and the Soviet youth has not been overcome, nor does it appear likely that it will be in the near future.

¹²⁷Scott, p. 11.

¹²⁸"The Politburo: Possible Changes of Policy and Personnel," Bulletin, XV (May, 1968), p. 60-61.

A P P E N D I C E S

APPENDIX I

CPSU Congresses

Y.C.L. Congresses

I	March 1-3, 1898 (old style)		
II	July 17-August 10, 1903		
III	April 12-27, 1905		
IV	April 10-25, 1906		
V	April 30-May 19, 1907		
VI	July 26-August 3, 1917		
VII	March 6-8, 1918 (new style)	1st	October 29-November 4, 1918
VIII	March 18-23, 1919	2nd	October 5-8, 1919
IX	March 29-April 5, 1920	3rd	October 2-10, 1920
X	March 8-16, 1921	4th	September 21-28, 1921
XI	March 27-April 2, 1922	5th	October 11-19, 1922
XII	April 17-25, 1923		
XIII	May 23-31, 1924	6th	July 12-18, 1924
XIV	December 18-31, 1925	7th	March 11-22, 1926
XV	December 2-19, 1927	8th	May 5-16, 1928
XVI	June 26-July 13, 1930	9th	January 16-26, 1931
XVII	January 26-February 10, 1934	10th	April 10-21, 1936
XVIII	March 10-21, 1939	11th	March 29-April 8, 1949
XIX	October 5-15, 1952	12th	March 19-27, 1954
XX	February 14-25, 1956	13th	April 15-18, 1958
XXI	January 27-February 5, 1959		
XXII	October 17-31, 1961	14th	April 17-21, 1962
XXIII	March 29-April 8, 1966	15th	May 17-21, 1966

References:

Edward L. Crowley, Andrew I. Lebed, and Dr. Heinrich E. Schulz (ed.), Party and Government Officials of the Soviet Union 1917-1967 (Metuchen, N.J.: The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 1969), p. 85.

Robert Maxwell (ed.), Information U.S.S.R. (Oxford, England: Pergamon Press, Ltd., 1962), p. 259.

Donald W. Treadgold, Twentieth Century Russia, 2nd Ed. (Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 1964), p. 538.

APPENDIX II

MEMBERSHIP OF THE KOMSOMOL

October, 1918	22,100
October, 1919	96,096
October, 1920	400,000
ca. June, 1921	250,000
September, 1921	400,000
October, 1922	250,000
July, 1924	840,000
March, 1926	1,750,000
May, 1928	1,960,000
January, 1931	3,623,000
1934	4,500,000
January, 1936	3,623,000
June, 1940	10,223,000
1945	15,000,000(?)
March, 1949	9,283,289
March, 1954	18,825,327
April, 1962	19,400,000
May, 1966	23,000,000
May, 1969	24,000,000

References:

CDSF, XVIII, No. 18, p. 12-13 and XXI, No. 17, p. 10.

Ralph Talcott Fisher, Jr., Pattern for Soviet Youth (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), p. 409.

APPENDIX III

Aleksandr Vasil'evich Kosarev

- 1903 - Born, Moscow.
- 1914 - Went to work in a zinc-tin factory.
- 1918 - Joined Komsomol.
- 1918 - Went to the front as a volunteer.
- 1919 - Member All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks).
- 1920-
 - 1926 Secretary of Bauman raikom's Komsomol in Moscow, Moscow-Narvsk Raikom's Komsomol in Leningrad and Penza gubkom (Guberniia committee) Komsomol.
- 1924 - Elected delegate of the 13th Congress of the Party and was a delegate of all the subsequent All-Union Party Congresses.
- 1925 - Participated in exposure and defeat of counter-revolutionary Trotskyite-Zinovievite opposition.
- 1926 - Elected secretary of Moscow Committee's Komsomol.
- 1927 - Secretary of the Central Committee of All-Union Komsomol.
- 1927 - Elected member of Central Control Commission of the Party.
- 1929 - Elected General Secretary of the Central Committee of Leninist Komsomol.
- 1930 - Elected candidate member of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks).
- 1933 - Awarded the Order of Lenin.
- 1934 - Elected full member of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party.
- 1934 - Member of Orgbureau of Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party.

From the time of the 5th All-Union Congress of Soviets, Kosarev was a member of the Central Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R.

References:

Bol'shaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia, Moscow, Vol. 34, 1937.

Ralph T. Fisher, Jr., Pattern for Soviet Youth (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959), p. 212-213.

Edward L. Crowley, Andrew I. Lebed, Dr. Heinrich E. Schulz (ed.) Party and Government Officials of the Soviet Union 1917-1967 (Metuchen, N.J.: The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 1969).

The Soviet encyclopedia biographical data was graciously translated by K. A. Jagannathan.

APPENDIX III (Cont'd)

Nikolai Aleksandrovich Mikhailov

- 1906 - Born
- 1922 - 1932 Worked at "Serp i Molot" (Hammer and Sickle) Metallurgical Plant, Moscow.
- 1930 - Member of CPSU.
- 1932 - 1937 Was elected secretary of the Party Organ, Production Training Unit, "Hammer and Sickle," then worked as the editor of the factory's newspaper "Martenovka"; Head Press Department Proletarsky Raikom of the Party of Moscow City; as an editor of the newspaper "Dinamo."
- 1937 - Editorial Staff of newspaper "Pravda."
- 1937 - 1938 Executive Editor of "Komsomol'skaia Pravda."
- 1938 - 1952 First Secretary of the CC of Komsomol.
- 1939 - Member of the CC CPSU, Member of Orgbureau.
- 1952 - 1953 Secretary of the CC CPSU, member of the Presidium of the CC CPSU, simultaneously Head, Department of Propaganda and Agitation, CC CPSU.
- 1953 - Not elected to post-Stalin Presidium.
- 1953 - 1954 First Secretary of Moscow Obkom of the CPSU.
- 1954 - 1955 U.S.S.R. Ambassador to the Polish People's Republic.
- 1955 - 1969 Council member, Interparliamentary Union.
- 1955 - 1960 Minister of Culture of the U.S.S.R.
- 1960 - 1963 U.S.S.R. Ambassador to the Republic of Indonesia.
- 1965 - 1969 Chairman of the Committee for Press attached to the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R.
- 1966 - Awarded the Order of Lenin.

Deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. of 1946, 1950, 1954, 1958, and 1966 convocations.

Incomplete higher education.

References;

Prominent Personalities in the U.S.S.R. (Metuchen, N.J.: The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 1968), p. 408.

Supplement to the Bulletin (Institute for the Study of the U.S.S.R.), XVI (September, 1969).

APPENDIX III (Cont'd)

Aleksandr Nikolaevich Shelepin

- 1918 - Born in Voronezh
- 1936 - 1939 Took part in purges, then Secretary Komsomol Organ, Moscow Institute of History, Philosophy and Literature.
- 1939 - 1940 Political Officer, then squadron commander in Soviet Army on Finnish Front.
- 1940 - Member, CP.
- 1940 - 1943 Instructor, then Secretary and Head, Department of Propaganda and Agitation, Moscow City Committee All-Union Komsomol.
- 1941 - Graduated Moscow Institute of History, Philosophy and Literature.
- 1943 - 1952 Secretary, then Second Secretary CC, All-Union Komsomol.
- 1945 - 1953 Member, All-Union Committee for Physical Training and Sport, U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers.
- 1951 - Deputy RSFSR Supreme Soviet of 1951 Convocation.
- 1952 - 1958 First Secretary, CC, All-Union Komsomol.
- 1952 - Member, CC, CPSU.
- 1954 - Deputy U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet of 1954 Convocation.
- 1954 - Directed mobilization of 350,000 Komsomol members for development of virgin lands.
- 1954 - Member Commission for Foreign Affairs, Soviet of Nationalities of 1954 Convocation.
- 1956 - Supervised mobilization of 300,000 youths and girls for "building Communism" in Siberia, northern U.S.S.R. and Far East.
- 1956 - CPSU Congress, and member, Commission for Examining Amendments and Additions to the 1956 CPSU Congress Draft Directive on the 6th Five-Year Plan for Development of U.S.S.R. Economy.
- 1957 - Organized dispatch of 650,000 Komsomol secondary school leavers to work in stock-raising; initiated "voluntary" monetary contributions by Komsomol members for benefit of state (3,000 million rubles for 40th Anniversary of Oct. Revolution; 5,000 million rubles for 13th All-Union Komsomol Congress) as well as militarization of Komsomol and enlistment of all Komsomol members for DOSAAF Activities.
- 1958 - Department head, CC, CPSU.
- 1958 - 1961 Chairman, Committee for State Security, U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers.
- 1958 - Member, Central Commission for Elections to U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet.
- 1958 - Deputy U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet of 1958 Convocation.
- 1959 - Member, CC, CPSU, and U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet delegation to Peking for 10th Anniversary of Chinese Peoples' Republic.
- 1961 - 1967 Secretary, CC, CPSU.
- 1962 - 1965 Deputy Chairman U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers.
- 1962 - 1965 Chairman, Committee for Party and State Control, CC, CPSU, and U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers.
- 1962 - Headed CPSU delegation to Hungary.
- 1962 - Deputy U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet of 1962 Convocation.

APPENDIX III (Cont'd)

Aleksandr Nikolaevich Shelepin (Cont'd)

- 1964 - 1966 Presidium member CC, CPSU.
- 1965 - Headed CPSU delegation to Mongolia and North Korea.
- 1966 - Headed Soviet delegation to North Vietnam and CPSU delegation to Mongolia.
- 1966 - Deputy U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet of 1966 Convocation.
- 1966 - Politbureau member, CC, CPSU.
- 1967 - Deputy, RSFSR Supreme Soviet of 1967 Convocation.
- 1967 - 1969 Chairman, All-Union Central Trade Union Council.

Member, Constitutional Commission.

Awards: Two Orders of Lenin; Two Orders of Red Star.

References:

Prominent Personalities in the U.S.S.R. (Metuchen, N.J.: The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 1968), p. 561.

Supplement to the Bulletin (Institute for the Study of the U.S.S.R.) XVI (September, 1969).

APPENDIX III (Cont'd)

Vladimir Yefimovich Semichastny

- 1924 - Born
- 1941 - 1942 Studied at Kemerovo Chemical Technological Institute.
- 1941 - 1959 Executive Komsomol posts.
- 1944 - Member, CP.
- 1945 - 1946 Second, Then First Secretary Donets Oblast Committee Ukrainian Komsomol.
- 1946 - 1950 Secretary, then First Secretary, CC, Ukrainian Komsomol.
- 1949 - 1952 Member and Candidate Member, Orgbureau, CC, CP Ukraine.
- 1950 - 1958 Secretary All-Union Komsomol.
- 1951 - Deputy Ukrainian Supreme Soviet of 1951 Convocation.
- 1955 - Deputy RSFSR Supreme Soviet of 1955 Convocation.
- 1956 - 1964 Candidate Member, CC, CPSU.
- 1958 - Deputy U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet of 1958 Convocation.
- 1958 - 1959 First Secretary CC, All-Union Komsomol.
- 1958 - Member of Commission for Foreign Affairs, Soviet of the Union of 1958 Convocation.
- 1958 - Headed All-Union Komsomol delegation at 6th Yugoslav Nar. Youth Congress.
- 1959 - Head, Party Organs Dept. for Union Republics, CC, CPSU.
- 1959 - Elected Honorary Member, All-Union Komsomol*
- 1959 - Voting Delegate at 1959 CPSU Congress.
- 1959 - 1961 Second Secretary and Bureau Member CC, CP Azerbaijan.
- 1961 - 1967 Chairman, Committee of State Security, U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers.
- 1962 - Deputy U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet of 1962 Convocation.
- 1964 - Member CC, CPSU.
- 1966 - Deputy U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet of 1966 Convocation.
- 1966 - Delegate at 1966 CPSU Congress.
- 1967 - First Deputy, Ukraine Chairman of Council of Ministers.

Committee member, U.S.S.R. Parliamentary Group; member, Constitution Commission.

Awards: Order of Lenin; Order of Red Banner of Labor.

*The only First Secretary to be elected as an honorary member of Y.C.L. He was elected after he left the Y.C.L.

References:

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Supplement to the Bulletin (Institute for the Study of the U.S.S.R.) XVI (September, 1969).

APPENDIX III (Cont'd)

Sergey Pavlovich Pavlov

- 1929 - Born
- 1941 - Head Librarian (no information as to where).
- 1944 - 1945 Worked in Military Hospital.
- 1949 - Graduated agricultural mechanization technicum.
- 1950 - 1952 Studied at Moscow Institute of Physical Training.
- 1952 - 1955 Secretary Krasnogvardeysky Rayon All-Union Komsomol Committee, Moscow.
- 1954 - Member CP.
- 1955 - Department Head, Moscow City All-Union Komsomol Committee.
- 1955 - 1956 Secretary, Moscow City All-Union Komsomol Committee.
- 1956 - 1957 Second Secretary, Moscow City All-Union Komsomol Committee.
- 1957 - 1958 First Secretary, Moscow City All-Union Komsomol Committee.
- 1958 - 1959 Second Secretary, CC, All-Union Komsomol.
- 1959 - Deputy RSFSR Supreme Soviet of 1959 Convocation.
- 1959 - 1968 First Secretary CC, All-Union Komsomol.
- 1959 - Headed Soviet delegation to Youth Festival, Vienna.
- 1960 - Member, Soviet Youth delegation to Guinea.
- 1960 - Medal "For Valiant Labor."
- 1961 - Headed All-Union Komsomol delegation to Cuba, member of CC, CPSU.
- 1962 - Deputy U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet of 1962 Convocation.
- 1962 - Member Foreign Affairs Commission, Soviet of the Union of 1962 Convocation.
- 1962 - Headed Soviet delegation to Youth Festival, Helsinki.
- 1962 - Member, U.S.S.R. Party and government delegation to Bulgaria.
- 1963 - Headed All-Union Komsomol delegation at Congress of East German youth organizations.
- 1964 - Headed Soviet Youth delegation to Italy.
- 1966 - Deputy U.S.S.R. Supreme Soviet of 1966 Convocation.

June, 1968 - Chairman, Central Council of Union of Sports Societies and Organization.

November, 1968 - Chairman of the Committee for Physical Culture and Sport of the Council of Ministers.

Awards: Medal "For Valiant Labor," 1960.

References:

Prominent Personalities in the U.S.S.R. (Metuchen, N.J.: The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 1968), p. 473.

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APPENDIX III (Cont'd)

Yevgeny M. Tyazhelnikov

1928 - Born

1958?-1964?

Secretary of the Party bureau of the Chelyabinsk Pedagogic Institute.

1958?-1961?

Taught history at Chelyabinsk Pedagogic Institute.

1961 - 1964

Rector of Chelyabinsk Pedagogic Institute.

1964 - 1968

Secretary of Communist Party Committee in Chelyabinsk Province.

1968 - Present

First Secretary of Komsomol.

Dec. 1968 -

Supreme Soviet Deputy, "elected" in August.

References:

New York Times, June 13, 1968, p. 7.Christian Duevel, "Shake-up of the Komsomol Leadership," Radio Liberty Dispatch (June 18, 1968).CDSF, XX, No. 51, p. 8-9.

The dates with question marks may be the correct ones, but no definite dates can be established.

APPENDIX IV

SLOGANS

Date	YCL!	Young Men and Women!	Young Pioneers and School Children!	Total Number of Slogans	Reference: <u>Current Digest</u> of the <u>Soviet Press</u>
May Day, 1964	100	101	102*	109	XVI, No. 15, p. 14-16.
Oct. Rev., 1964	101	102	103*	110	XVI, No. 41, p. 7-8.
May Day, 1965	104	105	106*	113	XVII, No. 16, p. 3-5.
Oct. Rev., 1965	103	104	105*	112	XVII, No. 43, p. 3-5.
May Day, 1966	103	104	105	111	XVIII, No. 15, p. 21-23.
Oct. Rev., 1966	100	101	102	108	XVIII, No. 42, p. 7-9.
May Day, 1967	98	99	100	106	XIX, No. 16, p. 12-14.
Oct. Rev., 1967	24	25	26	57	XIX, No. 41, p. 3-4.
May Day, 1968	15	33	34	52	XX, No. 16, p. 10-11.
Oct. Rev., 1968	16**	35	36	55	XX, No. 41, p. 13.
May Day, 1969	16	37	38	57	XXI, No. 16, p. 9-10.
Oct. Rev., 1969	15	35	36	57	XXI, No. 42, p. 10.

*The next slogan referred to "Communists and Y.C.L. members!"
The Y.C.L. reference was dropped in May Day Slogans for 1966 and never reappeared.

**Number 17 was a one time slogan on the subject of Y.C.L.'s
Jubilee Year (50th Anniversary).

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